305. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
1. On July 19, 1979, President Carter signed a general finding on Nicaragua which directed the Central Intelligence agency “to assist democratic elements in Nicaragua to resist efforts of Cuban-supported and other Marxist groups to consolidate power by disseminating non-attributable propaganda worldwide and in Nicaragua in their support and in opposition to Cuban involvement.”2 In order to implement [Page 738] this finding by tasking the covert action infrastructure the following perspectives was coordinated with the state department and was approved on 17 August 1979.
2. The U.S. Government hopes that the end of the Somoza dictatorship marks the beginning of a process of democratization in Nicaragua and that the Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) will move quickly to hold free elections and guarantee human rights. To ensure the survival of pluralistic democracy in Nicaragua, the USG supports the initiatives by the Andean Pact countries and the OAS to provide humanitarian aid to Nicaragua, support moderate political groups, and oppose the consolidation of power by pro-Cuban Marxist Factions of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).
3. As a result of the military success of the FSLN, a five-person Junta appointed by the Sandinistas assumed power on 20 July. The Junta includes one avowed radical Marxist, Daniel Ortega Saavedra; two leftists; and two moderates. Lines of authority between the Junta and the Sandinista military commanders remain confused. Although there are indications that the military commanders—headquarters in former President Somoza’s “bunker”—are becoming the incipient central authority, they reportedly continue to wrangle among themselves to achieve factional or individual ascendancy. Tomas Borge Martinez, former guerrilla leader with extensive Cuban ties, who is an effective and practical leader, appears to be fast becoming one of the real powers of government by having placed himself in a position of organizational control of the police, the army, and local government. As minister of interior, he is responsible for all police functions and his ministry is the liaison between the National Government and the leaders of Nicaragua’s municipalities. Borge is also one of the three commanders of the new FSLN Army.
4. While the FSLN received support from a number of countries, particularly Panama, Costa Rica and Venezuela, who worked in cooperation with Cuba in support of the FSLN, Cuba has been training members of the FSLN since the 1960’s. Besides training, Cuba supplied documentation advisors and some weapons and mobilized other Latin American communist parties and guerrilla groups in support of the FSLN.
5. In foreign policy the GNR has stated its intention to join the non-aligned movement at the summit conference in Havana in September 1979. Eden Pastora, Sandinista leader and Borge’s deputy at the interior ministry, denies any alliances, saying that the Sandinistas would “only move close to Russia, Chinese or Cuban communism if, at the end of their struggle, they do not receive from the so-called democratic nations the help needed to reconstruct Nicaragua, as was the case with Fidel Castro.” Nonetheless, in view of the heavy debt [Page 739] owed by the FSLN to Cuba, it is expected that Nicaragua will join Cuba as a member of the pro-Soviet bloc of the NAM.
6. The FSLN leadership is also indebted to the radical groups in neighboring countries for their help in overthrowing Somoza, but will probably try to consolidate its own power before exporting the Nicaraguan Revolution. Borge has set what is likely to be the government’s consistent public line—denying that there will be any export of the revolution but taking satisfaction in setting an example.
7. In support of the U.S. goal of a democratic and pluralistic government in Nicaragua, the following guidelines are provided for tasking the covert action infrastructure:
A. Encourage moderate groups in the GNR by publicizing both in Nicaragua and in the International Community, their programs and actions.
B. Expose the Marxist elements in the GNR and their links with Cuba; condemn Cuban subversive activities.
C. Support continued strong involvement of other Latin American countries as a moderating influence on FSLN elements in the GNR.
D. Support efforts through international organizations to guarantee human rights.
E. Encourage the development and maintenance of democratic institutions in particular a free press and political parties; advocate early free elections.
F. Publicize efforts by Western nations to provide aid and technical assistance to help rebuild Nicaragua; compare this with assistance provided by communist countries.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 81M01032R: Subject Committee Files (1943–1980), Box 9, Folder 20: Covert Action Pres Find Nicaragua. Secret. An unknown hand wrote: “Rec. 29 Aug 79” at the top of the page.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 286.↩