Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

319. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 13, 1980, 3–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Edmund Muskie, Secretary

• Defense

  • W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy Secretary

• Joint Chiefs of Staff

  • General E.C. Meyer

• Central Intelligence

  • Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Mr. David Aaron

• National Security Council

  • Mr. Robert Pastor

Dr. Brzezinski said that the meeting had a three-fold purpose. First, to obtain the latest update on the possibility of a coup in Nicaragua. Second, the President asked the Secretary of State to develop a series of demarches that we would use with Cuba, selected third countries, and with Moscow, if and when the coup begins. Third, the President asked the Secretary of Defense to prepare military options which would be available to us should we need to respond to Cuban involvement.

Dr. Brzezinski said that at the Secretary of State’s suggestion, he sent a memorandum to the President the previous night.² He then read the memorandum to the group. In the memo, Dr. Brzezinski informed the President about the possibility of a coup, which could occur as soon as this Sunday,³ or perhaps even sooner. The key issue is armed involvement on the part of Cuba. There are a variety of scenarios that could take place, but the strategic issue relates to how we should respond if the Cubans get involved. There are far-reaching consequences if the U.S. policy of non-intervention proves to be an invitation to Cuban involvement. Finally, Dr. Brzezinski recommended that this subject needed further thought at an NSC meeting. He informed the President that U.S. forces will be in the area, providing us the possible means to respond. The President agreed that it would be useful to have a meeting.

Dr. Brzezinski then asked for an update. What should we say to the Cubans? What military action are we capable of taking if Cubans get involved? How quickly will that take? What we don’t want is for the Cubans to deliver a fait accompli. Therefore, there are two specific objectives for this meeting: first, diplomatic, to develop ways to forestall the possibility of Cuban intervention; and second, militarily, what we should do if they ignore our warning.

Mr. Carlucci said that the situation in Nicaragua is deteriorating rapidly, and the position of the FSLN is also deteriorating. The moderate elements have recently walked out of the Council of State, and our reporting suggests additional credence to the possibility of a coup. We have also now learned that Eden Pastora, who is not overly bright but may be somewhat charismatic, has recently approached Honduran high officials for support if he should choose to launch a coup on his own. After giving some background on the various coup plotters, Carlucci concluded that a coup is very plausible now. He said that they are meeting on a daily basis with Sunday as a target date. They have decided to hold off for the time being because of border problems with Honduras. In summary, the additional reporting has lent credence to a coup, and enhanced the chances of success.

In answer to a question from Dr. Brzezinski about the purpose of such a coup, Mr. Carlucci said that the motives are primarily to get rid of the Marxist Junta and to establish a democracy. However, Moncada, the Deputy Chief of Security Services, is aware of the coup, and he could very well be an agent provocateur.

In answer to a question from Dr. Brzezinski about the prospects of Cuban involvement, Carlucci said that he expects the Cubans would be involved if they didn’t expect us to be involved. He said that an unusual meeting was held yesterday at the Cuban Embassy in Managua with high Sandinista officials. He said that he would be surprised if the Cubans did not know about the coup planning. Indeed, it is a reasonable assumption that the Cubans do know.

David Aaron said that everyone knows something is going to happen, but the question is what?

Pastor said that there could very well be more than one coup plot at this time. Indeed, there are several groups, which are plotting, which may not even have contact with each other. A recent intelligence report suggests that a coup is currently being planned by a group of Nicaraguan exiles, including former National Guardsmen. It is quite likely that this group has no contact with the other group that we have been watching. Indeed, both groups may have limited contact with the moderate democratic elements who have just walked out of the Junta.

Carlucci agreed with that statement.

General Meyer asked what is the complexion and make-up of these various groups.

Carlucci said that they are people of substance, who are relatively moderate.

Secretary Muskie, reading from a memo from him to the President which had recently been prepared, said that State’s analysis says that the background of the coup plotters is not that clear.⁴ He repeated that there seems to be three different movements: (1) The most likely group to launch a coup consists of high-level military officers, who are in the midst of an internal power struggle in the military, but who have some support from the private sector. (2) The private sector, labor, and democratic political parties make up the second group. They have recently walked out of the Council of State, and their strategy is to force the government to either meet their demands, or unmask the repressive face of the FSLN. (3) The third group is made up of Nicaraguan exiles, perhaps ex-Somoza types, under the banner of the Nicaraguan Democratic Revolutionary Alliance.

Continuing, Secretary Muskie said that these three movements share a common goal to replace the Marxist leadership with a more democratic system, but the prospects of any of these groups suceeding is slim. The most serious group is the first one. If this gets off the ground, and is crushed, we will have to deal with the very difficult question of foreknowledge and why we didn’t help. If it takes hold, then there is a real threat of Cuban intervention, since the Sandinistas could invoke their military agreement with Cuba. Castro would certainly try to limit his support, perhaps just to military advisers, at the request of the government. If the Sandinistas are losing, Castro may be forced to send troops, but Secretary Muskie’s advisers are divided about whether he would do that. Certainly, the possibility raises important questions. What should we do to stop the Cubans? One thing would be to send a message to the conspirators that they wouldn’t receive any of our support, but there are obvious domestic drawbacks to such a strategy. Secondly, we could try to discourage Castro, and we have drafted a message which would do that. Secretary Muskie said that he could strengthen the message by alluding to the President’s October 1 speech.⁵ In addition, we could send messages to selected governments, and to the OAS. We have already beefed up our communications-monitoring capabilities to be able to detect such involvement.

Dr. Brzezinski then read the paper which the State Department prepared as a demarche to Castro. (The original drafts are at Tabs A and B, along with Dr. Brzezinski’s handwritten suggested changes.)⁶ Dr. Brzezinski said that the drafts looked fine, except for the conclusion, and he agreed with Secretary Muskie that we should make an allusion that the message is in keeping with the President’s October 1 statement. In addition, we should say that there should be no miscalculation on this subject. The U.S. will not stand by idly in the event of any foreign intervention. He asked what was the precise wordings of the President’s October 1 statement, and whether it was on October 1 or 30.

Pastor said it was October 1, 1979, the President said that “we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries.”

Muskie said that was rather strong and suggested that we just allude to the statement without quoting from it. He then read from a recent cable that was sent from Wayne Smith in Havana on the issue of Cuban involvement.⁷ Smith says that he does not believe that there would be any Cuban intervention, and he raised this issue with Padron on November 6, in the context of saying that several members of the diplomatic community had speculated that a recent statement at a Conference of Central American Communist Parties in Havana may have implied that Cuban troops would be prepared to help revolutions in Latin America. Padron said personally that he thought the allegation was absurd, but he would speak to Castro to make sure that his personal reaction was consistent with Cuban policy. On November 12, he reported to Smith that Castro had said categorically that Cuba would not send troops to Nicaragua. This did not, however, rule out the possibility of advisers or materiel, and he does acknowledge that it would be difficult to detect involvement.

Pastor said that there are two issues regarding Cuban involvement—first, the use of Cuban advisers who are already in Nicaragua in order to put down the rebellion, and such action could have important implications, not only with respect to the rebellion, but with respect to public opinion in the United States; and second, the introduction of new Cuban troops and materiel.

Dr. Brzezinski returned to the draft demarches, and said that they were in need of refinement and he felt that the reference to the need to reassess our position and, allowing the Cubans “reasonable self-defense” would give them an opening that they would take advantage of. He therefore recommended a change along the lines that he suggested before. He asked if the members of the group agreed to that change, and all agreed.

(Brzezinski then asked Pastor to get those two drafts retyped, and Pastor left the room for a couple of minutes to do that.)

Military Contingencies

Claytor said that the USS FORRESTAL is in the area, and the 82nd Airborne is also ready, but neither have been alerted to moving specifically into position.

In answer to a question from Dr. Brzezinski, General Meyer said that the Army could send an entire division into Nicaragua within 7 to 10 days, and a battalion within 24 hours, provided that the Army was put on alert. If a brigade is put on alert at the time of demarche, he expected that at least two battalions (out of 3 battalions) could be sent within 24 hours.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he would assume that it would be put on the alert at the time of the demarche.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether General Meyer was absolutely certain they could get 2–3 battalions (approximately 3500 men) into Nicaragua within 24 hours.

General Meyer said that he is not sure. If the surge aircraft were available every 20 minutes, then it could be done. Claytor said that is why an alert makes a big difference. However, General Meyer said there is no quiet way to put our troops on alert. Everyone would know about it. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether it is likely that surge aircraft could take off every 20 minutes. General Meyer said that only if they were on alert. The determinant condition is the question of the airlift, and unfortunately we are now spread all over the world, with the major airlift to Egypt,⁸ and so it is uncertain that we could move that rapidly.

Dr. Brzezinski asked General Meyer to find out precisely whether we could use the Egyptian exercise as a cover to set aside a brigade, perhaps at Fort Bragg, which could be sent in immediately to Nicaragua, if necessary.

General Meyer said that this might be difficult to do, but he would check.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we would have to be ready for an airlift. In addition, the USS FORRESTAL should be in place to be able to interdict any flights by Cuba.

General Meyer said that Admiral Hayward is confident that the FORRESTAL could do that, and that Castro would know of our presence there, since it is already on a training mode right outside Guantanamo. The key question relates to the rules of engagement, and how to respond if attacked. The operational problem is how to interdict/civilian aircraft without shooting it down. There is no way that we will know what that aircraft will be carrying. Of course, pilots could signal to the Cuban airline pilots, but if disregarded then it poses a problem for us.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if the Cuban pilots disregarded our signals, then we could take that as a presumption that they are engaged in sending troops or military materiel, and they should be shot down.

General Meyer said that rules of engagement would have to be developed providing very clear instructions for our pilots.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if any work had been done on this, and General Meyer said that they would begin work on this immediately. He said that the question is one of timing. It will take 12 to 15 hours to move the FORRESTAL over to MODLOK. Dr. Brzezinski expressed surprise that the FORRESTAL is not there now, since the President has been informed of that. General Meyer said that they did not want to move it there because that would be a tip-off to the Cubans that we are aware of the possibility of a coup. Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that the Cubans could have a thousand troops in there in 24 hours, even before we put the FORRESTAL in place. Carlucci acknowledged that we will have little capability of knowing when and where the Cubans were taking off.

Claytor said we could put AWACS up right away, as they are within 3½ hours of the area.

Dr. Brzezinski asked for the argument for not having the FORRESTAL sail to MODLOK now. General Meyer said that they are in a flight-training mode, and that is why they are moved to where they are right now. We can maneuver it to the important point within 12 hours.

Dr. Brzezinski said he just doesn’t understand the General’s answer. The hell with the military exercise; we may need to really use the FORRESTAL.

General Meyer said that they didn’t want to move it there because they felt that it would tip our hand to the Cubans.

David Aaron said that if the carrier moves out of Guantanamo, the Cubans will have it under surveillance, and that would send another good message to the Cubans.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if we have good information that there is a coup by Sunday, and we want to credibly deter the Cubans, we should have it there.

General Meyer said that it is possible that the carrier could precipitate the coup if the Cubans saw that we would be involved.

Mr. Pastor asked whether it would not be possible that the Cubans would see the movement of the carrier for a totally different reason—perhaps for a different kind of exercise. He asked whether carriers ever do exercises in that area of waters.

Mr. Claytor said that normally they are there for training purposes, and they train at a different point than MODLOK.

General Meyer said that they would probably receive a clear signal if we sent it to that area.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the worst situation would be if we gave a stern demarche, but we didn’t have either the credibility or the capability to follow up. He suggested that the FORRESTAL move rapidly on Saturday night so that they could be there on Sunday morning.

Mr. Carlucci said that the coup could begin before Sunday.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President already approved the FORRESTAL at that location so this is not an issue. It is just not where the President thought it was. He suggested that the SCC inform the President that the Acting Secretary of Defense recommended that we redeploy the FORRESTAL to a potentially more effective place where it could perform interdiction within a few hours, and have good coordination with AWACS.

Secretary Muskie was concerned about the possibility of our pilots being trigger-happy. Before sending the pilots into action, we will need a clear assessment of the coup and its possibility of success.

Dr. Brzezinski confirmed that we will need a positive Presidential instruction on the rules of engagement.

David Aaron raised the possibility that the Cubans might try to get their people out if violence started, and he asked whether it is not possible that there may be even more Americans in Nicaragua than Cubans.

General Meyer said that there may be as many as 4400 Americans and approximately the same number of Cubans, and that he would want to consider trying to get Americans out if they were caught in the cross-fire.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we have any capability of knowing what will be in these planes. Would the SR-71 tell us any more? Carlucci said no.

Claytor said that the FORRESTAL could be moved in a position where it is within 6 hours of MODLOK, and since it will take us at least that long to get agreement on the rules of engagement, and since that would put it in a non-provocative position, that may be the best idea. There was agreement on that point.

General Meyer referred to the steps that we would need to take. First the coup starts, and we would present the demarche to Castro immediately, and move to MODLOK. Dr. Brzezinski confirmed that we should go immediately to the Cubans and also move the FORRESTAL into place.

David Aaron raised the issue of protecting Americans.

Dr. Brzezinski said that was an important point, but the President had asked the SCC to meet on two other issues: an approach to the Cubans; and basic military contingencies. He agreed with David Aaron’s point that we also need to look at the question of safe havens, but that this should be done at the next meeting.

Claytor said that he would work on that right away.

Dr. Brzezinski summarized by saying that the SCC agreed that at the moment of the coup we should make an immediate demarche to the Cubans; the carrier should move to MODLOK; and the AWACS should be activated. We will ask the President to approve these three steps at this time. In addition, he said that we will need to have a continuing capability to know what the Cubans are unloading, and he asked whether the carrier planes would be able to travel behind the Cuban aircraft and detect what was being unloaded.

General Meyer said that would be difficult, but possible. He said that their 40 Antonov’s could airlift in 2000 people from Cuba in 36 hours.

Carlucci said that they could send 1000 in a single sortie by 5 IL–62’s and 20 AN–26’s.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we will need quick decisions.

David Aaron asked whether we could have some of our people on the ground in Managua to cover the airfields and follow who and what is getting off.

Secretary Muskie agreed that it would be very valuable to do this. We do not want to shoot down planes in which there are innocent civilians on it.

General Meyer agreed that we need to be able to see that they are in fact discouraging armed soldiers.

Carlucci said that we had some SIGINT capabilities to detect that, but we don’t know how good it is.

Secretary Muskie said that we should meet again, and Dr. Brzezinski agreed, and asked Mr. Pastor to prepare a memo from him to the President which summarized the meeting, for him to send to the President within 2 hours.⁹

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 33, Meetings—SCC 349A, 11/13/1980. Secret. Sent for information. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Drafted on November 18.
2. See Document 318.
3. November 16.
4. Reference is to an undated memorandum from Muskie to Carter entitled “Possible Coup in Nicaragua.” A copy of the memorandum is attached to Brzezinski’s November 13 memorandum to Carter printed as Document 320.
5. Carter addressed the nation concerning the Soviet Brigade in Cuba on October 1, 1979. The address was televised live over radio and television. See Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, p. 1804. The speech is printed as Document 129 in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
6. See Document 320.
7. In telegram 7870 from Havana, November 12, Smith wrote: “My own assessment is that Cubans would not rpt not seriously consider sending combat units to Nicaragua.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1281)
8. On November 11, giant air transports carrying the new Rapid Deployment Force and soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division departed for Egypt to participate in operation ‛Bright Star,’ a combined U.S.-Egyptian military exercise in the Sinai Peninsula. (Richard Halloran, “U.S. Troops, Taking Off for Egypt, Get Some Advice on Camel Drivers,” New York Times, November 12, 1980, p. A6)
9. See Document 320.