Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State¹

San José, July 14, 1979, 0552Z

3079. From Bowdler. Subj: Meeting with GRN Junta.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Marv Weissman and I met with the GRN Junta tonight for an hour. The four titular members plus Padre D’Escoto were present. Despite the thunderbolts thrown during the GRN noon briefing, we had a good session and are very much in business.²

3. The greetings on arrival at Dona Violeta’s house were a little stiff, but the state of my health served as a good icebreaker. Suspicion of US motives runs very deep, but ten months of association generates a certain amount of empathy—even for an adversary.

4. The mood at the start of my presentation is best described as one of calculated boredom. Dona Violeta put her head back and closed her eyes. Ramirez slouched forward and did likewise. Robelo looked out the window, and the good Padre stared at the ceiling. The always-alert Ortega and his girl friend, who turns out to be a secretary who works at the Frente’s operations center in San Jose, remained attentive. I deliberately made no reference to the noon press conference. I led off by thanking them for the opportunity to continue yesterday’s discussion.³ I regretted the misunderstanding over the letter to the OAS, commenting that it took care of several of the points I raised yesterday, and represents a significant advance in establishing the conditions for an orderly transition. I brushed by the language on sanctuaries and zeroed in on the missing military items: new director for the GN, greater precision on the standstill, and more specifics on the procedure for fusion. I concluded my remarks reiterating what I said yesterday about Somoza’s departure not being a push-button operation, but one in which we all need to work together to establish conditions which facilitate his exit.

5. A suspenseful pause followed, during which Dona Violeta’s daughter passed Father D’Escoto a sheet of paper and I began to suspect that he had been assigned the task of formally informing me the conversations were over. (Earlier in the afternoon he petulantly told me he did not think the Junta would receive me.) At this point Ortega broke the silence in his practical, down-to-earth way by saying let’s examine the three points. Tension relaxed and the inattention of the others quickly changed.

6. I started off with a new head for the GN. I understood in their scenarios they wished to avoid describing what the interim government would do, but it is at this stage that the new director would be named, which would relieve them of that formal responsibility. But there would have to be a clear understanding, of course, on who the person would be, and on the GRN allowing him to remain in his post during the process of establishing a new military organization. The negotiations would involve the GN director as well as the Frente military leaders, presumably under the aegis of the Junta or the Minister of Defense. The person chosen to fill the directorship needs to have the confidence of the GN and at the same time be acceptable to the Junta. Col. Mojica could fill the bill. Robelo intervened to say that the country cannot have two recognized military forces—that is why the basic statute calls for termination of the GN forthwith. I said that with the creation of a new military establishment the Guard would terminate, but in the interim with the ceasefire and standstill in place there was no reason why the GN could not temporarily continue under the jurisdiction of the new government. Ortega said he thought this might be worked out on a practical basis but suggested having the Congress to whom Somoza presents his resignation name the new Director rather than an interim President. I said the method of designation could be worked out; the important thing is that agreement be reached soon on a mutually acceptable candidate, and that the Guard be allowed to remain under the standfast order in the areas they control under their own command structure until the new military establishment is set up. At this point, Ortega volunteered that the Frente directorate is meeting tomorrow, and he would discuss this issue with them to see what might be worked out. The civilian members kept silence—the first indication in our conversations that the “manda mas”, at least on military matters, are the field commanders rather than the Junta.

7. We next turned to clarification of standstill arrangements. I noted that in their scenario the GN must withdraw to their barracks, while the Frente forces take over the country. I said this is not realistic in terms of the areas they still hold and our common objective of creating a climate of confidence for the Guard, so that Somoza will leave. Ramirez entered the discussion for the first time at this juncture by producing from among his papers a map showing the areas now under FSLN control. I used the map to underscore my point that each side should be allowed to remain in the areas under its control until the negotiations on fusion are completed. In the meantime, the Minister of Defense would presumably be working with the FSLN commanders and the GN director and his staff coordinating their respective roles during the interim period. Ortega commented that some thing might be worked out here as well, and he would discuss the problem at the directorate meeting.

8. Finally, I presented the need for more precision on the procedure to be used in achieving fusion of forces. Ortega and Robelo observed that the Junta and Ministry of Defense would handle this task. Ramirez thought advisors from Costa Rica and Panama might be considered. I suggested they might wish to look at more neutral advisors, keeping in mind the need to have people who would command the confidence of the GN as well. The Andean countries or the Dominican Republic could be helpful. Ortega agreed to discuss this point also with the directorate.

9. I told them that I thought this had been a very useful session, and asked when we might meet again. I was at their disposal. I stressed the urgency. We agreed they would call me after the directorate session.

10. Comment. Had I not been through the FAO temper tantrums last year, I would have despaired after today’s press conference. They made no reference to it during our session. I have no good explanation for the noon, as against the evening, performance. They may have been playing to the Latin American grandstand, as suggested in State 180932,⁴ and this needs to be carefully watched. The problem of reconciliation of attitudes is theirs; and we should not complicate it for them by too much emphasis that the talks are continuing. I assume department will be doing some quiet diplomacy with the Andean group so that we minimize unpleasant surprises at their meeting on Sunday.⁵

11. We are inching forward in obtaining acceptance of our scenario. The letter to the OAS is not an insignificant commitment, despite its flaws and cosmetic quality. Tonight’s session is at least a constructive move toward better understanding of our requirements on the military aspects. Ortega is the man with authority in this area. He, rather than the civilians, is more likely to be flexible and obtain agreement from his military colleagues who really call the shots on these matters.

12. We are still left with the power-equation issue of expansion of the Junta. I did not make another pass on this neuralgic point because the purpose of the session was to pull the Junta back from the brink of ending the talks. It remains the key point in protecting the moderates from being swallowed up by FSLN majorities in the Junta and Council of State.

13. After the meeting, they asked me how the talks in Managua are going and how soon we expect Somoza to leave. I said talks are continuing. They are not easy, and we need your help in creating conditions that will facilitate his departure. They did not press me further. They did ask what I knew about the summit in Guatemala which, they said, Hodding Carter had confirmed. I looked surprised and begged the question by saying I had seen nothing by Hodding on the subject.⁶

Weissman

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1539. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Bogotá, Caracas, Guatemala City, Managua, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, and Tegucigalpa. Christopher summarized these events in a July 14 evening report to Carter; see footnote 3, Document 272.
2. In telegram 3075 from San José, July 13, the Embassy described the GRN’s noon press conference, during which the GRN announced the establishment of a “coordinating commission for Nicaraguan relief,” as well as its “final and definitive rejection of US proposal to expand Junta.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/12–14/79)
3. See footnote 8, Document 262.
4. In telegram 180932 to San José and Panama City, July 13, the Department instructed Bowdler to focus on convincing the Junta to agree to “real conditions that will permit a broad based transition to occur, and an equilibrium of forces which would prevent dominance by either extreme.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1545)
5. In telegram 183068 to multiple posts, July 14, the Department issued a message from Vance to Zambrano and Herrera, in advance of the Andean Group’s July 15 meeting in Caracas about Nicaragua, noting the U.S. Government’s “conversations with the Junta.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004–1743)
6. See footnote 3, Document 269.