Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, July 14, 1979, 0220Z

3178. San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: (S) Meeting with Somoza—July 13. Ref: State 181058.²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Somoza delayed our meeting until 6 p.m. He told me he had been advised by Cong. Murphy to call President Carter, which he did. Warren Christopher had taken the call and assured him he would pass his request to the President.³ Somoza said he was explaining this to me because he didn’t want me to think he was going around me, rather he wanted to be sure that President Carter understood the reality of the situation here.

3. I then drew from talking points in reftel giving special emphasis to the urgency that he depart in next 48 to 72 hours. He listened attentively, then said he was still concerned that there were no guarantees that the GN or the Liberal Party would survive. He said he did not trust the Junta nor the Sandinistas and looked to the USG to provide such guarantees.

4. I responded by indicating that we and many LA nations have been engaged in a major effort to assure that a democratic transitional government will assume power following his departure and that a ceasefire and commitment to avoid reprisals will permit institutions, such as the GN, to survive. Everyone involved, I added, was conscious of the pitfalls and dangers, but were convinced that a negotiated political solution which included his resignation was the only way to avoid more bloodshed and further deterioration of the fabric of Nicaraguan society. Further, each day that he remained diminished our capacity to influence that peaceful transition scenario. I ended by observing that he should realize that the best guarantee for the GN and the Liberal Party was the creation of an open democratic environment closely monitored and nurtured by interested hemispheric states.

5. Somoza appeared to accept this argumentation and dropped the “guarantee” issue. Instead he said he welcomed the position we now place him in, namely one in which he makes the decision to resign rather than be told to do so. I said we were pleased, that we had always felt that the final decision to resign should be his. We were offering him our best advice on timing. He said he appreciated our position and frankness.

6. We then briefly covered the T–28’s and press censorship.⁴ On the former, I advised him to keep the planes out of Costa Rican territory, because any action of that type could enflame what was already a very tense situation. The negotiations currently going on, which were laying the basis for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, could be severely prejudical or even aborted. He said he understood. On the latter, I suggested he reconsider censoring the international press. He said he would look into it.

7. At the end of the conversation he again raised his interest in speaking with the President. He has the impression that he has a commitment that President Carter will return his call. If that is the case, the President should be prepared to hear a recounting of Somoza’s long and close ties to the USG. He believes the President has been unfairly prejudiced against him (I told him that was not the case, that President Carter was a astute politician who viewed the Nicaraguan situation dispassionately.) He is also most likely to raise his concerns about the future of “his country”, about the fortunes of the GN and the Liberal Party and the lack of “guarantees” for their survival. He also will state that he is prepared to go.

8. On the last point, I emphasized before departing that we were extremely serious about the urgency of his departing in 48 to 72 hours. He said he understood and again raised the hope that the President would return his call tomorrow.⁵ I would appreciate being informed whether the President intends to call Somoza.⁶

Pezzullo

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1921. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Also sent Immediate to San José, Panama City, Caracas, Santo Domingo, Guatemala City, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa.
2. See footnote 5, Document 269.
3. In his July 14 evening report to Carter, which Carter initialed, Christopher described the information contained in this telegram. (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 7/79)
4. In telegram 181523 to multiple posts, July 14, the Department reported that the U.S. Customs Agency was investigating the unlicensed transfer of T–28s to Nicaragua. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Kimmitt, Arms Transfers/Country File, Box 27, Nicaragua: 5/77–10/80)
5. In telegram 3179 from Managua, July 14, Pezzullo wrote: “We have reached the moment of truth with Somoza” and commented that Somoza was “clearly trying to extract as much as he can from us in exchange for his resignation.” Pezzullo also noted that “if Somoza becomes difficult we must be prepared to pressure our credibility by taking some decisive actions,” including his recall to Washington, the reduction of the U.S. Mission, and the release of a “comprehensive statement of our efforts to attain the objectives of the OAS resolution and of the reasons for our recent actions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1930)
6. In telegram 183193 to Managua, July 14, the Department informed Pezzullo that Carter was “totally and urgently immersed in the energy problem,” and could not telephone Somoza. However, the Department was “currently seeking an alternative way of conveying the President’s message, recognizing the urgency.” The telegram also noted that Murphy had involved Congressman Jim Wright “in seeking to have the President talk to Somoza.” In response, Brzezinski informed Wright that Carter would not call Somoza and asked that Wright inform Somoza that he should “depart promptly.” Finally, the telegram informed Pezzullo that the SCC decided that Pezzullo should “determine ASAP what persons Somoza would designate as successor and in other posts, and who might be named as GN Commander.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1935) A memorandum of conversation of the July 14 telephone conversation between Brzezinski and Wright, which Pastor drafted on July 20, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 35, Nicaragua, 7/79–12/79.