300. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1

3437. Subject: (C) Presentation of Credentials.

1. C-Entire text.

2. I presented credentials to the Junta late afternoon July 31. The public part of the ceremony, attended by the press will be reported separately2 as will assistance/economic topics discussed.3 This report will cover political and military items and the general atmosphere.

3. Four Junta members were in attendance (Ramirez, Chamorro, Ortega and HassanRobelo was in Caracas for SELA meeting, FonMin D’Escoto and Junta Secretary Cesar. The principal spokesmen during private session were Ramirez and Ortega, with the latter taking the lead on military and political items and the former on economic issues. The mood was cordial and cooperative. The severity of the economic crisis is of priority concern to them as is the continued violence in the city and the perceived threat from GN/Somoza elements. Mrs. Chamorro asked one question (on food distribution); Hassan didn’t utter word. Mrs. Chamorro was most interested when I discussed the importance of US public opinion and the free press in shaping US foreign policy. There appeared to be a consensus in the group on all the issues raised. No one ever took issue with, or even qualified, a statement by another member. D’Escoto was helpful throughout and made a very forthcoming public statement of appreciation for USG assistance and the interest of the GRN in developing cordial and “profound” relations with the USG.

4. Ortega described the difficulties they faced in keeping “Trotskyist, Maoist” and other radicals from completely “socializing” the revolution. He said the Junta already was being accused of “betraying the revolution”. He did not identify the radicals. I said it was recognized that they were passing through the most crucial phase of their revolution and their own ability to control extremism and excesses will be [Page 730] crucial, both internally and externally. Their international image in turn will have a profound effect on other countries’ attitudes. I emphasized that our ability to be helpful, which is our sincere desire as clearly evidenced by our humanitarian assistance and willingness to play a role in reconstruction, could be seriously frustrated if the situation radicalized. Ortega and Ramirez, in particular, appeared very sensitive to this point, which I dwelt on at some length.

5. Both Ramirez and Ortega mentioned the continuing internal security threat and the rumors of intriguing by Somoza in the northern tier LA countries and the US. They asked if the USG could be helpful. I said we would do our utmost, but as of the moment have seen no evidence which substantiates the rumors.4 I suggest that war jitters and some interested parties might be deliberately exaggerating the threat. I suggested, as I had earlier to Borge5 and D’Escoto6 that they make a major effort to build bridges to their northern neighbors. Ortega reiterated what I had heard earlier, that they had opened talks with Honduras and were confident that relations would be friendly with that country. They were less certain that it would be possible to work closely with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan Governments. I said they had to make a major effort to quell the suspicion that they were interested in exporting their revolution northward. Despite their denials and assertions that “we have enough problems to deal with here,” they made no secret of the political incompatibility which separated them and the fact that opposition movements in Guatemala and El Salvador were using the Nicaraguan revolution as a rallying call for revolution in their countries.

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6. Ortega then raised the issue of US military technical and advisory assistance. His approach was closer to the original demarche by Borge. I recounted my discussion with Borge on the subject and suggested that we meet with interested members of their group to discuss the subject further. I suggested that, given the sensitivity about direct involvement by US military personnel, perhaps we would consider some multi-country program within which the USG could play a role, but not a major one. Ortega volunteered the Panamanians and some GN personnel, in the country. (I would appreciate if AmEmbassy Panama could confirm. Salamin is very illusive despite my repeated attempts to contact him.) He also reported that the military members of the Venezuelan delegation that visited here July 30, expressed an interest in some military advisory rule. Ramirez suggested the Mexicans as possibly also being interested. We left the discussion at that stage with the promise that we would join it again when we had collected our thoughts a bit more.

7. Comment. It was a productive first meeting free of polemics and posturing. Despite the financial and political crises they were composed and analytical in their approach to all the problems we discussed. The only hint that “the errors of the past” will cloud our relations came from Ortega. I suggested that we avoid being prisoners of the past, that the Carter administration had been very critical of the Somoza regime because of its violations of human rights and that we had cut off all military support to him well before the recent hostilities began. I said I hope that they would be sensitive to those who would like to provoke differences between US through distorted intelligence reports and misinformation. The USG had an earnest interest in helping in the humanitarian and reconstruction effort and in seeing the GRN prosper as a viable democratic government which served the needs of all Nicaraguans.

Pezzullo
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790348–0429. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Panama City, Caracas, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, Guatemala City, San José, Santo Domingo, and Mexico City.
  2. In telegram 3444 from Managua, August 1, the Embassy reported about Pezzullo’s presentation of his credentials to the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction on July 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790348–0646)
  3. In telegram 3443 from Managua, August 1, the Embassy reported on Pezzullo’s July 31 conversations with the Junta about economic topics including “the hoped-for early availability of an emergency package of $8 to $10 million.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790348–0654)
  4. In telegram 198755 to Guatemala City, July 31, Vaky informed Ortiz, Devine, and Jaramillo: “We can expect continued charges that National Guard refugees are being formed into a counter-revolutionary force.” He instructed them to make it a “top priority” to gather relevant information, requesting that they remain alert “particularly to any indication that Somoza or former officers like Comandante Bravo have contact with either local military or the GN elements.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Under an August 2 memorandum to Turner, Bowdler forwarded a copy of telegram 198755 and requested that Turner “ask the intelligence community generally to give priority attention” to the issue. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R: Executive Registry Subject Files (1977–1979), Box 13, Folder 28: C–352 Latin America)
  5. In telegram 3388 from Managua, July 30, Pezzullo reported on his July 30 conversation with Borge during which Pezzullo encouraged Borge to “open a dialogue with the leadership” of El Salvador and Guatemala “to quell their apprehension about FSLN involvement in their internal affairs.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790346–0558)
  6. In telegram 3409 from Managua, July 31, Pezzullo reported on his July 30 conversation with D’Escoto. Pezzullo wrote: “When he indicated preoccupation over possible attacks from Guatemala or Salvador, he jumped at my suggestion that he make a goodwill visit to those countries as ‛a good idea.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790347–0869)