295. Memorandum of Conversations1
PARTICIPANTS
- Anastasio Somoza Debayle, President of the Republic of Nicaragua
- Lawrence H. Pezzullo, American Ambassador in Nicaragua
I had at least nine conversations with Somoza, each lasting between one and three hours. At the first session (June 27), with Congressman Murphy present, I reviewed our position along the lines earlier described to Foreign Minister Quintana by Christopher and by me to Luis Pallais. The crux of our position was that the longer he stayed in [Page 716] power the more the situation would polarize and perpetuate the violence (see attachment).2
Somoza was noncommittal the first day, content to go on at great length about how the United States, and specifically the Carter Administration, had been out to get him. He played the role of the martyr who was being sacrificed because of U.S. loss of resolve and misunderstanding of the Communist threat.
The next day Somoza said he was prepared to leave and expressed concern that the GN and the Liberal Party be protected. We spent a great deal of time discussing both institutions. I argued that his departure and the establishment of a democratic regime offered those institutions opportunities for survival. The GN would have to go through a difficult transition period with new leadership and be flexible enough to accept change and restructure. The Liberal Party, if it had the broad-base strength Somoza alleged, would have an opportunity to show its strength when elections were held. At this early stage, Somoza was more interested in his own fortunes. We talked about his status in the United States and about extradition. I said the extradition issue would hinge on the attitude of the new government in Nicaragua and the climate of opinion in the United States at the time of an extradition request. I urged him to be mindful that his public statements following his departure would influence U.S. press and public opinion, which in turn would affect the Administration’s position on extradition.
The third meeting (June 29) was very much a repeat of the second. I told him on that occasion that we were not prepared to set a specific date for his departure as yet because we were hoping that the talks in progress would give us a better feel soon for the conditions which would exist following his departure. I emphasized our interest in a peaceful transition without retribution and one in which some elements of the GN would survive.
Foreign Minister Quintana was in attendance at these first three meetings and at all the subsequent meetings. On countless occasions we went over the two-step departure scenario, which Quintana had originally suggested to Pete Vaky as a possible transition formula. There was never any question in anybody’s mind as to what the process entailed. The first step was the constitutional transfer from Somoza to a member of Congress; the second—the caretaker one—was to be brief (we always spoke of hours with 72 being the outside limit) and to end with the resignation of the Interim President and the dissolution of the Congress. Indeed, at one point Somoza told Quintana that, since the second stage was a coup d’etat, if need be the transfer could even jump [Page 717] over the first stage. This is very important, because Somoza has alleged in the press that he was unaware of any specific discussions on this point.
There was then a pause in my meetings with Somoza as we began the TCP gambit. I did meet with Somoza on July 4 to indicate that we were hopeful that we would soon have agreement on the conditions following his departure (ceasefire, no retributions, etc.) and would then work toward a specific D-Day. He again said he was ready to leave. Midway through the TCP period, when it appeared their efforts were coming to naught, I proposed that we ask Somoza to leave without any assurances as to the post-period. It was on the basis of that second option that I was instructed to ask him to leave within 48 to 72 hours, and to name a congressional successor and a new commander of the GN. I did so on July 14. Within 24 hours we obtained his commitment to leave. The only question became whether it would be Monday3 or slip a bit.
At the same time, Bowdler’s conversation with the Junta began to bear fruit on the key issues of a ceasefire, reprisals, sanctuaries and most importantly, the role (and survival) of the GN. When I saw Somoza on July 15, I told him that a framework of assurances was being structured within which the GN would survive as an institution. I told him that the new GN commander would be a member of a commission with the FSLN which would work out the modalities of the ceasefire and later restructure the Nicaraguan armed forces. I urged him to select a GN commander who had the flexibility to deal in a transitional environment, and that his skill as a negotiator and as a respected officer within the GN would determine the fate of the GN. His final choice of Colonel Francisco Mejia (one of five candidates I suggested to Somoza) was made on those grounds.
I met Urcuyo for the first time on the afternoon of July 15. At the morning meeting with Somoza, the latter had announced that Urcuyo was his choice as successor. The meeting covered two issues: the selection of the new GN commander (Mejia was chosen) and the congressional succession scenario. I reviewed with Urcuyo his role in the two-step process. When I finished, I asked Julio Quintana if he had anything to add, noting that it was his brainchild. Quintana said I had covered all the essential details. I emphasized to Urcuyo that he would hold office for a very brief time (we were thinking of 72 hours at that time) and that he would have a historical role to play in being the transitional figure between Somoza and the new GNR. I told him he should [Page 718] announce early that he was prepared to resign, dissolve the Congress and turn over power to the Provisional Junta.
I never did have the opportunity to speak with Mejia in Somoza’s presence or in the detail I did with Urcuyo. This was unfortunate because he clearly was misinformed and misled by Somoza. The morning of July 16 I met again with Somoza. Urcuyo was present. We reviewed many details of the scenario. I told Urcuyo we would meet with him privately to go over the details of his role. He agreed to meet that afternoon at the hotel. Tom O’Donnell visited Urcuyo that afternoon, reviewed his role during the brief transition and went over specific points Urcuyo should make in his address to the nation. Concurrently, I was meeting with the Junta’s advance team. I called Urcuyo in their presence to arrange for an early meeting between them and to seek Urcuyo’s agreement to arrange for the radio/TV hookup the next morning at which the Archbishop, he and the Junta would make statement to the nation. I asked Urcuyo to be prepared with General Mejia to then meet with the Junta members who would arrive and their military commanders to work out the modalities of the ceasefire and transfer of power. He told me he would try to arrange things. He complained to Tom that he had no staff, indeed he was not even President yet, and might find it difficult to move quickly until after Somoza left. I passed that to the Junta’s advance team and advised that they continue to deal directly with Urcuyo but avoid any actions which might upset Somoza’s departure plans. They agreed and arranged separately to meet with Urcuyo on Tuesday morning, after Somoza’s exit.
The first indication of Somoza’s meddling came later that evening. I received a call from him at about 9:00 p.m. He warned me that “If you are not careful you will start a war here.” I reminded him that a war was going on. He laughed and said it would be impossible for members of the FSLN to come into Managua the next morning. I asked him why. He said it would be too inflammatory, and suggested that the FSLN leaders and Mejia meet near the border.
I called Bowdler and asked if the FSLN commanders would be prepared to meet with Mejia near the border rather than in Managua. He said he would ask them and call me back. He called within the hour and said the Southcom plane would be in Managua at seven in the morning to take Mejia and his party to Penas Blancas, Costa Rica, for ceasefire/military discussions. I called Mejia immediately (it was the first time we had spoken) and informed him of the FSLN willingness to meet at Penas Blancas and that we would have a plane at the airport at 7 a.m. to take him there. I explained that we had made this arrangement to satisfy Somoza’s concern about FSLN leaders coming to Managua. He asked about security. I said we were confident that [Page 719] he would run no risk and offered to send Lt. Colonel McCoy along on the flight. He said he would have to talk to the President and would be back to me. I indicated that unless he had difficulty I would assume that he would take the plane at 7 a.m. I then called Lt. Colonel McCoy and asked him to keep me advised if any difficulties arose. These conversations ended about one o’clock the morning of July 17.
At 5:30 a.m., McCoy called to inform me that Mejia was not going. I called Mejia, then Urcuyo, and urged them both not to abort this very important first meeting. Mejia simply stated that the President had made the decision that he should not go. Urcuyo, who had been a silent mouse of a man, suddenly became presidential in tone and indicated that a meeting in Costa Rica was out of the question. I pushed very hard and told him he was jeopardizing everything by aborting an essential meeting at this crucial time. He refused to budge.
A series of events followed. Urcuyo refused to meet with the Junta’s advance team. He told the press that he was going to complete the term of the constitutional President and indicated that he was willing to dialogue with the Junta but not to turn over power. In light of these developments, I called on Mejia and Urcuyo at 1 p.m. July 17 and discovered immediately that Urcuyo was following a new script. I told him he was endangering a carefully designed agreement, emphasized that history would hold him responsible for the failure to bring about an orderly transition and, speaking through him to Mejia, I lamented that the GN would be the principal victim of his intransigence. I said it was inconceivable to the USG why he was deliberately frustrating the process of working out a ceasefire and the modalities of a transfer of power. Urcuyo insisted that he had never been told that he would be a caretaker President. I reminded him of our earlier conversations, but he insisted that he had never had that understanding.
We met again for two hours later in the afternoon. To ensure that both Mejia and Urcuyo were fully aware of the events of the past several weeks, I summarized my conversations with Somoza and the understandings we had reached, placing specific emphasis on the two-step arrangement and the provisions worked out with the Junta to permit the GN commander to be a principal figure in the ceasefire arrangements and the restructuring of the Nicaraguan armed forces. Urcuyo again insisted he would not turn over power “to a Communist Junta.”
I tried another appeal the morning of July 18 with the same negative response from Urcuyo. I left on a C–130 at 10:15 a.m.
It is hard to believe that Urucuyo acted on his own though this is what Somoza would like us to swallow. There is no question that Urcuyo understood the scenario called for him to step down and turn power over to the GNR. Mejia, I believe, was misled. Somoza probably [Page 720] told him that the USG and the northern tier Central American countries would come to the assistance of the GN once he had left the scene. That would explain the anguished calls we received from various Guard officers after Somoza left, when they discovered that the USG was not prepared to supply materiel support. I think Somoza also orchestrated a series of contacts and calls from the northern tier Central American states and from influential private sector figures in Miami. These calls to Urcuyo offered support and urged him to stand fast and not yield “to the Communists.” I believe Urcuyo was fool enough to believe this.
Somoza taped all of my conversations with him. They cover a wide range of subjects. Naturally he can make public those excerpts which best serve his interests. Since our own position evolved during this time he may be able to support his argument that we did not provide the “guarantees” he had sought. I told him on more than one occasion that there were no guarantees, that the GN and the Liberal Party would have the greatest prospects for survival if they could be separated from the Somoza legacy and be offered the opportunity to work in a democratic atmosphere. The most telling point is that Somoza was scrupulous in following the part of the scenario which dealt with his personal welfare. The failure occurred on what was left behind. The GN and the Liberal Party were victimized by his cynical political maneuvering. History must record that message.