12. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for Emerson Brown of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State1

SUBJECT

  • PERSPECTIVES—Cuban/Soviet Presence in Angola

1. Cuban intervention in Angola succeeded in allowing Fidel Castro again to pose as a leader of “international revolution”, enhanced his image as a leader in parts of the Third World, gave him renewed international attention, and served to reinforce his contention that Communist and Third World countries are continuing to gain advantage over the West. The use of the Cubans as surrogates allowed the Soviets to retain a relatively low profile, offsetting possible African fears of neo-colonialism, while they extended their military capability and political influence over a significant part of Africa. The strategic location of Angola on borders of both black-ruled and white-ruled countries gives the Soviets an unusual opportunity to exert influence in this area, particularly in relation to the debate and struggle over the future of Rhodesia and Namibia, and the ultimate problem of South Africa.

2. It is estimated that there are 18,000 or more Cubans in Angola, and there have been recent reports citing a growing Angolan unhappiness with this presence. Angolans have referred to the Cubans as arrogant “new colonialists” who tread on African sensibilities, who together with the Soviets monopolize what few luxuries are available in the country, and who contribute little or nothing to the economic progress or internal security of the country.2

3. With the objective of dispelling the aura surrounding the Cuban/Soviet presence in Angola, and of discouraging its spread elsewhere in Africa, we propose to expose Angolan displeasure with the Cuban [Page 20] presence, and to discourage the continuation of that presence, through the use of our international covert action infrastructure. In general terms, we intend to influence the propaganda content of certain foreign radio broadcasts to parts of Africa; conduct related propaganda and political influence operations elsewhere in Africa, and use the infrastructure for propaganda outside of Africa, particularly in Western Europe and Latin America.

4. The following themes, to be used in selective tasking of the infrastructure, are submitted for State Department approval:3

a. Stress that the Cubans and Soviets in Angola are the new breed of colonials who have become arrogant and have continually ignored African sensibilities, and have monopolized those few luxuries that exist in the country.

b. Cite instances of frictions created between Angolans and Cubans as a result of Cuban attitudes and actions. These include Angolan charges that the Cubans enjoy conspicuously high standards of living while Angolans experience severe shortages of food and other basic necessities, that Cuban technicians were inadequately trained, that “administrators” know little about administration, and that Cubans confine themselves to garrison towns and do little in pursuit of the enemy.

c. Encourage moderate African leaders to express concern about Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola as a threat to the territorial integrity of African states.

d. Exploit continuing criticism made by the People’s Republic of China of Cuban/Soviet presence in Angola and domination of the Angolan government.

e. Question Castro’s requests for foreign aid from other governments, and the wisdom of such aid being granted while he is spending so much on continued deployment of troops and equipment in Angola.

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f. Call attention to the critical attitude of some Latin American governments toward Cuban foreign adventures, and to beliefs of some Latin American leaders that Cuba cannot expect to assume a position of being a worldwide “revolutionary leader” through continued presence in Angola, and at the same time retain its respectability in Latin America.

g. Emphasize that Angola is far removed from Cuba and well beyond reasonable limits of Cuban security interests. Stress that the presence of Cubans in Angola serves to undermine Cuba’s apparent wish to improve relations with the US and other non-Communist nations.

h. Cite the need for negotiated political settlement for majority rule in Rhodesia and self-determination for Namibia. Settlement of these issues would negate major pretexts that the Cubans and Soviets have used for their presence in Angola.

i. Stress that the Cuban involvement in Angola prolongs a bloody, internecine war, pitting black against black.

  1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files A–E, Box 25, Angola 11 July 1977–18 April 1978. Secret.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 4.
  3. On August 2 the Department responded: “We agree that the Angola government and its Cuban allies appear to be in an increasingly difficult situation, however, we are reluctant to agree that USG covert propaganda in an effort to publicize this situation would be useful to us for the following reasons: 1. We are attempting to normalize relations with Angola and Cuba and a covert propaganda campaign would work against that policy. 2. Moderate and friendly African governments are very aware of the situation in Angola and are already accusing us of failing to block Soviet-Cuban aggression and urging us to take action. Covert propaganda directed towards these governments would be preaching to the converted. 3. ‘Radical’ and ‘progressive’ governments are becoming increasingly aware of the situation. Savimbi of UNITA is attempting to obtain publicity (witness the Washington Post reporter who just returned from seven months in the bush and who will be publishing a series of articles in August). The situation is becoming increasingly embarrassing for the Angolans and the Cubans and any involvement on our part raises the risk of compromising the bona fides of the information now surfacing.” Leon Dash wrote a series of seven articles published in the Washington Post August 8–13.