Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

420. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, March 1, 1980, 2325Z

1557. For Assistant Secretary Bowdler and Robert Pastor of NSC. Subj: Next Steps in the El Salvador Situation. Ref: State 050823.²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Our Feb 25 assessment of where we stood in El Salvador (reftel) has been proven correct, following the strategy we outlined for this decisive week, we have apparently succeeded. Barring any last minute disaster, the agrarian reform will be announced on Monday³ and the banking reform within the next few days. Concurrently the JRG will undertake a number of social order measures the extent of which will depend upon the nature and degree of violent opposition that threatens the reforms.

3. Both the PDC and the military components of the JRG can be justifiably proud of their accomplishments this week. We can take some satisfaction from the critical role we played both in helping them to resolve their differences and in defending them against their enemies. The three of us—Military, PDC, and USG—have further developed and strengthened relationships among ourselves which should serve us well in the difficult days ahead.

4. As we move into phase two next week, I believe the assessment in para B of reftel regarding major new problems we will confront remains valid and that most of the measures which we contemplated taking in paras 8 and 9 are essential. If the second phase presents new challenges to us, clearly it also will offer important new opportunities. The JRG can at last break out of the corner it has been confined to since Oct 15 and can stop cowering under heavy attacks from left, right, and even center. New vistas should now open up for the JRG, giving it more room to deal with both the left and the right. With improved prospects of survival, better unity born of successful decision-making and enhanced authority from restoring a semblance of order, the JRG may be able to get off the defensive and take some offensive measures of its own.

5. Our unfailing support for the JRG has confined us to the same corner with the PDC civilians and the military. As the JRG breaks out we too will be able to move out and take some new initiatives, playing a stronger and more positive hand than heretofore. In this second phase, the main arena of our effort will continue to be here in El Salvador. We will therefore have to continue to rely principally on our mission in El Salvador to carry out our policy, supported by Washington and supplemented at critical moments by measures such as the spokesman’s forthright anti-coup statement of Feb 22.⁴ Thus the primary focus of SCC deliberations should continue to be what the USG itself can and should do here in El Salvador, although there will be opportunities for and indeed the need to secure participation by other countries and international organizations, the decisive measures will be those that we take here directly with the military and the PDC as well as with reachable elements of the right and left.

6. As reported in various telegrams (mostly Nodis), I have already initiated some elements of the phase two strategy which we agreed upon in Guatemala. In discussions with JRG members, the military High Command, and the PDC leadership, I have outlined to them our ideas for capitalizing on new opportunities to deal with the left and the right. All have generally concurred with our assessment and with going forward with some of the more important measures contemplated. With JRG and PDC blessing, FonMin Chavez Mena has had several positive contacts with key elements of the private sector including some of the more enlightened members of the oligarchy. He had a good luncheon meeting with the ANEP leadership on March 1 and the JRG minus Dada Hirezi will meet with a private sector group on Monday evening to brief them on the reform measures and try to enlist their support or at least their acquiescence. Chavez Mena also had an exploratory session with the Archbishop who agreed to put in motion a contact with less extreme elements of the far left, Gutierrez and Majano (who himself has had some contact with the FAPU) concur in the need to try to deal with some elements of the left. I believe they can be counted on to support and participate in this effort if it bears fruit. Some other elements of the military, particularly the High Command, are less sanguine about prospects for dealing with the left but USG support for this should give them the assurance necessary to go along. Thus I believe we may be able to bring the JRG together with the left without having to employ outside intermediaries as contemplated in para 9 ref.

7. In addition to the measures suggested in ref and to the post-reform announcement statements by US and others (proposed to you this morning in SS 1554),⁵ I recommend that we take the following steps:

—Bring in the MTT advance team on Sunday March 9 to be followed by the main party on Sunday March 16;⁶

—Sign the FMS credit agreement as soon as congressional requirements are fulfilled and proceed with the helicopter offer as soon as possible;

—Quickly identify agrarian reform related projects for immediate financing;

—Begin laying plans for Junta trip to Washington and meeting with the President in late March.

Cheek

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 20, El Salvador: 3/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Document 417.
3. March 3.
4. See footnote 3, Document 417.
5. In telegram 1554 from San Salvador, March 1, Cheek reported that the JRG had established a timetable for announcing their reform decrees and suggested that U.S. public statements of recognition be prepared in advance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1724)
6. According to a March 4 action memorandum to Vance from Bowdler, Vance had requested Bowdler’s views on Cheek’s recommendations regarding MTTs to El Salvador. Bowdler endorsed Cheek’s approach and provided a detailed scenario that included the dispatch of MTT following approval by the Chief of Mission in San Salvador. Vance approved proceeding with the scenario. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Misc. Memoranda, 1980)