Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

488. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)¹

Washington, October 29, 1979

SUBJECT

• US Policy to Central America and the Caribbean—2:00 p.m. Meeting, Monday, October 29, 1979 (U)

Let me use this memo to suggest some ideas for discussion at our 2:00 p.m. meeting today.² There are three subjects I would like to cover: (1) the President’s comments at our October 19, 1979 meeting;³ (2) some ideas on how to incorporate the President’s ideas into a more comprehensive approach; and (3) the next steps that need to be taken to activate that approach. (S)

I. The October 19, 1979 Meeting on Central America and the Caribbean: some comments. I rushed to write the notes from the October 19, 1979 meeting because I sensed that the President and the rest of us had missed each other; that we had approached the subject from such different directions that the discussion failed to grasp the issues in an effective way. On reading through the notes (Tab A)⁴ again, I find that I can condense my concerns to three points, relating to the information the President has received, his analysis, and his strategy:

1. Information. The President, by his own admission, said that he didn’t have a clear idea of what we have been doing in Central America and the Caribbean during the last three years. Perhaps, he concludes that we haven’t done much; I believe the more accurate conclusion is that we haven’t kept the President adequately informed of our approach, and also of its inadequacies, which have become more evident in the last six months. Instead, we have sent in individual intelligence items on developments, and he relates these items to his instincts rather than to a coherent framework. The President really should not have received a summary of our Ambassador’s current feelings on Jamaica without being informed that we had begun an interagency review to assess recent developments in Jamaica and decide on a new approach. (S)⁵

It would be useful to send a memo to the President which describes our overall approach to Central America and the Caribbean (CACAR) and identifies those areas undergoing reassessment. (As a matter of routine, it might be useful for all of the staff to take 2 or 3 subjects in their area and do such a memo from time-to-time, although I suspect this is probably most needed in areas—like CACAR—which are in a rapid state of flux, thus not lending themselves to a static definition.) (S)

2. Analysis. The President said that any new approach to the region must be based on a change in our attitudes. He said, “the problem is we have a tendency to hold on to things.” He said we tend to view the region as “our sphere of influence.” He came extrordinarily close to criticizing his October 1 speech on the brigade in the same terms used by other Caribbean leaders—like Manley and Bishop.⁶ He said that State’s briefing was too preoccupied with trying to find ways to keep the region from being “lost to the Cubans.” (S)

This is a rather startling statement. It appears to contradict other statements he has made about the need to counter the extension of Cuban influence in the area.⁷ Is it possible that the President was not aware that his October 1 speech would be viewed as one of his Administration’s most paternalistic actions in the Caribbean? Is it possible that he is not aware that our increased military presence, our high per capita economic assistance, our heightened attention, and indeed, our concern about the Soviet brigade are all indications that CACAR is within our sphere of special concern, if not influence? There is no way the US can relate to a region on its doorstep composed of approximately 20 political entities, the majority of which have populations of less than 1 million people, on the basis of complete equality. We can try to treat these nations with respect, but if they lean toward the Soviets or Cubans, we cannot very well ignore that without sending signals of weakness throughout the world. The issue, therefore, is not how do you eliminate paternalism in the Caribbean, but rather how do you limit it without permitting effects which jeopardize US interests. (S)

There are two rather different ways to visualize recent developments in CACAR. Andy Young probably is not terribly concerned about developments in Grenada or Jamaica, essentially believing that we should roll with the tide of events there. If we stay friendly, the attraction of the US will keep them “friends.”

There is an alternative view which suggests that if we acquiesce in the pro-Cuban tilt of Grenada and Jamaica, we will invite like-minded groups in the other islands to push in the same direction, which, in the least, means a heightened criticism of the US. Before too long, Cuba will have become the dominant influence in the region. It is not clear to me with which of these two views the President feels most comfortable, although it appears he’s closer to Andy’s view. Since the two frameworks are so different, suggesting different explanations and prescriptions, it is difficult to formulate policy to the region unless one has a clearer idea of which of the two frameworks the President wants to use. I believe the memo to the President should state this difference precisely and request his guidance. (S)

3. Strategy: People-to-People vs. Policy. A cynic could conclude that the President’s “people-to-people strategy” is either naive, extraordinarily subtle, or a cop-out. Habib, Bowdler, and you tried to get the President to focus on geopolitical considerations; Vaky tried to steer the President toward sugar, tin and energy policies. The President would have none of it. His prescription is to use the non-governmental resources of the US to reach out and touch the people of the region. On reflection, I believe the strategy is a subtle one, but inadequate.⁸ If we can unleash an intensive and extensive sister cities/Partners of the Americas-type program, I believe it would have an impact on the region, but unless we can do something about the inadequate investment in the region or Cuban subversion or inducements, or commodity pricing, we will find ourselves playing to the long-term while the Cubans prevail now. It’s important that the President realize that we need to deal with the legitimate and immediate concerns articulated by the governments in the region as well as reach out to the people. (S)⁹

II. An Overall Approach. I believe that we have in place most of the components of an effective policy to the CACAR; we just need to weave the different threads together, add a few new points, including the people-to-people strategy, and then present it in a speech.¹⁰ Hopefully, the Caribbean Conference in Miami will provide the President that opportunity (although I understand the schedulers are resisting the event). (S)

—Politically, our strategy has been to defend democratic institutions and processes in the Caribbean and help them to take root in Central America by supporting moderate and centrist groups. (S)

—Economically, we have increased our aid to the Caribbean (although not by that much) and sought to channel it through the multinational Carribean Group. We have committed ourselves to a similar approach in Central America. (S)

—Internationally, we have tried to work with basin countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico) with varying degrees of success, and with interested Europeans and Canadians. We have also allowed governments in the region a greater degree of “political space,” which some have unfortunately used to criticize us. (S)

That is the essence of our approach. Where are its inadequacies? What more should we do? (S)

—Economic Assistance. Our aid instruments are cumbersome and invisible. They are correctly pointed to long-term development needs, but they have been ineffective as either carrots or sticks. We need to be careful of the propaganda effect of our actions, taking immediate credit for positive actions and making clear our negative actions are unwanted reactions to insulting or offensive actions taken by others. Our assistance levels have not been proportionate to the challenge we face in the region. In fact, the “current” level of aid being requested for the Caribbean in FY 81 ($86.2 million) represents a decline from what was asked in FY 80 ($93.9 million), this despite a clear statement by the President that he would increase aid to the Caribbean. The increase in aid to Central America (from $48.6 to $71.1 million) is inadequate when one considers there have been two major changes in governments, and we have changed our strategy from disengagement to active involvement. (See Tab B) (S)¹¹

Recommendations

1. Bilateral Help for Moderates. We need to channel much more of our aid through bilateral channels to moderate governments in the Caribbean, like Barbados, St Vincent and Dominica. This should be explained by pointing to our desire to help those who most effectively use aid. (S)¹²

2. Less Help for Radicals. We need to gradually reduce our aid to governments that take potshots at the US, tilt toward Cuba, or are subverting democratic institutions. These include Jamaica, Guyana and Grenada. We should not announce reductions; in response to questions, we should point out our concern that recent actions by these governments have lead us to question the degree of their commitment to development, and we intend to be more cautious about giving future aid. But we should be very responsive to signs of significant change by those governments. (S)¹³

3. Caribbean Group and Overall Aid Levels. We should maintain our overall contribution to the Caribbean Group, and increase our overall economic assistance levels. Those who have abstained from criticizing our Caribbean initiatives have done so by pointing to the portions of the President’s speech, calling for increases in economic assistance to the region. As FY 81 budget figures now stand, however, our assistance levels will decline. This needs to be reversed. The President will be severely criticized by our moderate friends if we fail to register an increase in our aid level to the Caribbean. (S)

4. CDB. Many countries in the region have complained about the slowness with which the Caribbean Development Bank disburses loans. AID should commission a special study mission to investigate the problems and make specific recommendations to its board. Future contributions by the US should in part be determined by the commitment of CDB to follow up on those recommendations. (S)¹⁴

5. Publicity. ICA should undertake special efforts, and if necessary commission a public relations firm to make sure that the people of the region are aware of the extensive aid the US is giving. (S)

6. Flexible Contingency Fund. We need to be able to react much more quickly to events. A regional (CACAR) contingency fund (from ESF) should be established in the FY 81 budget to meet this need. (S)

7. Central America. Should receive dramatic increases in aid. Nicaragua should be programmed in FY 81 to receive the $50 million aid for commodity imports; current FY 81 budget doesn’t have this item. To get these funds will require some hard trade-offs—perhaps even with the Middle East—but the way the budget process is currently working, the middle-levels at State/AID are cutting this money out before the higher-levels can even focus on it. (S)

8. We should immediately follow up Frank Press’s trip to Barbados by funding S&T projects ($10 million), initiated by him.¹⁵ (S)

—Military Assistance/Presence. In addition to programming increases in our military presence in the Caribbean, we ought to dramatically increase military assistance in Honduras and El Salvador. I believe this would have a positive demonstration effect on Nicaragua and Guatemala. The US is presently proscribed from assisting the mini-states of the Caribbean to build up their police forces. (S)

9. After full consultation with Caribbean basin and Central American governments, we ought to continue to increase port calls and identify other ways to enhance the US military presence in the region. (S)

10. We should try to get Congress to alter the law to provide aid to police forces in the Parliamentary Caribbean. (S)

11. We ought to purchase and maintain patrol boats for St Vincent, Dominica, the Bahamas and Dominican Republic. (S)

12. We should increase the level of FMS to Latin America—with special emphasis on CACAR—to 4–5 percent. We should especially increase military assistance to El Salvador and Honduras. (S)

—Political/Covert/Diplomatic. Part of the criticism of the President’s October 1 speech stemmed from our failure to consult or even inform the nations before the speech. Another problem is that the Cubans actively help their allies while we have done little to support democratic groups. (S)

13. Consultation. We ought to consult with CACAR on a regular basis on issues of concern to both sides, particularly on routine military-related exercises. (S)

14. Political. We ought to seek out ways to help centrist groups either directly or indirectly. (S)

15. Expose Cubans. We need to make sure that all reports of Cuban activities in the region are widely circulated to interested basin governments. (S)¹⁶

16. Build Democracy. We need to try to develop, or maintain as the case may be, regional institutions which defend or strengthen democratic processes or institutions, like the Inter-American Press Association or IAHRC. We should stress “democracy and development” as our major themes and look for opportunities to demonstrate our commitment to them. (S)

—Manpower. The President mentioned that he sensed our Ambassadors were not as good as they should be, and he is right, and the appointments continue to be a quality notch below that of other regions. For reasons of security, size, and former unimportance, most Missions continue to be understaffed. (S)

17. Quality of Personnel. You need to look especially close at Ambassadorial appointments suggested by State in this region. We need more experienced and entrepreneurial Ambassadors. (S)

18. Quantity. Because of overall reductions in overseas personnel, it will be important to increase the priority of CACAR. (S)

—Investment. The radical governments are suffering from a lack of private investment—domestic and foreign. (S)

19. We can only encourage private investors to invest where they feel secure. This is clearly a step which the governments in the region can take. (S)

—Global Policies. Our failure to obtain ratification of the sugar or coffee agreements has had a profound impact on this region. There are many minor modifications in a variety of laws which could have a significant and positive impact on the region and draw it closer to us—laws dealing with tax deductions on conventions, duty-free status, and rum tariffs. We need to be alert to these. (S)

20. As part of the President’s increased interest in CACAR, we should push for the ratification of the sugar and coffee agreements and task the agencies to find ways to give special assistance on preferences to CACAR. (S)

—People-to-People (PTP). There are many PTP programs, including sister cities and Partners of the Americas, but a Presidential push could lead to an important expansion and intensification of the effort. I have tasked State for an inventory of existing programs (Tab C), and after examining their report, we will be better positioned to decide how to expand it.¹⁷ The President was right to focus on this area. (S)

The best way to use the President would be for him to speak to this issue in the context of the more comprehensive approach before an audience which includes members and leaders of these groups. That event is clearly the Miami speech. Maurice Ferre, the Mayor of Miami, and an energetic, intelligent politician may be the person Zbig is looking for as the leader of such a broad PTP effort. I think he would be interested in doing it, and he knows the region well. We need to expand the purpose of the Conference from just the Caribbean to CACAR and from primarily business groups to a broader cross-section of America. This can only be done if the President gets involved, and if we focus on it immediately. Ferre is in town today; I suggest Zbig get in touch with him (after firming up the President’s schedule) and with the organizers of the Conference (Joe Blatchford and Peter Johnson), and steer them in this direction. (S)

III. Next Steps—Recommendation. If you approve I will draft a memo from you to the President which summarizes what we have done in CACAR and what we haven’t done. The memo will include an outline of the speech he would give in Miami which would deal with both PTP and policy and include references to the recommendations in this memo. That speech will be used as a deadline for us to get budgetary and policy decisions out of the government and to organize a massive PTP effort. We have less than one month, but if we work hard on getting these decisions, I believe we can do it.¹⁸ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 83, Sensitive XX: 10/13–31/1979. Secret. Sent for both action and information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “RP—good.”
2. No further record of this meeting has been found.
3. See Document 487.
4. Not attached.
5. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 191.
6. See footnote 5, Document 319.
7. Brzezinski underlined “to counter” and wrote in the left-hand margin next to the sentence: “No the question is how.”
8. Brzezinski underlined “the strategy,” placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the sentence, and wrote: “his doesn’t exclude also ours.”
9. In a December 13 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski discussed Carter’s proposed people-to-people strategy on Central America and the Caribbean. Carter’s comments indicated that he wanted a low profile effort that would require minimal federal funding and be primarily non-governmental. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 12/79–1/80)
10. Brzezinski drew a line in the margin next to this sentence and wrote in the margin: “Yes.”
11. Not attached.
12. Carter placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
13. Carter placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
14. Carter placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
15. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.
16. Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote: “this should be done on a cont. basis.”
17. Not attached. See footnote 3, Document 487.
18. Brzezinski wrote at the bottom of the page: “We should hold a PRC on all of these items—together with our private/govt. initiative. How about a speech by the V.P. or Vance?”