21. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1
466. For Bushnell From Todman. Subj: Belize: Todman Conversations in Guatemala January 23.
1. Accompanied by Ambassador and ARA/CEN Director Matthews, Todman was received January 23 by Foreign Minister Molina who also participated in longer subsequent conversation with President Laugerud.2
2. On the basis of his recent contacts with Price, Todman expressed serious doubt to Molina that Price will accept both a territorial cession and the contemplated treaty articles spelling out a close post-independence relationship between Guatemala and Belize. He said it may be that Price can be persuaded to accept some kind of cession, however unpalatable, but he will not accept anything he sees as “tying” Belize to Guatemala.
3. Molina seemed sincerely taken aback. He said Price himself had been party to the earlier UK-Guatemalan negotiations which had led to agreement in principle on all parts of the treaty except the territorial adjustment and two other minor articles. Guatemala had taken it for granted that all of the parties accepted the previously agreed parts of the proposed settlement. Molina stated that Belize’s “natural relations” are with Guatemala. The GOG was particularly interested in that part [Page 59] of the draft treaty which called for formalized security consultations. Guatemala is fearful of the vacuum which would occur when Britain withdraws and which could be filled by Cuba.
4. Todman also expressed uncertainty that a pre-arranged mediation would work. It may be necessary to give the mediator more scope than was earlier contemplated. Molina did not reject out of hand the notion of a more open-ended mediation process but stated that Guatemala would have to know the terms of reference before it could render a considered opinion.
5. Todman stressed that the realities of the situation were such that the attitude of Mexico will somehow have to be taken account of in a settlement process. Molina resisted this idea, noting that Mexico had given up its rights in Belize pursuant to its 1893 treaty with the UK. Todman said that Mexico was willing to forego its latent claims in the interest of self-determination but that any negotiation, in Mexico’s view, should be based on that principle. Mexico, moreover, preferred negotiation within an international body.
6. Molina responded that GOG would never accept Mexican “interference” and expressed puzzlement about Mexico’s wishing to insert itself. Todman hoped Molina would think about some formula allowing Mexico to at least be seen as an interested party. (Later Molina and President appeared not to object to idea, broached by Todman, of mediator “consulting” Mexico as well as other interested parties like Honduras.)
7. In any event, Todman stressed, if there is no further flexibility in the GOG position on these matters, it is better for the USG to know it lest we involve ourselves in an effort doomed from the start.
8. Todman covered much the same ground with the President, stressing Rowland’s current pessimism and noting Torrijos’s efforts to be helpful in Kingston.
9. President Laugerud commented that the more time that passes the harder the problem will be to resolve. Tradition to the contrary, he hoped he would not have to bequeath this problem to his successor—it shouldn’t be allowed to go on indefinitely. Nevertheless, it must be understood that Guatemala, in preparing to renounce its claim to the vast bulk of Belizean territory, is making the concession. He reaffirmed, also, that if a unilateral grant of independence should ensue, Guatemala would have no choice but “to react.” The GOG was not close-minded and could look again at the treaty provisions, but Price must understand that he, Laugerud, must face the Guatemalan people. The moment would come when Guatemala would have to say this far and no further. Molina described the situation as a backward step, a “reshuffling of the deck.” Price was abusing the good faith both of Guatemala and [Page 60] the UK. He also raised the question of the “substantial development contribution” which Britain had earlier proposed.
10. Todman asked that, between now and the next conversations with the UK (Molina indicated they were likely to take place the week of January 30), Guatemala review the draft treaty provisions and see if there is any room from the Guatemalan perspective for flexibility. For our part, we would urge that Price define with precision where his objections to the draft treaty lie. We noted that Price is scheduled to meet with Owens on January 24.
11. In response to a question on whether he could get an agreement ratified, President Laugerud drew an analogy between the difficulty he expects in seeking eventual approval of a settlement with President Carter’s legislative problems over the canal treaties. Laugerud concluded, however, that he felt confident of his ability to obtain approval for a reasonable settlement.
12. For London: Please inform Rowlands and Price of the contents of this message.
13. For Mexico: Please share substance of this message with Roel.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780034–0889. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London, Mexico City, and Belize City.↩
- In telegram 488 from Guatemala City, January 24, Todman covered a number of topics discussed with Laugerud. Todman reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to human rights. Laugerud “lamented the inefficiency of the existing legal apparatus in dealing with terrorists and criminals” and linked “the remaining vigor of the terrorist left in Guatemala” to Cuba and Fidel Castro’s “unreasoning hatred” of Guatemala due to Guatemala’s role as a training and staging area for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Todman expressed the hope that the upcoming human rights report on Guatemala would “cause no problems.” Laugerud responded that “no one has a monopoly on the truth” and that the report would be incomplete without Guatemala’s version of events. Finally, they discussed Guatemala’s September 1977 request to buy F–5 airplanes from the United States. Todman noted the Presidential policy against the sale of supersonic jets in the Central American region and said he was “not optimistic” that Carter would make an exception for Guatemala. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780039–0375, D780035–1088) In an April 7 action memorandum from Todman and Gelb to Acting Secretary Christopher, sent through Benson and Newsom, Christopher decided to refuse the sale of F–5Es to Guatemala. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780066–2149) Telegram 2381 from Guatemala City, April 20, confirmed that Boster informed Laugerud that the United States had turned down his request for F–5Es. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780170–0024)↩