55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Belize City and Multiple Diplomatic Posts1
281673. Subject: FCO Minister Ridley’s Meetings With Deputy Secretary Christopher and ARA Officials on Belize.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Summary: FCO Minister of State Nicholas Ridley briefed Deputy Secretary Christopher and other Department officials October 15 on his October 13–14 negotiations with the Guatemalans on Belize, as well as future British moves on Belizean independence.2 No settlement has been reached, but further talks will be held in January. Ridley said the Guatemalan representatives are searching for a face-saving formula for a negotiated settlement that would be acceptable domestically; the British would try to help them find it. The British, however, will move Belize to independence by late 1981 with or without an agreement with Guatemala. Ridley said the Guatemalans now accept this reality. Moreover, Foreign Minister Castillo seemed to understand and accept that there can be no cession of Belizean territory to Guatemala, although he must still find a face-saving formula to sell this domestically. Ridley [Page 154] expects that even if a negotiated settlement on Belize is not possible, Belizean independence can occur with a minimum of tension. He was gratified that the Guatemalans had foresworn the use of force in the dispute.3 After the UNGA approves a resolution this fall calling for Belizean independence by the end of 1981,4 the UK will launch the independence process—meanwhile continuing to negotiate with the Guatemalans. Ridley urged the US to vote for the resolution as a means of nudging the Guatemalans to face the inevitable and accept a settlement. He suggested that we make some gesture to the Guatemalans to reduce their sense of isolation and perhaps increase their flexibility on Belize. Deputy Secretary Christopher said that we would be reconsidering our previous position of abstaining on this question. Ridley said that the British are prepared to retain a post-independence military presence in Belize sufficient to respond to the security concerns of the Guatemalans and Belizeans. End summary.
3. Minister Ridley, accompanied by James Hennessy, UK Governor of Belize, met with Deputy Secretary Christopher October 15. He also held discussions the same day with ARA officials including DAS Bushnell, DAS Cheek, ARA/CEN Director Blacken, Consul General-designate to Belize Barnebey and desk officer Mack.
4. British strategy with the Guatemalans: In his meeting with ARA, Ridley opened by observing that the October 13–14 talks in New York with the Guatemalans and Belizeans had been less decisive than he had hoped. Nonetheless, he was pleased with the results. The British strategy, prior to and during the latest round, was to convince the Guatemalans that they could no longer delay Belizean independence, and to disabuse them of any notion that the land question was negotiable, while assuring them that everything else was. This strategy seemed to be succeeding in making the Guatemalans more forthcoming. The UK had done nothing to discourage efforts by Belizean Premier George Price to create the impression in the Caribbean and elsewhere that momentum was building for independence which the British could not resist. Ridley had told the Guatemalans that his government would [Page 155] abide by the expected UNGA resolution calling upon the UK to grant independence before the end of 1981.
5. In New York, Ridley informed the Guatemalans that the UK had decided to proceed on two “parallel paths” with respect to Belize. First, the UK would initiate in December a process that would lead to independence for the colony within 12 months, with or without a settlement. Secondly, the UK would continue negotiations with the Guatemalans in the hope that a settlement could be reached prior to independence. Ridley said he had feared the Guatemalans might respond to this approach by breaking off the talks and going home. But this had not happened. The Guatemalans had simply asked if the UK would consider delaying the start of the independence process until March 1981, and actual independence until March 1982.
6. Ridley said he had responded to the Guatemalans that he could not delay independence past 1981, but he would work with them to manage the process to minimize domestic problems for the Guatemalan Government.
7. In New York, the UK put forth a 16-point proposal to the Guatemalans which dealt inter alia with communications, maritime access, use of a free port, economic cooperation and security. Price had accepted all of them beforehand and even had suggested an arrangement by which an independent Belizean Government would grant to Guatemala long-term lease rights to some of the southern cays, a concession which to Ridley appeared to imply some Guatemalan rights to the seabed as well. Price even proposed the construction of an artificial Guatemalan cay in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Honduras that would give the Guatemalans a basis from which to claim a 200 mile territorial sea. But the Guatemalans had said they needed more and could not agree with the UK proposal as it stood. They claimed that to do so would cause the government to fall.
8. Upon that note, the parties agreed to suspend the New York talks and to meet again, possibly January 6. In the meantime, Ridley hoped to come up with a few more ideas to help the Guatemalans sell a settlement domestically.
9. Ridley’s impressions of the Guatemalan attitude: Ridley said he had found the Guatemalans genuinely prepared to reach a settlement, but subject to political constraints on the home front. He characterized Foreign Minister Castillo as desperate to find a face-saving solution. There was no hint of Guatemalan saber rattling. Indeed, the Guatemalans assured the UK and the Belizeans that they did not intend to use force on this question. He felt the Guatemalan Government representatives were also prepared to abandon their land claim, but were inhibited from doing so by the presence of the four political party representatives in the GOG delegation. Ridley said the latter had continued to posture [Page 156] about territory long after they fully realized a land cession was out of the question. Castillo had hinted he wanted to hold private talks with Ridley to come up with some “cosmetic” proposals to get over the land hurdle.
10. Ridley said that instead of looking at the Guatemalans as obstructionist and imperialistic, we must look at them as very realistic. They recognize the UK’s determination to press on with the independence process. The challenge now was to find a way to help the Guatemalans accept a settlement and to keep control of any hotheads in the army who might try to take the situation in their own hands and resort to force.
11. Ways the US could help: Ridley said that the US could help the UK and the negotiations process by voting for the UN resolution on Belize this fall. By doing so we would make clear to the Guatemalans that their isolation on Belize was complete. This might be what was needed to nudge the Guatemalans to accept a settlement. The British would attempt to insure that the resolution was not insulting to Guatemala. Although the Guatemalans would never ask the US to vote for the resolution, a favorable US vote would encourage the Guatemalan Government to resist those who opposed giving up the land claim. He suggested also that USG send someone known as sympathetic to Guatemala for a heart-to-heart chat with them on Belize. The Guatemalans would be tremendously appreciative. They had informed Ridley of their great satisfaction with the recent visit by Luigi Einaudi.
12. The schedule for independence: Ridley then speculated that the timing of the overall process would run along the following lines:
(A) Early November—a resolution on Belize would be proposed at the UN which calling upon the British to grant independence in 1981.
(B) November 10 (approximately)—UN approval of the Belize resolution.
(C) December—announcement by the British of a Constitutional Conference in February or March.
(D) Late December or early January—a new round of negotiations with the Guatemalans.
(E) February and March—the Constitutional Conference in London.
(F) May or June—Act of Parliament on Belize. This date could slip because Parliament would be voting on similar acts for Canada and Antigua.
(G) September 10 (or possibly October)—independence.
13. Ridley reiterated that the British would continue attempts to reach a negotiated settlement with the Guatemalans. However, even if a negotiated settlement proved impossible, the excellent relations the [Page 157] UK had developed with the Guatemalans during the long negotiations process would permit a non-negotiated Belizean independence to occur with a minimum of tensions. The way would also be opened for future talks between the Guatemalans and an independent Belizean Government to deal with many of the issues contained in the 16-point proposal the British had presented in New York.
14. Security arrangements: Ridley said that the British forces would remain after independence and that the Guatemalans would accept no one else. Price had agreed to this. If there were a settlement, the British would leave a small force to train the small Belizean self-defense force and police, but also to exchange intelligence information with the Guatemalans to prevent leftist use of Belize as a base of subversion or supply against Guatemala. If there were no agreement, the British would retain a garrison of sufficient size to counter any belligerent act by Guatemala. However, the British had cautioned Premier Price they would only defend Belize against an unprovoked attack from Guatemala. The British would not defend Belize against Guatemalan military action launched in response to the presence of foreign troops in Belize, such as the Sandinistas. Ridley said that Price understood this condition, that it extended to verbal provocations as well, and was prepared to make a pledge not to interfere in the internal affairs of Guatemala. However, Price did have some reservations about turning away what he termed “political refugees” from Guatemala.
15. In a separate meeting with Deputy Secretary Christopher, Ridley touched on some of the same points. Ridley reiterated his request that the US support the Belize resolution in the UN this fall. The Deputy Secretary responded that we would be considering our position carefully.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800503–1017. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate to Guatemala City, USUN, London, Mexico City, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights. Drafted by Mack; cleared in ARA/CEN, S/S–O, and D (by phone); approved by Bushnell.↩
- No other records of the conversation were found.↩
- In telegram 6908 from Guatemala City, October 27, the Embassy reported that UK Consul Michael Wilmshurst had shared fresh details about the October 13–14 Anglo-Guatemalan talks in New York, including the point that Castillo had assured the United Kingdom only that “Guatemala would not move against British (sic) forces and pointedly reserved the military option for the future by drawing a parallel with the Iraqi invasion of Iran.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800522–0784) Iraq invaded Iran on September 22.↩
- The resolution on Belize was adopted by the UNGA Fourth Committee on November 6 by a vote of 123–1–7. (Telegram 4973 from USUN, November 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790512–0616)↩