Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

223. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 23, 1979

SUBJECT

• SCC Meeting on Nicaragua

This morning, I chaired an SCC meeting on Nicaragua, and Cy, Harold, Stan, Gen. Allen, and others attended. The Sandinistas are getting a lot of arms from the Cubans, and the CIA expects they will launch an offensive from Costa Rica to get some Nicaraguan territory in the Southwest soon. At the OAS, not a single country has supported our resolution, but 14 countries support a resolution drafted by the Andean Pact and Mexico which is designed to prohibit any OAS involvement in the Nicaraguan crisis.² There is a consensus at the OAS that Somoza should go, and many of the democracies clearly favor the Sandinistas.

The SCC agreed that we should take the following steps:

1. OAS Resolution. Warren Christopher should continue his negotiations with the Andean countries and Mexico to try to modify their resolution so that it could serve as an umbrella for possible follow-on actions by some OAS countries to seek a peaceful and enduring solution to the Nicaraguan crisis. We should bargain hard, and with some modifications we should support the final resolution, although we should also make a statement noting the resolution’s weaknesses.³

2. Presidential Messages. NSC and State will draft Presidential messages for you to send to Torrijos⁴ and Carazo⁵ urging them to stop the flow of arms to the Sandinistas.

3. Venezuelan Support. Christopher will seek Venezuelan (and other country) support for a demarche to Somoza urging him to step aside in favor of a government of national conciliation. We will also exchange views on how to structure the next government and provide it some stability.

4. Demarche to Somoza. With or without other countries support, Christopher and Bowdler will go to Nicaragua this weekend or as soon as possible to deliver the demarche to Somoza and sketch out in detail the structure of the post-Somoza government.

5. Reconstituting the Guard. Secretary Vance will meet with Nicaraguan General Gutierrez, presently Ambassador to Tokyo, when he arrives there, to talk about the beginning of a process of creating an alternative to Somoza.⁶ We will also begin talking with Nicaraguan exiles in Washington and elsewhere for the same purpose.

6. US Support. We will indicate to Gutierrez and also to Somoza that if the latter agrees to step down, we will assure sufficient support to the National Guard to guarantee stability during this transitional process.

7. Murphy.⁷ Cy or Chris will speak with Murphy to convey our views to him.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 35, Nicaragua, 1/79–6/79. Secret. Sent for information. Carter wrote at the top of the page: “OK—cc: V.P., Cy, Zbig.” No other substantive record of the meeting has been found. In an unsigned memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, June 23, Pastor provided some suggestions for the SCC meeting that day on Nicaragua. He endorsed a strategy containing four elements: 1) “Stop arms shipments to the Sandinistas;” 2) “Somoza must step down;” 3) “A more legitimate government can invite U.S. and other help;” and 4) “Work through Sandinistas and bolster other Central Americans.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: Current Crisis: 1–7/79)
2. At the June 21 OAS Foreign Ministers meeting Vance proposed six actions: “formation of an interim government of national reconciliation acceptable to all major elements of the society; the dispatch by this meeting of a special delegation to Nicaragua; a cessation of arms shipments; a ceasefire; an OAS peacekeeping presence to help establish a climate of peace and security and to assist the interim government in establishing its authority and beginning the task of reconstruction; and a major international relief and reconstruction effort.” (Department of State Press Release, June 21; National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff, Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 14, TL Secy’s MFM Statement on Nicaragua, 6/21/79; Graham Hovey, “Vance Proposes Replacement of Somoza Rule in Nicaragua; Asks for an O.A.S. Peace Force,” New York Times, June 22, 1979, p. A1) Vance also introduced a resolution embodying these points, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 160356 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, June 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790294–0454) In a June 21 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski commented that Vance’s references to Cuba, within the context of his statement, needed to be strengthened. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 67, Nicaragua: 10/78–7/79)
3. Brzezinski wrote in telegram WH 91351 to Carter and Vance, June 24, that the “OAS has just passed a resolution which was modified to take into account most of our concerns.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 12/78–6/79) In telegram 163599 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, June 24, the Department included the text of the compromise draft resolution by the 17th MFM, which declared that “the solution of the serious problem is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the people of Nicaragua;” and that the solution should include the “immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime;” the “installation in Nicaraguan territory of a democratic government;” a “guarantee of the respect for human rights of all Nicaraguans;” and “the holding of free elections as soon as possible.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790327–0050)
4. In telegram WH 91354 to Panama City and the Department of State, June 24, the White House instructed Moss to deliver an oral message from Carter to Royo and Torrijos. The message stated: “Somoza must be replaced; but it is essential that we not go from one oppressive regime to another, and I feel that is exactly what will occur if the Sandinistas insist on a military solution.” The message requested that Panama “cease the arms flow to the Sandinistas and work together with us to assure that the successor government [to Somoza] will not be dominated by an armed leftist militia.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua, 6/21–24/79) The message reflected extensive revisions made by Carter to an undated draft. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua, 7/1–4/79) In telegram 828 from Panama City, June 25, Moss reported that he had delivered Carter’s oral message to Torrijos and Royo. Torrijos responded that “the message is understood.” Moss noted that Torrijos “admitted (the first time ever) that he and Carazo had let arms go the Terciario faction because they wanted to build up the moderates in the FSLN.” Torrijos also said that “he and Carazo would ‘impose moderation’ on the Sandinistas and he could ‘absolutely guarantee’ that neither a radical regime nor a continued armed population would result.” Royo offered to arrange for a meeting between a U.S. official and three Nicaraguan “junta provisional” members. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua, 6/25/79)
5. In telegram WH 91353 to San José and the Department of State, June 24, the White House instructed Weissman to deliver an oral message from Carter to Carazo. The message stated: “I do not believe the provisional government established in San José gives full representation to all opposition forces, and it rests on military force constituted in large part by extremists.” The message continued: “without support from you and us, I fear the moderate elements in the provisional government will not be able to hold their own or survive.” The message also asked that Carazo “hold off the supply of arms to the Sandinistas” and “stop facilitating Cuban support” to help “assure that the Somoza government will be replaced by democratic, non-communist government.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua, 6/21–24/79) The message reflected extensive revisions made by Carter to an undated draft. (Ibid.) In telegram 0060 from San José, June 25, the Embassy reported that Weissman had delivered Carter’s message orally to Carazo. Carazo “sat in obviously stunned silence for a couple of minutes” and responded that “we have suffered enough already, there is nothing for me to say.” (Ibid.) In telegram 62 from San José, June 26, the Embassy reported that, “once he got over his shock” regarding Carter’s message, Carazo offered to try to “stem the flow of FSLN supplies.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua, 6/25/79)
6. In telegram WH 91343 to Tokyo, June 23, Brzezinski instructed Mansfield to arrange for Gutierrez to meet with Vance. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/21–24/79) For Vance’s discussion with Gutierrez, see Document 225.
7. Brzezinski wrote in telegram WH 91351 (see footnote 3 above) that Newsom had phoned Murphy on June 24 and discussed the OAS resolution on Nicaragua, which had upset Murphy.
8. Below this point, Carter wrote: “Ok, but before we provide support to the National Guard, the transitional governing group who controls the Guard must be determined by me to be legitimized by adequate support from OAS members or by Nicaraguan people. J.C.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 12/78–6/79)