Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

385. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in El Salvador¹

Washington, October 9, 1979, 1702Z

264095. For Ambassador Devine from Assistant Secretary Vaky. Subject: Situation in El Salvador.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. On October 8, I chaired an inter-agency meeting to review the situation in El Salvador, our current policy and strategy and possible options.² Clearly, the situation in El Salvador is deteriorating. As you have reported, the efforts to forge a political opening through a credible electoral process have lost momentum. President Romero has been unable or unwilling to convince others he will implement a real political opening; the moderate political parties—especially the Christian Democrats—may well have definitely decided to give up on both Romero and the electoral process; the country is bitterly fragmented and coup rumors grow more insistent and credible; the extreme left shows greater strength and capability; and signs indicate that we probably cannot expect further significant steps on the human rights front nor progress against violence from the government.

3. Questions are thus raised as to whether it is realistic any longer to believe that a legitimately contested electoral contest in March 1980 can be fashioned, encouraged or induced. More broadly than that, is it now possible to create any sort of “moderate” coalition of military, private sector, church and democratic parties to regain political momentum and thus increase the government’s legitimacy and isolate the extremists? The reported coup plotting appears to spring as much from frustration and desperation as anything else, but these reports raise serious concerns as to whether a coup scenario provides any viable alternative to insurrectional violence, or whether a coup would not split the military, create vacuums and bring further violence effectively opening the way to the extremists.

4. Clearly, we must now decide whether we should—or can—involve ourselves more deeply in attempting to shape an outcome compatible with our interests, and if so how and in what direction. In this connection, we believe that we still need to test more rigorously than we have whether our present policy’s assumption is in fact realistic, before assuming too early that it is not, i.e. whether or not it is possible to fashion a coalition of GOES, democratic parties, private sector, church, etc. to create an electoral, political process capable of halting the deterioration and polarization. To determine these matters and to answer questions like the ones listed above, it was agreed that we need to know more about current dynamics and what the various players think and are planning now. In particular, we would like to know more about the Christian Democrats’ current thinking and planning, with whom they have been in contact, what their internal situation (and possible divisions) may be, and what scenarios they see as likely or desirable. We also believe that we must once again press them hard with regard to the electoral route, and probe more insistently their willingness to make a real and realistic effort to establish a credible electoral process.

5. We similarly need this kind of deep probing with Archbishop Romero, who is clearly a key player in any future scenario. Are the two Romeros absolutely irreconcilable? Does the Archbishop believe that any evolution toward a political opening and electoral process is now possible? Is he willing to support this course or not, and if so, under what conditions? What does he see as possible scenarios in the circumstances? With whom is he working and what are his objectives? Who are his contacts and whom is he relying on for information and planning purposes?³

6. Accordingly, please arrange to see ASAP—separately of course—Morales Erlich⁴ and Archbishop Romero for the above purposes. Any correlative information you may develop from other sources bearing on the above points should also be reported. We wish to provide recommendations to the Secretary by October 12, and you should therefore try to provide us with a report as soon as you can. By separate cable I am asking Ambassador Luers to make similar contact with Napoleon Duarte.⁵

7. In talking with Morales Erlich, you may draw upon the following points:

—President Romero has taken some steps, not entirely satisfying your concerns, aimed at providing the atmosphere for a political opening. We still believe strongly that you should respond to these steps in order to give the game an opportunity to be played out. Otherwise there may be no game to play.

—What can Romero do concretely to overcome PDC reluctance to participate in the electoral process?

—What are your views about the current situation in El Salvador? What steps is the PDC thinking about taking now? (FYI: We need to know with what groups, civilian and military, the PDC is in contact and what is the nature of its internal divisions. End FYI.)

—What is the likely scenario if the PDC and other opposition groups do not choose to participate in elections?

—(FYI: If Morales mentions a coup as a possibility, you should ask if Morales Erlich and the PDC have carefully thought out the consequences of supporting or acquiescing in the removal of President Romero in other than a constitutional process. A democratic outcome is by no means assured by such a development.)

8. In talking with Archbishop Romero, you may wish to draw on the following:

—Your homilies, many of which I have heard, are unremitting in their criticism of the present government, and are having the effect of making a democratic opening more difficult and precarious. Under the circumstances is there anything that President Romero can do now that would help induce the participation of the moderate opposition, especially the PDC, in the electoral process?

—If the game of political opening is to be played out, it would appear that the moderate opposition should consider taking some steps toward meeting those steps that President Romero has taken. What should these steps be?

—What alternatives do you see to the evident stasis in the efforts toward a political opening? (If he mentions a coup, he also should be asked if all the consequences have been carefully studied.)

—(FYI: In the conversation with Archbishop Romero, it will be helpful to draw out the nature of his present contacts to find out who he is relying on for information on which he bases his assessments. End FYI.)

9. For San Jose: As reported by septel, President Carazo told Vice President Mondale that he believed Duarte’s return to El Salvador was essential since his leadership was urgently required.⁶ He promised to convey this to Venezuelan President Herrera whom he believes has great influence on Duarte. You may wish to inquire of President Carazo, reminding him of our conversation, as to whether he was able to communicate with Herrera.⁷

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2496. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, San José, and Panama City. Drafted by Hemenway and Vaky; cleared in NSC, S/S–O, and ARA; and approved by Vaky.
2. No minutes for the October 8 meeting have been found.
3. See Document 386.
4. No record has been found of this meeting between Devine and Morales Erlich.
5. In telegram 264159 to Caracas, October 9, Vaky instructed Luers to call on Duarte to seek his views on “what, if anything, would induce the PDC to participate in the electoral process.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–1241)
6. Telegram 263971 to multiple posts, October 9, included portions of an October 1 memorandum of conversation recounting a meeting between Carazo and Mondale in Panama. During the meeting, Carazo emphasized the importance of strengthening the position of the Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador and persuading Duarte to assume a leadership role. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, El Salvador Telegrams, 10/79)
7. In telegram 4704 from San José, October 11, Binns reported that Carazo had already conveyed his views on El Salvador to Herrera. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 6, El Salvador: 10/1–14/79)