446. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State1
8332. Dept pass Mexico City for the Secretary and Asst. Sec. Bowdler.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Junta member Napoleon Duarte, Foreign Minister Fidel Chavez Mena, and I had a three-hour session yesterday afternoon and evening (Nov. 29). Duarte reluctantly admitted that security forces participated in the assassination of the FDR leaders.2 He hoped to use our position on the helicopters to put an end to the division of authority between the Junta and the military High Command. He did not say so explicitly but I believe he will try to get the approval of the military to concentrate all the power of government in the hands of Napoleon Duarte. He hopes to achieve the punishment of a few of the civilians involved and the expulsion from the military of those who participated in the assassination of the FDR leaders but this is clearly a secondary aim. It is Duarte’s strategy to increase his authority by continuing to cover up for the military’s wave of killings thereby winning their gratitude and confidence.
3. Chavez Mena does not believe this plan will work. He stated that those who are guilty of the murders must be tried and punished. Otherwise the world will perceive the Christian democrats as nothing more than a facade behind which the security forces kill with impunity. He believes that the right wing civilians incorporated into the FAN (Frente Amplio Nacional, D’Aubuisson’s Group), in league with a large number of the security forces, will now begin to kill left wing priests and Christian Democrats. He did not quite say that the killings were being done with the authorization of the military High Command but he clearly implied that at least some of them agreed in principle with the FAN strategy and would continue to protect the guilty. Chavez Mena is discouraged and, unusual for him, a little afraid. He clearly regards our holdup of the helicopters as unimportant unless it is backed up by sterner stuff. It is obvious that he regards Duarte’s plan to [Page 1138] end the division of power between the Junta and the military High Command as illusory and a device to advance the ambitions of Duarte at the expense of the Christian Democratic Party.
4. As the conference was about to break up, Junta member Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez telephoned Chavez Mena. Chavez Mena explained to Gutierrez something of what was taking place and soon after, Duarte and Chavez Mena departed en route to the house of Gutierrez and a conference with Gutierrez.
5. The discussion with Duarte and Chavez Mena was useful and necessary but it will have one signal disadvantage. When I meet tommorrow (Monday) with the four Junta members (Majano is in the United States) and the Minister and Vice Minister of Defense plus the National Guard Commander (I hope to be able to limit the attendance to those seven), it will be like facing murderers row with no infield or outfield behind me, each participant will know exactly what I am going to say. They will already have their strategy prepared. It will take me less than five minutes with the maximum padding to present our demarche and it’s thinness will be obvious. My guess is that the first response will be from the military spokesman who will tell me politely what the United States can do with its Phantom helicopters and to please stop interfering in the internal problems of El Salvador while they take care of their own problems in their own way. The underlying premise will be that on January 21 they will receive helicopters and other military assistance without having to listen to anymore moralizing.
6. Thus, I need more ammunition if our policy is to have any chance of success. Concretely, I need authorization to say that unless prompt and satisfactory action is taken (a) military assistance will be suspended and (b) the Military Training Teams will depart. In addition, I need a joint statement out of Washington of intent to carry on the broad lines of the present policy beyond January 20, specifically including a reaffirmation of the emphasis on human rights. If the last requirement is impossible to obtain, then we have one other tool available which would improve dramatically the chances of success. During the early moments of the conversation of yesterday, Duarte asked me when we could sign the agreement on the pending twenty million dollars of ESF. When I responded that I had received instructions to hold up signing the loan (telephone call from Deputy Office Director Brown to me of November 28),3 for the first time I saw Duarte and Chavez Mena lean forward, listen intently and take what I had to say seriously.
[Page 1139]This government cannot last a week without our economic support and specifically cannot last without the $20 million ESF and our lobbying in its favor with the IMF, World Bank, etc. Seven weeks may be a short time in the life of some governments but it is forever in the life of the Government of El Salvador. It is of vital importance that I have these assets in hand tomorrow when the meeting takes place.
7. In my judgment, we must use all the leverage we have to support the democratic elements of this government, military as well as civilian, and give ourselves a solid probability to make our policy work.
8. The success of our policy in El Salvador has an importance that transcends the boundaries of this country. In capsule, our policy is to assist this government to carry out basic reforms, bring the rightist violence under control. Convince the rational left that violence is unnecessary and that their best hope is to participate in the political process promised by the JRG culminating in elections by 1983 or perhaps before.
9. Over the past year, two right-wing coups have been attempted and frustrated. A third right-wing coup attempt is now under way. If the barbaric killings of the FDR leaders does not succeed in breaking up the present government, then tomorrow they will kill a high Church figure such as Msgr. Ricardo Urioste or a leading Christian Democrat such as Junta member Jose Antonio Morales Ehrlich. And the toll of the young people killed every day by the security forces will continue and increase.
10. The left can count on the support of at least 25 percent of the population. Most of these people will willingly support a reform government such as the JRG if it can put an end to the repression. Our strategy has been to put maximum pressure on the military to cease the repression and seek to establish a dialogue between the government and the leadership of the left. By killing FDR leader Enrique Alvarez, the right-wing civilians and hard line security forces have challenged that policy and have announced that extermination is the only answer.
11. I think it is still possible to frustrate this third rightist coup attempt but we cannot succeed unless Washington adopts measures that have sufficient bite to make them felt. What is at stake in El Salvador is the nature of the government which we are supporting. It will either be a government of moderates, or a government in which the extreme right acts with impunity behind a moderate facade, or one run openly by the extreme right. At this moment the second possibility appears both most likely, and most dangerous for our policy. We could well find ourselves in the position of championing a regime which talks like a democracy and acts like Bolivia. We have a clear chance now to avoid some even more painful choices later, and I believe we must use all our resources to influence the choices that will be made here in the next few days. At a minimum we must achieve the expulsion [Page 1140] from the armed forces of the middle-level officers who are responsible for the killings and a rededication of the officer corps to professionalism and a code of conduct. I believe the Christian Democrats, the Church, and moderate elements in the military would rally behind such changes.4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 8–11/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 8301 from San Salvador, November 28, the Embassy reported the assassination of four Democratic Revolutionary Front members. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 11/80)↩
- Record of the November 28 telephone call between Brown and White has not been found.↩
- In telegram 317787 to San Salvador, November 29, the Department instructed White that, due to the assassination of the FDR leaders, the Department would withhold further action on the helicopters “until we can more fully assess the implications” of the killings. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 11/80) In his December 1 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Pastor noted that White “asked us to concur in his strategy of telling the Junta and High Command that we will cut military and economic assistance if they do not punish the security forces, which he believes were responsible for the deaths of the leftist leaders. Bushnell and I agreed that we would not further our interests by empty threats, and suggested that he merely tell them that we are reviewing our entire relationship, and explore their views about what they intend to do.” Pastor also noted: “Duarte is clearly trying to use this incident to further centralize control, and Bushnell and I think we ought to back him, but White disagrees, preferring the alternative of an outright confrontation, even if its effect is to further polarize the situation.” Pastor recommended that a PRC or SCC address the issue. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 55, Evening Reports: 4/80–8/80)↩