Office of the Historian

318. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, November 12, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Possible Coup in Nicaragua

1. You ought to know that a coup may be taking place in Nicaragua as early as November 16. I attach a paper from Stan Turner, which provides more detail.2

2. The key issue that will face us is how to react in the event of an armed intervention by Cuba to suppress the coup.

3. There are three possible scenarios:

(1) Cuban intervention to forestall or mop up the coup on behalf of the government in Managua.

(2) Intervention to restore the government if the coup succeeds.

(3) Intervention to suppress the coup while it is in progress, with fighting in various parts of the country.

4. The strategic issue that we will confront is how to respond to such Cuban intervention, especially if it were to occur in the circumstances outlined under 3/2 or 3/3. Far-reaching strategic consequences would be involved if our policy of non-intervention in Central America was now to be exploited by a policy of armed Cuban intervention (which would be de facto also a form of Soviet intervention).

5. You may want to give this matter some advance thought and Harold Brown and Muskie urged me to bring it to your attention. We will convene an SCC if circumstances direct it.3 In the meantime, the USS FORRESTAL is in the area and will stay in the area so that the U.S. will have the necessary means for interdiction of any Cuban airlift.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 8/80–1/81. Secret. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum.↩
  2. Not attached. The attachment was a paper prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency entitled “Nicaragua: Update on the Coup Plotting,” November 11. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, Folder 9: Latin America)↩
  3. For the minutes of the November 13 SCC meeting, see Document 319. In a November 12 note to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor noted that the coup attempt might be on November 16. He indicated that he had a “long talk” with Tarnoff during which they “disagreed rather fundamentally on the ways the USG should respond if a coup began and Cuban involvement was possible.” Pastor concluded that “unless we work out any differences before the coup, we will probably be unable to act quickly enough to stem possible Cuban involvement.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 55, Evening Reports: 4/80–8/80)↩