Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

316. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 9, 1980

SUBJECT

• Certifying Nicaragua’s Eligibility for Aid (S)

The Congress finally authorized $75 million in aid to Nicaragua, but before releasing the funds, you are required by the law to certify that the Government of Nicaragua has “not cooperated with or harbors any international terrorist organization, or is aiding, abetting, or supporting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries.”² State, OSD and I have reviewed all of the evidence provided by the Intelligence Community and our ambassadors in the field and we find there is no conclusive proof that the Nicaraguan Government (GRN) has been directly involved in such activities. (S)

However, there are reports which lead the CIA to conclude that the Sandinista Directorate “has adopted a policy of providing assistance to Salvadoran insurgents in the form of training, transit, materiel, and arms.” CIA’s overall intelligence judgment is “that there is a very high likelihood that such support activities are occurring and that they represent official FSLN policy. Similarly, the DIA believes “there is sufficient evidence to suspect some official acknowledgment, if not support, of such activities. Yet there is room for doubt.” That is the point: there is no conclusive evidence of Nicaraguan government involvement in promoting revolutionary violence, and indeed the government has denied it. (S)

Our Ambassador to El Salvador makes the excellent point that the Salvadoran Junta has a tremendous incentive to demonstrate Cuban involvement, and since they haven’t, nor has anyone for that matter, there is obviously no conclusive proof that it is taking place. Second- and third-hand reports, even by reliable sources, are not conclusive, nor proof. Moreover, Congress had a secret session on this very issue with virtually all of the evidence available to all of us, and they approved the $75 million (although at the same time, shoving responsibility back to you to confirm their judgment).³ This is a controversial decision, which the Republicans may attack.⁴ You do have the option to postpone a decision for a couple of months, but I think that would be a mistake. We are already committed to the $75 million and to the policy. We have a good case—we want to challenge the Cubans, and we need the money to do that. We postpone the decision only at the risk of hurting the Nicaraguan moderates at a critical moment when they are fighting for free elections and, indeed, for their survival; these leaders have urgently asked us to go ahead. Moreover, since this issue has already attracted so much Congressional and press interest, postponement itself would be interpreted as a political decision and an effort by you to dodge a difficult decision. Therefore, I recommend you go ahead.

Christopher’s memo is at Tab A.⁵ The finding which he and I recommend that you sign is at Tab 1 along with the justification which we will send up to the Hill.⁶ INR’s intelligence assessment is at Tab 2⁷ and the assessments of our Ambassadors in the field are at Tab 3.⁸ (C)

Although there is no conclusive evidence of Nicaraguan Government involvement in terrorist activities in other countries, there are many disturbing reports, and we will therefore instruct Ambassador Pezzullo to go in with a firm demarche and urge them to take prompt action to stop any such activities which are taking place from Nicaraguan territory and not to engage in any such activities.⁹ (S)

State also recommends that we begin disbursing aid to Nicaragua immediately rather than wait until October 1 when the money is available. Therefore, with your approval, we will reprogram $45 million ESF from Egypt now and reimburse that account after October 1. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the finding at Tab 1.¹⁰ (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 39, Nicaragua (Terrorism): 12/79–1/81. Secret. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the top of the page: “Zbig: Go over with Jody.” Pastor sent Brzezinski a draft of the memorandum under a September 8 covering memorandum requesting that Brzezinski “move as rapidly as possible on it.” (Ibid.)
2. An unknown hand underlined the word “Government” and the portion of the sentence beginning with “not” and ending with “countries.”
3. See footnote 3, Document 311.
4. Brzezinski underlined the phrase “Republicans may attack.” He also placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the following two sentences and added an arrow pointing inward in the margin.
5. Attached but not printed is Christopher’s August 25 memorandum to Carter.
6. Tab 1, attached but not printed, is a Presidential Determination addressed to Vance and a “Justification for Presidential Determination to Authorize the Furnishing of Immediate Assistance to Nicaragua.” The determination certified, on the basis of available evidence, that the Government of Nicaragua had not cooperated with or harbored any international terrorist organization or aided acts of terrorism and violence in other countries. Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the administration determined that the $45 million earmarked for Nicaragua in FY 1980 from funds appropriated from Egypt was important to U.S. security.
7. Tab 2, attached but not printed, is an undated “Assessment of Possible Involvement of the Nicaraguan Government in Terrorist Activities in Other Countries,” which noted that “the intelligence currently available, while circumstantial, reveals a persuasive pattern of significant collaboration with Salvadoran insurgents by individual Sandinistas.” The report also stated: “There is no conclusive evidence, however, that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) Directorate—and by extension, the Government of National Reconstruction (GRN)—has been directly involved in, or authorized such activities.”
8. Tab 3, attached but not printed, is telegram 5613 from San Salvador, August 15; telegram 3840 from Managua, August 13; and telegram 4846 from San José, August 19.
9. Carter replaced “stop” with “prevent” and replaced “are taking” with “may take,” and then reversed his decision, writing in the margin: “Leave as was.”
10. Carter signed the determination on September 11.