105. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State1

414. Dept also please pass to White House and USUN. Subject: Namibia: Talk With Prime Minister Botha. Ref: (A) State 48936;2 (B) Helman/Edmondson KY–70 telecon3.

1. S–entire text.

2. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha received me at his residence from 0715 to 0725 local this morning (March 1) just prior to his 0730 departure for a flight to Windhoek where he and Foreign Minister Pik Botha will consult with the “Constituent Assembly” about the implications of Secretary Waldheim’s February 26 report to the Security Council on Namibia.

3. I conveyed to him the information in ref (A), but he was obviously not impressed. When I said that we believed South Africa’s concern regarding SWAPO camps in Angola and Zambia will be satisfactorily met, he interrupted to say he did not agree. Although I put strong oral emphasis on the phrase “the full range of its (the U.S. Government’s) existing intelligence capabilities,” the Prime Minister did not respond to that point in particular nor did he ask any questions about it. He simply said, at the end of my presentation, “But what about the camps inside South West Africa? You are addressing the wrong issue.” He then went on to claim that the Western Five had “left South Africa in the lurch” by going along with something new that was never in the [Page 280] agreement; there had never been a provision for SWAPO camps to be established in South West Africa.

4. I made some of the points that the Five had previously made with Fourie, but the Prime Minister was not interested and replied instead that South Africa had been deceived by the UN. He hinted (as Pik Botha and Fourie had done earlier) at some kind of underhanded dealings at the UN, or by the UN. I said I had already heard these general allegations but did not know what he was referring to. “Then, you had better check,” he said. I replied that the only thing I knew of were reports that had circulated concerning some of SWAPO’s most extreme original demands, but that any examination of these demands would show that SWAPO had not won any of them. At this point he only repeated his hint about deceitful action by unspecified parties and suggested that President Carter would be concerned if he knew what was going on behind the scenes. I said I would faithfully report his views and any specific information he wished to convey but I did not comprehend the real nature of the charges he was making.

5. After a solemn, dramatic statement that “a representative of the United States should be ashamed,” Botha said that I should report his view that (a) the Western Five have “left South Africa in the lurch,” and (b) the UN Secretary General and the Western Five are more interested in pleasing the Frontline African States and SWAPO than in cooperating with South Africa.” I responded “with all due respect” that this was not true, that neither the Western Five, nor as far as I could tell, the UN, favored one party over another in the long process of negotiations that had gone on; we were all trying very hard to find a workable solution, not the ideal of any one party or group. He reminded me that he had told Secretary Vance that he would not sacrifice stability to win international acceptability. I said we were aware of and respected his position but sincerely believed that the settlement procedures outlined by the Secretary General were workable ones that required no such sacrifice.

6. The Prime Minister asked if I was aware of Sam Nujoma’s latest speech to the OAU. I said that I had seen the local press reports and also received some good summaries. Botha thought this showed how impossible it was to deal with SWAPO; he did not acknowledge my counterpoint that it could equally be seen as evidence that neither the West nor the UN was “favoring SWAPO.”

7. Botha asked if I had a written message. I said no, adding that I understood Secretary Vance was speaking to the Foreign Minister by phone but that I had been asked to convey the message I had just given him (ref A) personally because of the highest level sensitivity attached to it.

8. Botha was formally polite and controlled throughout but not in a mood to argue substance. He repeated not just once but several times [Page 281] over that the West had left South Africa “in the lurch,” had accepted (from SWAPO) things that were never included in the original proposal, and was more eager to please the Frontline and SWAPO than to cooperate with South Africa. At the end he escorted me to the door and thanked me for coming; I wished him a good trip to Windhoek.

9. The foregoing has to be weighed in the light of the mood reflected by Pik Botha in his telephone conversation with the Secretary, and by Fourie in his meeting with the Cape Town Five last night (septel).4 While it is often difficult to factor out the personal feelings of these men from their tactical maneuvering and to predict what their next actions are going to be, they certainly project a sense of self-righteous outrage at the current UN and Western position on implementation of the Namibia settlement plan and a determination not to concede on their major points of concern. We will attempt an assessment of the situation in a later message.

Edmondson
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 3/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
  2. In telegram 48936 to Cape Town, March 1, the Department transmitted the following message for either Pik Botha or P.W. Botha from Vance: “We believe that the UN will be able to establish effective civilian liaison arrangements in Zambia and in Angola which will provide a basis for monitoring SWAPO camps in those countries. As a consequence, we believe that South Africa’s concern regarding those camps and their monitoring will be satisfactorily met. At the same time, we want the SAG to know that we take most seriously our responsibility as participants in the negotiations leading to the present settlement to which South Africa has agreed. In light of that, we wish the SAG to know that the U.S. plans to employ the full range of its existing intelligence capabilities to monitor those SWAPO camps. This will provide us with added information regarding those camps. (FYI, you should make no commitment to Botha that we will supply photos or information. End FYI). With that information, combined with other normal monitoring activities, we believe that South Africa can have high confidence that the camps will not be used in a fashion which might undermine the successful implementation of the Namibia agreement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2355)
  3. Not found.
  4. In telegram 413 from Cape Town March 1, the Embassy reported on Fourie’s meeting with the Cape Town Force. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790093–0311)