Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

22. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bushnell) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, January 27, 1978

SUBJECT

• Belize—Whither Now

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Shall we informally provide the British with our assessment of the feasibility of an early settlement?

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Over the past few days consultations involving, in various combinations, Todman, Price, Laugerud and Molina, Lopez-Portillo and Roel, and Owen and Rowlands, indicate that prospects for an early Belize settlement are less than we, the British and others had earlier thought. An analysis of what has transpired is at Tab 1.

In brief, we have known all along that the British would have to deliver Price. It is now clear that they can’t on the terms which had been tentatively worked out.

Price won’t buy a pre-cooked deal with territorial cessions, and the British have gone along with him. They jointly announced in London that any agreement would be subject to a referendum in Belize. The British have agreed to go back to the Guatemalans to try to diminish the territorial concession, both land and maritime, and to obtain changes in the proposed treaty provisions. Laugerud told Todman they might be modestly flexible on the latter, but they will be adamant on the issue of territory.

Price also rejected use of the term “mediator,” and the British agreed to the use of the title “special negotiator.” They tell us names mentioned include Andrew Young and Arthur Goldberg.

The British and Guatemalans will talk again here in Washington next week, and of course will want to consult with you. In addition, they have asked us for our analysis of the recent turn of events.

What we must consider now is what outcome and timing we should seek to foster, and what our role should be in the process. If we and the British work for a short-term solution, two things are clear:

—Timing will make it very difficult. An agreement would have to be reached through a real negotiation process, and then it would both have to be blessed by a Belize referendum and accepted through Guatemalan constitutional change—all before July 1 when Laugerud leaves office.

—Such a resolution would not be possible without a major U.S. role of a nature which would assign us a responsibility in the whole matter in excess of what we have found prudent to date.

If the chances of success were high, this could be worthwhile. Since they are not, we do not believe this would be a prudent course.

We believe a more likely course, and one which the British will buy after they have sounded us out on an all-out short-term effort, will be one in which we cooperate in fostering continuation of negotiations which would extend on into the next Guatemalan administration. At Tab 2 is an analysis of the options we would have regarding the U.S. role in such a scenario. This certainly will be a key element in any discussions with both the British and the Guatemalans next week.

Assuming your agreement, I would propose to respond to the British request for our analysis by conveying our view of the situation informally to the British Embassy here on Monday. I would express our skepticism that there remains time to accomplish a solution before July 1, and suggest that our thinking now be directed toward how negotiations can be kept going with a view to engaging the next Guatemalan administration. This will clearly signal to the British our disinclination to engage in the kind of high-profile involvement which would be necessary in further pursuit of a short-term solution.

If you decide we should await your conversations with the British before indicating to them our concern with the feasibility of getting a short-term solution, I believe it would be useful to alert the British that there is one major issue which the British must work out with the Guatemalans bilaterally. This is the amount and nature of the British economic package for Guatemala, the one issue which would put a U.S. negotiator between the Guatemalans and the British acting in their own interest (on other issues the primary British interest is a settlement acceptable in Belize).

This issue has been discussed with Phil Habib, who makes two points:

—without pre-agreed terms for a negotiation or mediation situation, we must be extremely wary of our role lest we end up stuck with an entanglement and responsibility contrary to our interests; and

—absent a quick agreement our best interests are served by continuation of the status quo in Belize, with some form of negotiation continuing if possible.

THE OPTIONS

1. Indicate concern with the feasibility of an early settlement but necessity to continue negotiations. (ARA recommends)

2. Indicate we await conversations with Rowlands to assess the situation but we believe economic issue must be resolved bilaterally.²

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860124–0962. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Tice and cleared by Pfeifle. There is no indication that Vance saw this memorandum. Tabs 1 and 2 are attached but not printed.
2. In his January 31 memorandum to S/S, Bushnell noted that Vance responded to Bushnell’s January 27 memorandum to Vance with the following guidance: “The U.S. will not appoint a U.S. Government mediator. U.S. Government involvement would be limited to his good offices in approaching a private American to undertake this role for the involved parties. Pending discussions with Rowlands, we would not give up trying to get a settlement which can be adopted before President Laugerud leaves office but we should keep open the possibility of a second track involving a longer time frame.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860124–0961) Todman relayed Vance’s guidance in telegram 26290 to multiple posts, February 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–1765, N780002–0262)