Office of the Historian

27. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1

Guatemala City, May 16, 1978, 1751Z

2861. Subj: President-Elect Lucas Will be Tougher on Belize.

1. Belize was one of the subjects addressed by General Romeo Lucas during his May 12 conversation with Ambassador and political section chief. (Septel deals with other aspects.)2

2. In response to the Ambassador’s inquiry regarding foreign policy views of the incoming government, Belize among them, Lucas began by saying that the Constitution required the Army to defend Guatemala’s territorial integrity. Thus, if independence were granted without Guatemalan consent, the Army would have to move. Otherwise the Guatemalan people would ask why have an army. While he was not opposed to a compromise solution based on territorial transaction, the Moho line was out of the question. It would represent a transfer of nothing but swampland in his view. Betraying a certain unfamiliarity with Belizean hydrography, Lucas noted that at flood stage the Sarstoon and Moho Rovers are one.

3. General Lucas said Guatemala did not aspire to all of Belize, “only Toledo district.” Guatemala had ethnic affinities with the latter and needed it to provide ocean access for Peten production via Poptun. Asked whether he really meant all of Toledo district, Lucas retreated somewhat and said perhaps not even everything south of the Monkey River would be necessary, conceding at one point that the GOG had no particular interest in the (Maya) mountains.

4. Lucas maintained that the Cubans were trying to take advantage of the situation, and alluded to contacts between them and Belizean Attorney General Assad Shoman. He described the dispute as a “running sore,” and expressed the fervent hope that it would be settled soon so that the two peoples could live in peace.

5. Comment: These comments support expectations that the Lucas government will prove considerably less flexible than the current [Page 74] administration about what might constitute a satisfactory settlement.3 They also suggest again that he and Vice President-elect Villagran Kramer (see Guatemala 2248)4 Do not see eye to eye on this issue.

Boster
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780207–0523. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to London and Belize City.↩
  2. Reference is to telegram 2897 from Guatemala City, May 17, which described Boster’s initial meeting with President-elect Lucas. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780210–0029)↩
  3. In telegram 90007 to London, April 7, the Department requested that the Embassy pass a message from Todman to Rowlands informing Rowlands that the United States shared the belief that it “is important to keep negotiations going even though it seems unlikely that an agreement could be reached in the near future” due to a lessening of flexibility in Guatemala following the strong showing of the right and Lucas’s victory in the March Presidential election, the failure of the last round of negotiations over territorial issues, and the strength of the Belizean opposition and its call for a 10-year moratorium on independence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–1794)↩
  4. In telegram 2248 from Guatemala City, April 14, the Embassy indicated that Villagran seemed capable of innovation regarding the Belize negotiations but was not yet fully informed on the subject by the Foreign Ministry. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780161–0757)↩