Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

278. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State and Multiple Central American Diplomatic Posts¹

San José, July 16, 1979, 1801Z

3101. From Bowdler. Subj: Nicaraguan Transition Scenario.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. At meeting with GRN Junta this morning they went along with the naming of Urcuyo as the interim President.

3. As indicated in San Jose 3090² they expressed strongest reservation about General Heberto Sanchez.

4. On the issues of ceremony formula and parallel call for cease fire, they expressed strong preference for the following scenario:

A. Early morning hours—Somoza and his group depart.

B. 0800 hrs—Congress convenes and elects Urcuyo, who turn names the new Chief of Staff of the National Guard.

C. 0800 hrs—Archbishop Obane y Bravo using radio on national hookup calls for: cease fire, standfast, no reprisals, halt to armed shipments, and explains system of sanctuaries.

D. Urcuyo and Junta statements ratifying Archbishop’s call follow immediately upon completion of Archbishop’s words. The Junta in its statement announces time of arrival in Managua.

E. All radio stations will continue in national hook-up from 0800 hrs through arrival of Junta in order to reiterate these messages and urge people to remain calm.

F. 1300 hrs—Junta arrives at Las Mercedes airport and is met by Archbishop and Urcuyo. Brief ceremony is held at the airport during which Archbishop makes opening statement; Urcuyo makes statement dissolving Congress and turning over power; Junta takes oath before Nicaraguan flag and makes statement to the nation.

5. Ramirez indicated that the rest of the points of the scenario (State 183735)³ which I gave him yesterday are satisfactory as stated. With respect to point “H”, Ramirez observed that since the time-span between Somoza’s departure and the Junta takeover is going to be so short, there may not be all that much of an opportunity for the Chiefs of Staff of the Frente and Guardia Nacional to contact one another although there would be no objection.

6. Given shortness of time Ramirez said that the Junta may designate some representatives now in Managua to serve as advance team in working out details with Urcuyo and Embassy Managua. For example, the Junta would like to have the airport made into neutral ground by not having national guardsmen present. They suggested that the Red Cross to [be] used to establish a large presence at the airport to maintain discipline. They also lamented that key people like the Archbishop and Red Cross Director are this morning in Caracas. They are taking immediate steps to urge these two players plus the Andean Foreign Ministers to come to San Jose immediately. Ramirez asked that we use our influence in Caracas to buttress this request. The Junta agreed to contact FonMin Jimenez to ask him to invite OAS Foreign Ministers to come to Managua for transition. They will also request IAHRC committee to be on hand.⁴

7. I raised issue of relief supplies as per telecon this morning with Deputy Secretary Christopher. Response on this aspect is covered in San Jose 3092.⁵

Weissman

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/15–17/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Also sent Flash to Managua, Bogotá, Caracas, Guatemala City, Panama City, Santo Domingo, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa.
2. See footnote 4, Document 277.
3. See Document 276.
4. In telegram 3103 from San José, July 16, Bowdler reported that Robelo had telephoned twice with modifications to the transition scenario. Noel Rivas Gasteasoro was now to be the Junta’s “advance man” for “specific planning on the arrival of the Junta” in Managua. The GRN also demanded additional security arrangements, asking that the GN confine itself to barracks in only two locations; Air Force installations be turned over to the Red Cross and all flights grounded; and there be an advance party of one hundred “men in uniform with long arms.” Additionally, the Junta “had also changed their mind” about Urcuyo taking “any part in the arrival ceremony.” Bowdler suggested to Robelo that Noel Rivas should raise these issues with Urcuyo. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/15–17/79)
5. In telegram 3092 from San José, July 16, the Embassy reported that during a meeting with the GRN Junta, questions regarding the military transport of relief supplies were raised. The Junta was “pleased” that the United States was “making arrangements to expand food aid,” but, “at the same time, the Junta members did not make any response to proposal to use US military aircraft and personnel other than to say they would consider its advisability.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790321–0597) No record of the telephone conversation between Bowdler and Christopher was found.