Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, August 29, 1980, 0039Z

4111. Subj: (U) The August 23 Hangover. Ref A. Managua 4015² B. Managua 4093.³

1. C-Entire text

2. As expected, 23 Aug announcement on elections (see ref A) has prompted all non-FSLN sectors of Nicaraguan society and international representatives here to reflect and reassess. (Political party and La Prensa’s reaction is covered in ref B).

3. COSEP has been engaged in a continuous round of internal discussions to analyze the current situation and determine courses of action. After getting over the initial shock during which many thought the solution was a one-way ticket to Miami, COSEP members have attempted to chart an activist course while preserving unity. They have come to realize their lack of activity and coordination during the month long absence of COSEP President Enrique Dreyfus has permitted the GRN/FSLN to intimidate individual members through harassment. The events of Aug 23 have shocked them into the realization that they either stick together or hang separately.

4. The Council of State will be the immediate forum in which some of the debate will take place. Some proposed that COSEP reps should withdraw from the Council, but cooler heads prevailed by arguing that COSEP should make use of the forum for its purposes. Retirement from the Council, if and when they choose to take that step, will be planned to extract maximum political effect.

5. The members of the Chamorro family running La Prensa are battening down the hatches in preparation for an assault on the newspaper. The bills Sergio Ramirez said would be sent to the Council of State regulating “disinformation” (ref A) were made public on Aug 27 and passed by the Council of State the same day over private sector and independent political party opposition. One prohibits electoral activity. . . although apparently not political activity . . . in the period before 1984. The other two limit press freedom with respect to information on scarcities of popular consumer products and matters of security and national defense.

6. The Ambassadors of Venezuela, Costa Rica, Peru, Spain and Ecuador generally agree with our assessment that Aug 23 represented a FSLN coup d’etat, in that the Junta was cavalierly pushed aside by an FSLN Directorate that made clear that it had the guns and would rule. In the face of this reality, all come to the conclusion that they must keep their cool and program inputs must continue. Venezuelan Amb Yepez, whose govt was particularly stunned by some of the recent gratuitous swipes at Venezuelan aid, brought his displeasure to the attention of several members of the govt. He received assurances that they appreciated Venezuelan assistance and apologized for statements which may have offended Venezuelan dignity.

7. The question universally asked is why the FSLN felt compelled to take this dramatic step (which all see as self-destructive) at a time when its dependence on international assistance and on the support of the private sector is critical to see it through the economic crunch expected before year end.

8. There is no simple explanation, but we believe that pressure on the govt to hold elections was the catalyst. Ever since their entry into power in July of last year, FSLN leaders have spoken in the most vague terms about elections, repeatedly emphasizing that economic and social problems had to be attended to before the elections were held. The April crisis, precipitated by the resignation of Alfonso Robelo,⁴ forced the FSLN into discussions with COSEP and led to agreements on a wide range of political and economic issues including elections. The dialogue with COSEP may have appeared to be working toward a series of fundamental threats to FSLN dominance, the discredited (by Somoza and Marx) concept of elections foremost among them. (It is quite possible that the most zealous FSLN ideologues argued that the FSLN negotiators were driven to accept a revisionist path). The Aug 23 pronouncements may thus be viewed as the FSLN assuring itself a degree and duration of control necessary to consolidate the revolution.

9. The FSLN must have realized that the pronouncements would run the risk of sharpening their authoritarian image at home (which may not have troubled them) and in the rest of the world (which would be costly to them). The FSLN has been pumped up in the past six weeks by the July 19 celebrations, Castro visit,⁵ and the completion of the largely successful literacy campaign (which may have convinced them they have won over the youth). We think they may have seriously underestimated the negative impact, at least externally, of the Aug 23 pronouncements.

10. Comment: After being stunned by the events of Aug 23, the democratic and moderate forces are thinking carefully about their next moves. On reflection, most are convinced that the FSLN Directorate was driven to respond to pressure to hold elections in the only way it knows how; namely to strike out against those national and international forces that want to “destroy the revolution”. By setting a date for elections so far in the future and making clear that its version of “revolutionary democracy” limits participation by those forces critical of its leadership, the FSLN has created a pressure cooker without an effective escape valve. The political parties, La Prensa and the private sector can be counted on to try every means to bring this reality to the attention of the FSLN leadership.

Pezzullo

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800412–0070. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Bogotá, Caracas, Guatemala City, Mexico City, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa. Sent for information to Santo Domingo, USINT Havana, and USCINSO Quarry Heights.
2. In telegram 4015 from Managua, August 24, the Embassy reported that at the August 23 “mass rally in Managua to celebrate the conclusion of the literacy campaign Defense Min Humberto Ortega announced that elections would not be held until 1985.” Ortega also “attacked foreign and domestic enemies of the revolution, chief among which he placed ‛North American imperialism.’” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 37, Nicaragua: 4–8/80)
3. In telegram 4093 from Managua, August 27, the Embassy reported that the FSLN “pronouncement on elections has evoked sharp reactions from the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Nicaragua Democratic Movement (MDN), and the Conservative Democratic Party (PCD).” The Embassy also noted an August 25 article in La Prensa entitled “Without Elections There is No Democracy” and commented: “The gloves are off in the Nicaraguan ideological and civic struggle.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800411–0246)
4. In telegram 1893 from Managua, April 22, the Embassy reported that Robelo and Cruz had resigned from the GRN. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800200–0352) In telegram 1929 from Managua, April 23, the Embassy noted that Robelo had “made a clear statement of his reasons for leaving the government which puts the issue in context of political pluralism, respect for the fundamental statute of the GRN, and arbitrary actions of FSLN.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800202–0468)
5. In telegram 3655 from Managua, August 1, the Embassy provided an overview of Castro’ s “eight day visit on the occasion of the 19 of July anniversary of the FSLN victory.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800371–0917)