Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, February 12, 1977, 2315Z

32724. London for Schaufele and Seitz only. Subject: The Secretary’s Meeting With Ambassador Botha. Cape Town for Ambassador Only.

1. Summary. Botha called on Secretary Vance February 12. In repeating the Prime Minister’s message as passed both to Assistant Secretary Schaufele and Ambassador Bowdler,² Botha emphasized the South African belief that Smith is now irrevocably committed to majority rule. The Rhodesians know the Five Points³ are no longer negotiable, and, in a similar vein, the internal solution is also in question. Maintaining the momentum of the negotiations, Botha argued, is vital and he called for an early high level meeting which would include representatives of the United States, South Africa and Britain. The Secretary did not close the door to a high level meeting, but said he preferred discussions at the level of Assistant Secretary to begin on February 16 to define specific proposals which would lead to a settlement. End summary.

2. In his call on the Secretary, the South African Ambassador said that his Prime Minister had had little contact with Smith since September 1976. Vorster decided that it was time to review the bidding. Without being specific, Botha said a number of factors had emerged which led the Rhodesians to realize they were at the end of their road. He repeated his Prime Minister’s message that the Rhodesians are irrevocably committed to majority rule in two years or less and are prepared to set up an interim government. Smith is willing to overcome procedural obstacles and a new initiative is possible if managed correctly.

3. Elaborating on the point of irreversibility, Botha said that, in Vorster’s view, the Kissinger proposals had foundered because of deep African suspicion that Smith was not sincere in his commitment to majority rule. If irreversibility can be proved beyond question, the South Africans hope that African suspicions will subside and a settlement will be reached. While the South Africans have misinterpreted Smith in the past, they are convinced that not only Smith, but his principal collaborators, have undergone a “change of heart.”

4. In order to take advantage of the change in Salisbury’s mood, and to avoid a further escalation of emotions (Botha cited the recent killing of Catholic missionaries), Britain, the United States and South Africa had to meet quickly at a high level and decide basic objectives and work out ways to reach a settlement which will be so reasonable that the Africans cannot reject it. The objective which South Africa seeks is one of putting itself in a position where it can guarantee irreversibility. Botha said that he realized how tight the Secretary’s schedule is and suggested that a meeting could take place between the Prime Minister, Assistant Secretary Schaufele and the British.⁴

5. The Secretary agreed that a clear definition of the negotiating process was required and it was in all of our interests to avoid proposals which would lead to further, fruitless discussion. Nevertheless, and while not closing the door to a later meeting at higher levels, the Secretary said he preferred an initial exchange at the level of Assistant Secretary to discuss details and an agenda. In the final analysis, Smith’s sincerity can only be tested on the basis of the firm and realistic proposals. It is in all of our interests to prepare these proposals carefully. A high level meeting would create expectations. The Secretary agreed we should move forward quickly and recommended that Botha meet Assistant Secretary Schaufele on February 16. With respect to the British, they might participate and send a representative from the Foreign Office. Botha agreed in principle but did not leave the impression the South Africans have clearly defined proposals in mind.

6. The Secretary raised with Botha Smith’s statement of February 10 after his return to Salisbury.⁵ Botha urged that we not take the Smith statement seriously. It was, in fact, a “breech of faith” and did not, in his government’s judgment, represent Smith’s real views. The Secretary reminded Botha that Smith had all too frequently made unhelpful statements and that these statements contributed to the atmosphere of suspicion.

7. The Secretary asked whether Smith realized the internal option will not work. Botha said he could not answer the question categorically. Vorster had told Smith the Five Points were no longer “fashionable” and said the Rhodesians realize that, in effect, the Five Points are dead. Botha continued, somewhat ambiguously, to some extent, their realization includes the internal option, for if the Five Points are not “fashionable” nor could an internal option based on the Five Points work.

8. With regard to the question of who would represent Rhodesian Africans in the negotiations, Botha said that Vorster felt one of the reasons Geneva failed was the division among African parties. Nkomo and Mugabe may have the guns, but Muzorewa has the votes. It is important, he said, to bring together a negotiating team which speaks for black Rhodesians. A divided Nationalist side can only produce claims and counter-claims which serve each group’s interests and complicate a settlement. The Secretary replied that it would be impossible to reach a settlement if Nkomo and Mugabe were excluded. Botha said that Muzorewa could not be excluded either, but did not say how the South Africans plan to address the issue of African representation.

9. In closing, the Ambassador discussed his government’s view that Machel is committed to a peaceful settlement and is joined in this respect by Khama and Kaunda. He warned that Nyerere’s views change frequently and he is more interested in avoiding black conflict than in achieving peace. Nevertheless, it is Vorster’s opinion that if the Africans realize how committed Smith is to majority rule in a reasonable period, a settlement can be obtained.

10. We have informed the British of the Secretary’s discussion with Botha and of our intention to discuss specific steps with Botha on February 16. The British Embassy reports that Crosland will review the Rhodesian situation the morning of February 14; the question of who will represent the British will not be decided until then.

11. Comment. It was not clear from Botha’s presentation what the South Africans have in mind. Botha gave no indication that the South Africans have detailed proposals to discuss. He left us with the impression that the South Africans are more interested in an approach which will hook Smith. They may have in mind coming to agreement with us on general principles and an approach which would force Smith to draft his own terms of settlement.

Vance

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Wisner; cleared by Seelye and Tarnoff and in S/S; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Cape Town.
2. In telegram 2436 from London, February 12, the Embassy transmitted a synopsis of Vorster’s message. (Ibid.)
3. See Tab 1, Document 264.
4. In telegram 2630 from London, February 14, the Embassy reported that the British Government was not prepared to engage in trilateral talks on Rhodesia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77)
5. In a February 11 memorandum to Carter, Vance mentioned that Smith’s statement reaffirmed his previous negotiating position and his intention to proceed with the “internal option.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77)