Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

487. Summary of Conclusions of a Presidential Meeting¹

Washington, October 19, 1979, 3:05–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Central America and the Caribbean

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
  • Viron T. Vaky, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
  • William Bowdler, Director of Intelligence and Research
  • Lawrence Pezzullo, U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua
  • Ambler Moss, U.S. Ambassador to Panama
  • Philip Habib, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State

• OSD

  • Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary of Defense

• CIA

  • Stansfield Turner, Director
  • Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director

• White House

  • The President
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser
  • Hedley Donovan, Presidential Adviser

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Summary of Conclusions

The President asked Secretary Vance to begin the briefing, and he, in turn, asked Phil Habib to make a presentation on the Caribbean. Bill Bowdler would follow with a presentation on Central America.

CARIBBEAN²

[Omitted here is discussion on the Caribbean.]

Central America

Bowdler stated that Central America is a real volcano; the surprising thing is that it has not erupted before now. Like the Caribbean, Central America suffers from a manipulation of the political process, extreme economic disparities, rapid population growth rates and low economic growth. This has led to growing resentment and pressures for change which have produced violence and counter-violence. The extreme left is well organized and poised to exploit the discontent. These conditions are present in all the countries in Central America, except Costa Rica. Bowdler said that Nicaragua is a classic example of militarism which was carried to such a degree that it alienated everyone. Honduras has a relatively benevolent situation. The economic and social differences are not so great. Past governments have implemented an agrarian reform which has alleviated some problems. There will be elections for a Constituent Convention in March and this could be the government’s escape hatch. If the government allows all groups to take part, it can defuse the situation. Our role should be to encourage President Paz to allow the political process to be open to all parties, and particularly to allow the Christian Democrats to participate as a party in the election. (S)

Bowdler said that the recent coup in El Salvador removes the crisis. We have been fortunate. It provides a real opportunity for constitutional government in the near future. In answer to a question from the President, about when free elections would occur, Bowdler said it would probably occur within 12 months. The composition of the Junta is such that they will probably want to expedite the transition to democratic rule. The leadership is young, moderate and progressive. It will face challenges from the extreme left and possibly also from the right. It will also have the problem of having to stop the economic down turn while moving the country toward free elections. (S)

What can we do? We can assist them economically by AID projects, by encouraging the international development banks to undertake projects, and by encouraging investment. Vaky interjected that business has been moving out of El Salvador, and we should try to get business to go back in. (S)

Bowdler continued by suggesting that the US should also encourage in subtle ways various groups in El Salvador—the Church, the Private Sector—to play a constructive role in the democratization process. We should also make available economic and security assistance if that is requested. At the same time, we should keep an eye out on the Cubans and help the government cope with its guerrilla threat. (S)

Bowdler said that the situation in Guatemala is less serious, although certain conditions are very disturbing. This is the third military president in a row to rule Guatemala. The private sector is frightened by the polarization and by developments in Nicaragua. Tourism is also down. All this has led to a general economic retrenchment. Congressional elections are scheduled for next March and we should encourage Lucas to make them free. We should use modest amounts of aid to do this. (S)

What do we need to do? First, we need to have a sensitive understanding of revolutionary forces in Central America. Secondly, we need to use our resources flexibly to support moderate elements in these countries. Third, we need to provide encouragement and leadership when necessary. Fourth, we ought to try to facilitate the settlement of the border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras. Fifth, we should promote a new level of economic integration and try to involve Nicaragua in it. If we succeed, it will be most difficult for Nicaragua to go radical. Sixth, we need to develop sophisticated political operatives to help these regimes better deal with their problems. In response to a question from Secretary Vance as to whether this would involve covert operations, Bowdler said it would. (S)

The President asked how we would involve the Andean Group in this process and whether we had a good relationship with them on these issues. (S)

Bowdler said that we are talking to the Andean Group, but we have not moved into the action stage yet. Vaky said that the capacity of the Andean Group to act is limited although they are naturally interested and their information on Central America is good. The Andean Group has spoken among themselves on this issue often. Pastor said that we ought to continue to coordinate and work in parallel with the Andean Group, but we should not think that it would be easy to adopt a unified approach with them. They may be reluctant to do that. (S)

President Carter said that he wanted to be frank with the group, and without meaning to be critical, he feels that he has sat in the Presidency for three years and he still does not have a clear idea of what we are trying to do in the region. All he ever gets are last minute requests from Vance and Christopher for a budget supplemental to deal with these problems and this irritates him. There is nothing long-term to deal with the problem. Do we need a conference on this? Andy (Young) could take a group down to the area if this were necessary. Do we need a long-term stabilization program for the region? What are we trying to encourage? (S)

Habib answered by saying that we do need a coordinated and integrated program, and that was one of the conclusions of his report. He also found that there wasn’t sufficient attention given to the region. Since then, the Secretary has set up an interagency group, and it is looking into our policies toward Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana. The group will also examine what kind of coordinating effort could be undertaken in the economic, political and multilateral fields. We look forward to an early decision on these issues. In addition to these long-term programs, we also need to be able to react better to short-term crises. (S)

President Carter said that whenever there is a problem, all the recommendations seem to focus on sending more money. There is no idea what it will be used for. There is no sense of how it will fit into an overall approach. (S)

The President said he received recommendations that we should knock the hell out of Manley and support a moderate group. He said he was going down that path when Andy came to see him. He persuaded me that such a policy would be suicide in Jamaica, that Manley will be in power until 1981 and he is too strong to be overthrown. Such an approach would only put us in danger of losing Manley permanently. (S)

The President continued by saying that he felt that in sensitive areas, we are simply not getting sound advice. We need to treat even the small islands in the Caribbean with respect. If it is necessary to have Manley up here for a talk and to stay in the Mansion, he would be prepared to do that or if we wanted to send someone down—like my wife or Andy—I would be willing to do it. (S)

Secretary Vance said that a number of months ago he asked Habib to undertake the task of developing a comprehensive strategy for the Caribbean. He particularly asked Habib for suggestions on the way to deal with Jamaica. The Secretary felt that the President might be overreading what he and Dr. Brzezinski had recommended. We are not suggesting that we jump Manley, but rather that we express concern about recent developments. We have to be careful to think of what kind of leverage we have in Jamaica; to exercise that effectively, we need to know the local situation better. Recently, he spoke to some officials from Kaiser, which has long experience in Jamaica, to get a better feel for the situation there. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that in the memo which he sent the President that morning he wrote we should not view Manley or even Bishop as irretrievable. To do so would only have the effect of pushing them in a radical direction. (S)

President Carter said he was not referring to the memo this morning, but rather to the advice he had been getting for the past three weeks. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then tried to put the current difficulties in a broader perspective. The Caribbean and Central America have recently emerged from a colonial or neocolonial legacy. Central America has long been under US domination, while the Caribbean has been under the domination of various European countries. One needs to understand the current problems in the region within this context and also within the more recent context of US disengagement. Our long-term goals are correct. The problem is in the short-term and in the mid-term where it looks as if the US is out of the picture, and people who are hostile to the US are on the offensive. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski recommended that the President make a speech soon, which states that the US has long and enduring interests in the Caribbean. But these interests are different than they have been in the past. We are interested in the long-term development and democratization of the region. We are interested in letting these countries define their own place in the world. But in the short-term, we should be prepared to assert ourselves, politically, economically, and perhaps even militarily. We need to develop more sophisticated covert operations. These have been destroyed over the last five years, and we need to rebuild them. In addition, we need to be prepared to provide more economic aid to the region and we need to do more politically. Unless Manley realizes we are in the picture, and we are willing to crack down, he will gravitate to the left. (S)

Secretary Vance said that our technological and economic assistance is our advantage, and we should use it more. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed, and said that our approach should be clearly set in a secure and confident context. We are a major power with major responsibilities, but we are interested in helping the countries in the region achieve their objectives of development and democratization. (S)

President Carter said we may have made an enormous mistake in Jamaica if we had followed the original path, but what really disturbs him is that the discussion seems permeated with an inadequate attitude. We should try hard not to be exploitative. It is wrong to think that we can buy friends, and I think that is our major problem. I don’t think that people in the area think that the US really cares about them, that we are their friends. There are many ways we can demonstrate this interest. We have a thousand major universities in the US and I could call and ask them to participate in a program to help the area. If I called some business leaders and told them we have a problem, and divided up responsibilities, I am sure they would be glad to help. I believe we could really help if we did this. The American people would be happy to establish friendly relations directly with the people of the area. I don’t feel that the people in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and perhaps even in Costa Rica feel that we care about them; perhaps they think that Cuba does. (S)

The President said that as long as white Anglos sit in the Cabinet Room and think of ways to keep out the Cubans, we will be unable to get at the problems in the area. If we could spend our time thinking of ways we can help the people of Guatemala—to work out a good transportation system or an educational system—I think that would work. We need to get the American people involved—the church, business, labor, etc. When I was in Atlanta, the Baptist Church there sent 30 people into the mountains to help poor people, and I think that helped. We do not have a broad enough outreach and I believe they can sense that. And we ought to do that. They probably feel we have been exploitative and they are probably right. (S)

Habib referred to two examples to prove the President’s point. The Prime Minister of Dominica was recently here and asked for just $200,000 of fertilizer and a few bundles of seeds to begin to reconstruct his country’s agriculture after the hurricane. We were able to respond quickly, and the Prime Minister became a hero when he returned. By and large, we have neglected the area because we thought it was a British responsibility. We need to change that. Our two goals should be democracy and development. Business is not going into the Caribbean because it is not profitable (due to poor transportation, etc.) and because they feel they are unwelcome (rhetorical attacks against international corporations). (S)

Habib said that Manley is a complex person. The British think he is off the wall; they also believe that Bishop is not salvageable. Habib agrees with that. Manley is preparing to win the election and that explains the reason for his radical shift. We ought to continue to press Manley and Bishop to go toward free elections. As to Manley, Habib did judge him on his ability to maintain the democratic process and to make his source function better. He has an affinity for Cuba because he admires Castro and because he wants to play a world role. (S)

In Guyana the alternatives to Burnham are worse. (S)

President Carter said he is not trying to oversimplify, but it seems to him that what we need to do is change our basic attitude. We need to do what we can to give them a reason to like the US. We need to reach beyond the government structure and relate directly to the people. (S)

The President says that he thinks Manley, like him, is a politician facing elections. He wants to do the right thing, but maybe he is constrained. Maybe we can give Manley some help in agriculture. That was Andy’s suggestion. We have Castro beat 10,000 to one in this area, but somehow we cannot compete. If we concentrate on labor and agriculture, we can magnify greatly what we can do in Jamaica. The problem is we have a tendency to hold on to things. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we need to break with the paternalistic tradition. (S)

President Carter said that we still have it. Dr. Brzezinski said we must engage the private sector which would involve them and others. Secretary Vance said that the business community is prepared to work with us. Habib said that the AFL/CIO wants to expand its activities, but to do so requires money. (S)

The President said that he is the only person in the region who can marshal all the resources, private and public. He said that we need a country-by-country analysis, describing in detail what resources are required, and who he should contact, and he said that he would get in touch with these people. (S)³

Admiral Turner said that the CIA is considerably more pessimistic than Andy Young about Jamaica. Jamaica has received about $100 million during the last year, but much of this has been wasted. It is possible that Jamaica may have passed the point where we can influence Manley to continue down a Parliamentary path. Turner cited a number of instances of Cuban-Soviet collaboration in Jamaica, including the fact that the Soviet Ambassador provided the Jamaican Minister of Information some ideas on October 2 about how to respond to the President’s speech of October 1. The CIA increasingly sees Manley working with the Cuban DGI to generate anti-US propaganda. The CIA thinks that it is difficult for him to come back after making such a sharp turn to the left. (S)

Turner said that he agrees with the State Department’s analysis on El Salvador and our need to be more sympathetic with the Junta. He believes there is a 50–50 chance of civil war, and that Jamaica will need to find some strong leadership soon if it will survive. He suspects that it will require military aid to keep the extreme left down and it will also need to coopt the moderate left. (S)

The President said that he is willing to provide more aid, if it is placed at the context of our longer-term objectives. (S)

Ambassador Pezzullo said that if we had tried to describe a worse case for Nicaragua six months ago, we would find ourselves presently in it, but it’s not that bad. We have a tendency to have a bad mindset which often leads us to exaggerate the impact of the Cubans, although he did recognize that many of the new leadership have been trained in Cuba. In Central America, there have been a number of rapid changes, and Castro is resourceful in currently taking advantage of it. On the other hand, we have opportunities which we don’t use. For example, Humberto Ortega, Commander in Chief of the Sandinista Army, wants to come to the US to meet with people in State and the Pentagon. He told Pezzullo that Castro had promised him a plane to take him to Cuba, but we have difficulty in even getting him an invitation to come up to the US. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski interjected that he supported the idea of having the Pentagon invite Ortega for a VIP visit. (S)

Pezzullo said that we need to use our advantage in technology better. It is very attractive throughout Central America. Even Jaime Wheelock, Nicaragua’s radical Minister of Agriculture, has expressed interest in getting an adviser from the Wisconsin Land Tenure Center to work with him. We do not need to jump in too fast with our power, but we should be quick to respond with our technology. (S)

The President said that he understood what Pezzullo was saying. (S)

Secretary Vance said that we need a contingency fund; otherwise, it is very difficult to respond rapidly to such opportunities. President Carter agreed with him. (S)

Habib said that he had briefed the Congress on the Caribbean, and had found considerably more sympathy there than in parts of the bureaucracy for more money to the Caribbean. (S)

President Carter said that we need to plan ahead and anticipate these changes and developments. He acknowledged that there is a fair amount of attention to the region, but he insisted that we do not have an adequate long-range approach to the region. He said that we are starting to correct that, but we have not thought through what we should do in an extra-governmental way. He wondered whether we had graduated from a neocolonial perspective, but thought that we haven’t. The general tone of the briefings at the beginning of the meeting suggested that we are about to lose these countries from our sphere of influence. He thinks that is the wrong approach. (S)

The President said that we need to focus much more on the preparation of the FY 81 budget as it applies to our concerns in Central America and the Caribbean. We need to build in some flexibility—perhaps including a contingency fund—so that we can respond rapidly to events. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we respond to the problems in the Caribbean and Central America in five ways: First, we must respond to the socio-economic needs with an economic assistance plan, and we will provide the President with such a plan. Secondly, we need to develop a strategy to deal with the political-military problems in the region. Third, we need to develop a covert strategy which complements our overall approach. Fourth, we need to develop an extra-governmental strategy, devising ways to mobilize the resources of the country as the President had described. (The President interjected by suggesting that we examine the example of a group from Georgia who went to Haiti recently to plant one million trees.) And fifth, we need to develop a regional strategy for engaging other Latin American countries in these problems. Secretary Vance can follow this up in La Paz. (S)

Secretary Vance suggested a number of mechanisms we can use, such as land grant colleges. Habib said that the AFL wants to do more. (S)

The President said that he is eager to help. This conversation should help to stimulate our thinking, and he asked the group to come back to him with an analysis of each country individually—not the region—and what we can do. It is surprising what can be done if we set our minds to it. (S)

Habib suggested that a good time to mobilize this effort would be at the Committee on the Caribbean meeting in Miami in November. Secretary Vance said that the President has agreed to see Prime Minister Adams of Barbados. (S)

Ambassador Moss agreed that we faced a significant attitudinal problem. There are a lot of suspicions in the area, particularly that the only reason we are interested in it is because of Castro. (S)

The Secretary said that he will mention the need for a new attitudinal approach in his speech in La Paz. (S)

The President said that Bob Graham, Governor of Florida, had recently visited three or four countries in the Caribbean and was very excited with the experience. One of the President’s neighbors in Plains had spent a year in Jamaica, and another group from Georgia had gone to an island in the Caribbean and given every person on the island dental work. This is the kind of activity which conveys a genuine feeling of warmth. Georgia had a relationship with the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, and it was a good opportunity to assert our influence in an exciting and enjoyable way. To me, this is one of the best opportunities to relate to other governments, without trying to figure out what we are trying to get out of it. (S)

The President also expressed some skepticism about the quality of our ambassadors. In a country which is black or Spanish-speaking, he wondered whether we are sending our best ambassadors. We should look very closely at the quality of our ambassadors, and we ought to assess every possibility of upgrading our people in the area. (S)

Vaky said that the U.S. traditionally has difficulty relating to the interests of these countries. Whether it is on sugar or tin, we do not take into account their concerns very well. The IDB is currently having a problem with Ecuador, for example. We need to find a better way to examine the consequences of our global policies. Secretary Vance said that we should also examine the GSP from that perspective. (S)

The President said that there is another opportunity we should examine. Dante Fascell can help us by organizing a group of Congressmen. The region is an attractive place to visit. If they did, we could arrange meetings with good, moderate leaders, but we need to identify with the people. For too long, dictators had identified key members of the Congress and entertained them. By the time we tried to change our policies, it was more difficult. We should involve them early on. We need to work with Fascell, and look for another 20 like him. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that in about 15 minutes an interagency group would be meeting to examine ways to improve the quantity and quality of our manpower in Central America and the Caribbean, and he said that that was very much consistent with what the President had said. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 83, Sensitive XX: 10/13/1979–10/31/1979. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.
2. For more information about U.S. government policy toward the Caribbean, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 368.
3. In an October 24 memorandum to Tarnoff, Dodson instructed the Department of State to prepare a report by October 31 “describing activities undertaken by U.S. non-governmental groups which contribute to the development (economic, political, or social) or democratization of Central America and the Caribbean,” on a country-by-country basis. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 7, Central America: CACAR: 11/78–11/79) Tarnoff replied to Brzezinski in an October 31 memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 10/15–31/79) In a November 15 memorandum to Carter, Vance discussed proposals to enhance “U.S. non-governmental activities in Central America and the Caribbean.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 11/79) In a December 12 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff outlined strategies for and raised questions about “strengthening people-to people ties in the Caribbean and Central America.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America: 12/79–1/80)