281. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State and Multiple Central American Diplomatic Posts1
3230. Subject: (S) Transition Planning.
1. S-Entire text.
2. I met with Junta representatives Noel Rivas Gasteazoro, and Edmundo Jarquin early afternoon July 16 and later in the day. Meanwhile Tom O’Donnell and PolOff were meeting with the President-designate to the Congress Francisco Urcuyo.2 I believe I succeeded in convincing Rivas and Jarquin that the scenario spelled out in San Jose 31033 was unworkable and would create unnecessary strains during the first day of transition. They recognize that Urcuyo did not have the authority yet to put a plan in motion and recognized the advisability of not doing anything which might upset the Somoza departure plan. [Page 693] We then turned to the specific of their scenario. The 8:00 a.m. call to Archbishop for a ceasefire, steadfast, etc seemed a good idea, if the Archbishop returned on time. The idea of having the Junta play a tape and Urcuyo speak in support of a peaceful transition sounded good. Their scenario plan was unnecessarily insulting to the GN and not in keeping with the earlier agreement regarding the role it was to play in the transition period. I suggested that a Jerry-built plan for securing entry of the Junta was dangerous and unnecessary, rather what was needed was a meeting between the new Guard Commander and FSLN leaders to work out security arrangements for the capital not only for tomorrow but for the days and weeks ahead. This would be the first substantive meeting on the subject at the cease-fire arrangement, which could then lead to a standing committee to work out cease-fire arrangements throughout the country.
3. Rivas and Jarquin liked the idea and said they would forward their endorsement to the Junta in San Jose.
4. I called Urcuyo to see if he could agree with the 8:00 a.m. session and arrange for radio and TV broadcasting from either the airport or the Camino Real Hotel. Urcuyo agreed in principal but clearly was overwhelmed by the logistical aspects especially when I suggested that he and Col. Mojica should greet the Archbishop at the airport and accompany him, perhaps with the FSLN leaders, to the site selected for the radio/TV address and the negotiations. He separately told Tom O’Donnell that he had no staff and no authority yet. I mentioned this to Rivas and Jarquin and urged that they inform the Junta of the real situation, including the status of Urcuyo.
5. The DATT will meet with Mojica tonight and counsel patience, discipline and steadfastness. There will be hard days ahead for the GN and we do not want to see GN units provoke an incident.
6. At one point, Rivas asked whether an “interim Chief of Staff” had been designated. I responded that I expect a non-controversial military commander to be designated this afternoon, adding Mojica and Sanchez had been rejected. I stressed that, at this point, the departure of Somoza was far more important than to quibble about a new Guard Commander. They appeared to agree.
7. The meetings with Rivas and Jarquin was business-like and friendly and I made clear that the USG had no desire to broker the transition but was willing to establish lines of communications between the GNR and the transitional government.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1990. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Also sent Flash to San José, Caracas, Guatemala City, San Salvador, Panama City, and Tegucigalpa.↩
- Pezzullo reported in telegram 3226 from Managua, July 17, that Mejia had been installed as Commander of the National Guard and that Urcuyo “appeared willing to cooperate, sincere in his desire for smooth transition, but at a loss as to what was expected of him and how to provide it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1958)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 278.↩