338. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State1
3804. From Asst. Secretary Bowdler. Subject: Support for Salvadoran Insurgents: Closure of Cuban Ops Center. Ref: (A) San Jose 35971;2 [(B)] San Jose 3706.3
1. S-Entire text.
2. In my pre-departure meeting with Carazo, I again found that his attitude and the atmospherics had changed markedly from our Sunday evening meeting (ref B). He was once again cordial and seemed delighted with the outcome of the San Jose II Conference.4 But a good part of the change was probably due to the fact that he wanted some[Page 832]thing from us, i.e. help with Costa Rican financial problems (see septel on this subject).5
3. In any event, I was able to raise the use of Costa Rica as a transshipment and supply point in the arms traffic with Salvadoran insurgents with ease. Without going into specifics, I pointed out that Costa Rican territory was being used for that purpose and, possibly, to train Salvadoran extremists as well. Drawing on data provided by Seso, I noted that the Cuban support network established to help the Sandinistas continued to function, and that it was in both the U.S. and Costa Rican interest to put a stop to it. I also reminded him that he had earlier agreed to close the Cuban ops center, but that we had mutually decided to delay this action so as not to jeopardize the initiative on the Costa Rican airlift of Cuban refugees and San Jose I.6 I also asked him to look at Cuban Consulate and Soviet Embassy with a view to reducing their size since they also [garble] as bases for promoting subversion.
4. He accepted the point on the Cuban operations center without exception, indicated his basic agreement and observed that he had earlier moved to reduce the size of the Soviet Embassy, but in sending the two Soviet diplomats home he had a pretext—one had been in Limon shortly before a serious strike in that city, while the other had met with a number of Communist labor leaders shortly before the strike. While he would be happy to close the Cuban ops center, as he had previously promised to do, he needed a rationale he could use to justify such action. If we could provide information on which he could follow through, he would move. I pointed out that his own sources could surely provide the necessary link, but Carazo maintained they could not.
5. Seeming to warm to the subject, he suggested that July (in which he expects to see increased labor unrest) might offer a propitious opportunity to take such action. He would, he said, have to play it very close to his vest, since there were a number of people in the Public Security Ministry whom he does not trust. In this regard, he repeated earlier assurances he had given to Charge Binns that he planned to make [Page 833] extensive changes in that Ministry shortly; he is only waiting for the return of Civil Guard Chief Col. Munoz Marin from training in Taiwan to initiate action. (Comment: Seso reports that Munoz Marin is deeply and directly involved in the removal and sale to Salvadoran insurgents of left-over FSLN arms. Putting Munon in charge of a clean up of public security is like selecting a fox to guard the chicken house. Carazo may have made this suggestion to try to draw us out on how much we know about the funny business in that Ministry.) Again, he affirmed the need for a plausible information peg on which to hang action against the Cuban ops center. I said I would see what we could do, pointing out that we had to keep in mind the need to protect sources.
6. I subsequently discussed with Seso ways in which we might provide an information “fig leaf” for Carazo, as evidence of our willingness to meet his perceived requirement. It may be possible to do this without risk of blowing any sources, I understand Seso will be in touch with its headquarters on this matter. I also believe Carazo’s selection of the July timeframe for possible action against the operations center and request for a specific peg on which to base his action give us benchmarks against which we can measure his performance. If we can come up with as good a rationale as he used in ringing the Soviet diplomats, we can test the validity of his declared intentions.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 12, Costa Rica: 12/77–5/80. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 336.↩
- See Document 337.↩
- For an overview of the conference, see footnote 4, Document 337.↩
- In telegram 3801 from San José, July 3, Bowdler reported that Carazo had asked for U.S. financial assistance to address Costa Rican balance of payment difficulties, as well as U.S. assistance with influencing the IMF toward a favorable assistance package for Costa Rica. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800319–0473)↩
- In telegram 2092 from San José, April 18, Binns wrote to Bowdler that Carazo had informed him on April 17 that he had decided to “hold up raid on Cuban ops center” due to his fear that Castro would retaliate by revoking the departure authorizations of Cuban refugees. Binns wrote: “Carazo reiterated that GOCR will close ops center once all Cubans have been evacuated.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800200–0400)↩