443. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Issues Requiring Presidential Decision Before January 20, 1981 (U)
The issues which either should come to the President for review or will, include:
[Omitted here is material unrelated to El Salvador.]
3. Lethal Military Assistance to El Salvador. I believe the situation in El Salvador will change very rapidly during the next three months, and our ability to influence developments there will decline sharply. Unless the Reagan people clarify their position, the right will force the moderates out of the Junta and out of El Salvador, and a bloodbath will occur.2 I believe the granting of lethal military assistance could precipitate this. I would have recommended going ahead if Carter had won, since the credibility of our strategy would have been enhanced. Now I am not so sure it’s either necessary or a good idea. We do have an obligation to review the Salvadoran government’s human rights performance, and if the government satisfies the criteria set by the President, we should make a decision (around December 15–20) to go ahead with helicopters. I doubt that the Salvadorans will satisfy the criteria, and if that is the case, I don’t believe that a decision is necessary. (C)
The Salvadoran Junta has been extremely successful over the last year because it has pursued the correct political strategy of moving toward the middle and pre-empting the left by its reforms. Our feeling has long been that if the Salvadoran military pursues the correct political strategy, then US military assistance would not be that important or necessary. Conversely, if they did not pursue the correct political strat [Page 1132] egy, no amount of US military assistance would help. Between now and January 20, the Salvadoran military frankly will not even be able to absorb the FMS materiel that we have promised them. I don’t think we need to provide any more, and indeed, to give more could send the wrong signal—that we don’t mind if they revert to the old repressive strategy. DOD has two missions there now to determine additional requirements, but frankly I don’t think the issue of lethal military assistance need be addressed in the last three months of the Carter Administration.3 (C)
[Omitted here is material unrelated to El Salvador.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 19, State: 7–12/80. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum was stamped: “ZB has seen.” An unknown hand wrote: “11/10/80,” next to the stamp.↩
- In telegram 7743 from San Salvador, November 5, White reported that “the landslide victory of Governor Reagan has convinced the private enterprise sector that the United States will, if not support, at least not oppose a restructuring of the ruling Junta.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 11/80) An unsigned memorandum entitled “Situation Room Checklist,” November 6, included a summary of telegram 7743. Aaron underlined the last sentence: “The need for guidance from the transition team is important and urgent,” and wrote “no” in the margin along with his initials. (Ibid.)↩
- In a November 12 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski described various presidential administration transition issues and included El Salvador policy in Category 1, which involved “issues in which our decisions could be affected by the views of the incoming Administration.” An attached memorandum from Muskie to Carter, November 10, noted: “Conservative elements in El Salvador are using our election results as a pretext for moving against Col. Majano and the Christian Democratic members of the Junta. Such changes would diminish even further the limited appeal of the Junta in El Salvador and abroad. Unless the incoming Administration resists overtures from the far-right and signals support for the Junta, there will probably be a rightist coup before inauguration day with a consequent polarization in El Salvador and constriction of U.S. policy options.” Carter wrote in the margin: “Continue to express our support for Junta.” Muskie also noted in reference to the budget: “We should decide whether to supply urgently needed but controversial military equipment and possibly increase aid to the Junta to help cope with the worsening economic situation.” Carter wrote in response to this and other foreign assistance proposals: “Repubs may help us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 2, State/NSC Relations)↩