Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

322. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 15, 1980

SUBJECT

• Possible Coup in Nicaragua

Attached is Secretary Muskie’s memo to you concerning Nicaragua and Cuba.² His bottom line is that the coup plot is not in our interest and should be opposed. As you can imagine, this judgment and others in the memo are not shared by the Secretary of Defense or Dr. Brzezinski. In particular, the pessimistic assessment of the prospects for the coup is not shared by the Intelligence Community which now believes the coup has at least an even chance of success.

As you read Secretary Muskie’s memo you may want to bear the following in mind:

—The current developments in Nicaragua make clear that the FSLN Directorate has not only lost the support of the moderates and business elements, but the coup plot itself shows that the Directorate is now opposed by important and militarily powerful nationalistic elements within the Sandinista movement. Increasingly dependent on Cuba, the radical leaders are losing their legitimacy with the Nicaraguan people.

—The risks of interdicting Cuban intervention set forth in the memo appear exaggerated while the failure to respond to Cuban intervention may be understated. The idea that Castro would attack Guantanamo strikes me as extreme and unlikely. Certainly the CIA should be asked for its considered judgment on likely Cuban responses to U.S. interdiction and on Central American reactions to unopposed Cuban intervention.

—In this connection, I have modified my earlier confidence that overt Cuban armed intervention is unlikely because of Castro’ s assurances conveyed by Padron to Wayne Smith. Ten days before the start of the massive Cuban airlift of troops from Ethiopia we received similar assurances that Cuba would not intervene militarily in the Ogaden War. In his cable summarizing his conversation with Padron, Wayne Smith said that the principal deterrent to Cuban intervention would be threat of U.S. force—a judgment shared by the CIA.³

—An important distinction which the Secretary’s memo fails to make is between U.S. unilateral intervention—which everyone opposes—and efforts to prevent Cuban intervention. The nations of the hemisphere would be able to make that distinction, particularly given the increased disaffection by Nicaragua’s friends (Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Mexico, Jamaica) with the direction the Marxists are taking the Nicaraguan revolution.

—Finally, I must express my astonishment at the suggestion that we should oppose the Nicaraguan desire to take up arms against a government that is increasingly dictatorial and dependent on foreign military support. The difficulties in Nicaragua stem from the efforts of a minority to progressively impose a Marxist regime which broad elements of that society are resisting. (The circumstances are not that different from Afghanistan under Taraki and Amin.) For us to oppose this resistance effort would contravene the very principles on which our own nation was founded. I disagree with State’s definition of the legacy of your policy in Central America and the Panama Canal Treaties: it is to strengthen progressive democratic forces, not open the region to Cuban intervention.

The recent intelligence that the coup will be put off for 10–22 days provides time for a thorough and careful consideration of your choices. (You may wish to read the intelligence cable at Tab B.)⁴ Subject to your direction, we plan to hold a meeting next week of your senior advisors to review these issues and present systematically recommendations or alternatives. In this connection, it is premature to decide on whether a Bowdler/Tarnoff mission to Castro would be desirable, but that is certainly one alternative that should receive careful consideration.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 79, Brzezinski Chron—To/From President, 9/80–12/80. Secret. Carter initialed another November 15 memorandum from Aaron, which discussed the evacuation of U.S. citizens and others from Nicaragua if a civil war broke out. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: Current Crisis: 8/80–1/81)
2. Tab A was not attached. See the attachment to Document 323.
3. In telegram 7792 from Havana, November 6, Smith wrote: “In my judgment, it most unlikely rpt unlikely that Cubans would send troops (rather than simply weapons and advisers) to Nicaragua to prop up GRN or save it from ‛counterrevolutionary reaction.’” He added: “Whatever US in fact might or might not do, Cubans believe we would react with force to deployment their troops to participate in civil wars or suppression ‛counterrevolution’ in any neighboring state.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, Havana, 1980–1983)
4. Tab B was not attached. A November 17 memorandum from McMahon to Bowdler, Spiers, Tighe, and Pastor reported a delay in the coup attempt by up to 22 days. Pastor wrote on the memorandum: “The day before the FSLN killed our source.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 38, Nicaragua: 11/15–30/80) In a November 15 note to Carter, which Carter initialed, Aaron wrote: “Our latest information from the CIA is that the reported coup has been put off for perhaps as long as 22 days. The plotters are waiting for the political climate to improve—that is, for the current conflicts between the moderate political forces in the government to further isolate the radical Marxist elements in the government.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 8/80–1/81)