Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

13. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 3, 1977

SUBJECT

• Meeting with UNITA Secretary of Information

PARTICIPANTS

• • Angola (UNITA)
  • Jeremias Chitunda, UNITA Secretary of Information
• • US
  • William Swing, AF/C Alternate Director
  • Marianne Spiegel, S/P
  • Thomas Doubleday, AF/C Angolan Desk Officer

In opening the conversation, Mr. Swing stated that the Administration, in line with its policy of openness, attached importance to listening to all points of view, especially as regards countries such as Angola with which we have no relations. Swing also underscored Congressional prohibitions on assistance to any group or faction in Angola. This said, it was useful to have this occasion to obtain an assessment of the situation in Angola given the constraints on information available to us from Angola.

Mr. Chitunda said that the hostilities in Angola were continuing to increase, especially in the Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa) region. The Cuban presence, he said, now numbers 24,000, including about 4,000 who arrived shortly after the unsuccessful revolt of May 27, and UNITA expects that the total may reach 50,000. Asked for the basis of this prediction, Chitunda replied that the conditions were similar to that phase of the Vietnam war when the US was being sucked into a deepening involvement and felt compelled to commit ever great numbers of troops.

Chitunda observed that despite UNITA’s string of victories over the past year and a half and the fact that more than half of Angola is under its control, the Angolan conflict will never be settled until a political solution is found. A total military victory, he said, is not feasible and even if it were, it would only increase the suffering in Angola. In the end, a political settlement must be worked out between MPLA and UNITA. The MPLA is a minority, and any government by a minority, white or black, cannot be condoned. At the same time, UNITA realizes it cannot govern Angola without the MPLA, since Luanda and other areas are traditional MPLA strongholds. The MPLA are not UNITA’s principal enemy, Chitunda said; after all, they are Angolans too. He specified that UNITA would deal with MPLA as an organization, not simply with individual MPLA members. He added that a settlement must include FNLA as well, because, even though it may have become ineffective militarily, it still has a popular base of political support.

However, such a political solution is not possible at present, Chitunda continued, because the Cuban presence has internationalized the problem. Withdrawal of Cuban troops is a prerequisite to a settlement. The international community has the responsibility to take steps to bring this about, since the moral and political support of the international community is the critical factor enabling the Cuban presence to continue. More specifically, this support comes from the West, and especially the U.S., which is following an “ambiguous” policy, and, through Ambassador Young, issuing public statements in support of the Cubans. Mrs. Spiegel asked why Chitunda seemed to be more critical of the US than of the Western Europeans, who have recognized the MPLA government, whereas the US has not. Chitunda replied that recognition by the Europeans took place last year, whereas he was referring to current conditions; and that what he had in mind was a country’s overall attitude, which, in the case of the US, was not favorable to UNITA, as shown by Ambassador Young’s remarks. In the case of Portugal, he said, although the Soares and Neto governments are developing closer relations, there is still sympathy for UNITA within the Portuguese government—although not on the part of such as Manuel Alegre—along with a desire to encourage a reconciliation.

Mr. Doubleday, referring to Chitunda’s statement that a Cuban withdrawal was a prerequisite for negotiations, asked whether a Cuban withdrawal and UNITA–MPLA talks might possibly proceed along parallel tracks, rather than all Cuban troops having to be out of Angola before talks could ever begin. Chitunda replied that, once the Cubans had decided to leave and had begun the process of doing so, “even though their bags might not be completely packed,” he could conceive of UNITA agreeing to begin talks. (Comment: Later in the conversation, he appeared to return to the standard UNITA hard line, so that it was not clear exactly how flexible UNITA might be. He was obviously instructed to present the line, and was not prepared for the question.)

Swing asked whether the Cubans were more active or less so now. Chitunda said that the Cuban military stick primarily to the cities. The Cubans are well uniformed, whereas the MPLA are ill-clad and barefoot for the most part. MPLA suffering is considerable and they are increasingly resentful toward the Cubans. Although Cuban troops, by UNITA’s calculations, number 24,000 and the MPLA only 30,000—almost the same strength—the casualty rate is 90 MPLA to 1 Cuban. Increasingly, the Cubans are spreading out into the provincial capitals and are to be found in administrative and social services as well as security and other para-military functions.

Chitunda observed that the MPLA had suffered a severe blow in the loss of over 20 of its senior people in the May 27 uprising, either because they were killed in the fighting or were implicated in the plot. He added that the Cubans would clearly have to take on greater responsibility. Some 400 Algerians, including a sizeable number of pilots, are also in Angola. Asked whether UNITA had captured any Algerians, Chitunda replied in the negative. Asked what other African nationals were serving in support of the MPLA, he responded that there were about 500 Nigerians, 300 Congolese, and some from Guinea (Conakry) and Mozambique.

Asked for his assessment of the Shaban border situation, Chitunda replied that he expected the Katangan gendarmes soon to launch a guerrilla (not conventional, like last spring) attack against Shaba. UNITA has two battalions in the Shaba border area and is preparing to fight the Katangans, who UNITA considers to be the enemy because of the Katangans’ past attacks on UNITA in support of the MPLA. UNITA will hit the Katangans “just as hard” as they do the MPLA. UNITA’s combat against the Katangans has not yet begun, however, because the UNITA forces in that area are still being organized and equipped. Asked about possible assistance to UNITA by Mobutu, Chitunda replied to the effect that if (in return for UNITA’s attacks against the Katangans, UNITA’s enemy) Mobutu were to provide aid to UNITA, UNITA would certainly not object. Asked about reports of 200,000 refugees from Shaba in Angola, Chitunda expressed doubt that the number was that high, although a large number of refugees is to be expected, because of Mobutu’s negative attitude toward the Shabans.

In reply to a question, Chitunda stated that at the UNITA Congress last March, it was decided not to have any further collaboration with FNLA in the struggle against MPLA, and that this decision still held. He noted the “enormous decline” of support for FNLA in Kinshasa.

Swing raised the question of UNITA’s current relations with FLEC. Chitunda recounted that several months ago there had been some unofficial, exploratory meetings between the two. The question of collaboration with FLEC is “delicate and complex” for UNITA, however, as the problem of territorial integrity is thereby posed. Cabinda’s importance at present lies in its oil reserves. At current pumping rates, however, these will last no longer than 15–20 years. Angola’s long-term economic future depends upon development of foreign trade and investment. There will have to be a meeting of minds on priorities if UNITA/FLEC cooperation is to come about.

Chitunda said that he had been in Angola most recently from February until July 7. This included participation in UNITA’s Congress March 23–28. He had walked some 3800 kilometers around southern Angola and had felt completely secure. MPLA forces simply were not to be encountered. Chitunda said that he had read the Dash articles in The Washington Post and found them generally accurate.²

Mrs. Spiegel queried Chitunda about UNITA’s apparent inability to take the cities, especially in the south. He replied that (a) UNITA had only withdrawn from most of these a year ago; (b) they lacked the necessary military hardware and equipment; and (c) the Cubans are good soldiers and are strongest in the cities. Chitunda went on, however, to point out that UNITA controlled the breadbasket area of Angola. In reply to a question, he said that UNITA forces are still in control of the several small southern towns they have captured in recent months, such as Cuangar and Calai.

UNITA has forbidden the circulation in its territory of the kwanza, the Luanda regime’s monetary unit, permitting the use only of the Portuguese escudo. UNITA is capturing as many kwanzas as it can, as many as 3 million per month, and withdrawing them from circulation. After it has accumulated a large amount, it plans to dump the currency back on the market as part of its strategy of sabotaging the economy of the MPLA-controlled area.

Chitunda said he would be staying in Washington a few more days before leaving for Africa via Europe.

Comment: UNITA had told our Embassy in Kinshasa that Chitunda was coming to Washington to discuss UNITA’s written request, submitted through the Embassy, for US aid, including arms, money, medicine, and radios. However, perhaps because it was made clear at the beginning of the conversation that existing legislation prohibited such aid, he did not raise the matter. His emphasis was on the political factor, on US policy as it relates to the Cuban presence.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 2, Angola: 1977–1978. Confidential. Drafted by Swing and Doubleday on October 7; cleared by Spiegel.
2. See footnote 3, Document 12.