104. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

831. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Draft Message From the Five Foreign Ministers to South African Foreign Minister Botha.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. The Contact Group approved ad referendum pm Feb. 27 the following draft message from the Five Foreign Ministers to South African Foreign Minister Botha. As discussed septel, the Group believes it most important that this message be delivered to Botha prior to his departure for Windhoek (pm Feb. 28 or am March 1).2

3. AmEmbassy London: Please pass text immediately to FCO.

4. Begin text of message:

1. We are writing to you at this time about Namibia, because the settlement has reached a critical phase and because our Ambassadors in Cape Town have conveyed to us your current concerns.

2. In our view the Secretary General’s report on implementation is fair and reasonable. It reflects a positive approach and makes practical proposals which we support.

3. We are disturbed, however, by the indications in the statement by Prime Minister Botha on 26 February and by your remarks to our Ambassadors that you believe decisions inconsistent with the proposal, and therefore unacceptable to you, have been taken and are being concealed from you. We have been closely in touch with the Secretary General about the implementation of the plan. There were of course suggestions which were inconsistent with the proposal, or clearly unacceptable or unworkable. However, none of these are included in the report or in any sense agreed to.

4. We should like to set out for you our understanding of the basis on which the Secretary General’s report was written. On some issues it proposes solutions in practical terms for the problems which UNTAG [Page 278] will meet on the ground. We cite, for example, the measures proposed to ensure the peaceful return of Namibians.

5. On some other issues the report is not so detailed. We realize that you would have preferred the report to deal specifically with the means by which SWAPO will be restricted to base in the neighboring countries. We are confident that the Secretary General will in practice be able to deal satisfactorily with this question through the establishment of UNTAG offices in the neighboring states.

6. The difficulty is however that this has become very much a public issue, and the more so it becomes, the more difficult it is to solve. We are sure it can be solved if all those concerned display the necessary discretion and political sensitivity.

7. We should also like to address the question of how to deal with SWAPO military personnel inside Namibia at the start of the ceasefire. If there are no SWAPO armed forces in the territory at that time, there will be no problem. If, however, there are such personnel who identify themselves as such at the start of the ceasefire, they will, under the Secretary General’s proposal, be restricted under UN monitoring to locations to be designated by the Special Representative after necessary consultation. These arrangements seem to us to be fair and practical. The people involved have the right to stay in the territory and should be encouraged to reveal rather than conceal their military status. On the other hand, it is clear that the number of SWAPO armed personnel in Namibia cannot be permitted to increase after the ceasefire begins.

8. The time to implement the proposal is now. Delay will only jeopardize the settlement. Neither side will be completely satisfied by the Secretary General’s proposals. But we think that a real and honest effort has been made, and that the balance between the concerns of both parties is being struck as fairly as it ever can be.

9. We urge you to respond positively to the Secretary General by March 5.3

End text.

Young
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790090–1000. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborne, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Nairobi, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, and Cape Town.
  2. In telegram 830 from USUN, February 28, the Mission summarized the February 27 Contact Group meeting, which focused on possible actions “the Five might take to influence upcoming events concerning Namibia.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128–1578)
  3. In telegram 472 from Cape Town, March 6, the Embassy transmitted Botha’s detailed letter to Waldheim. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790103–0828) In telegram 489 from Cape Town, March 7, the Embassy transmitted Botha’s letter regarding the message from the Foreign Ministers to Vance. Botha expressed concerns about the prospects for negotiations on Namibia: “The position adopted by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council and his pronouncements on some key issues of the settlement plan have assumed the ominous appearance of an expectation of failure. In the light of Dr. Waldheim’s report and in particular the serious deviations from the final settlement plan it is my belief that the process which until recently had generated hope and confidence for a successful resolution has now reached an impasse.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790105–0317)