Office of the Historian

139. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting1

Washington, November 13, 1978, 5:30–7 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • U.S. Policy to Nicaragua

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
    • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
    • Ambassador Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs
    • Ambassador William Bowdler, U.S. Mediator to Nicaragua

  • Defense

    • Mr. David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
    • Mr. Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Pacific, and Inter-American Affairs)

  • JCS

    • Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith, Assistant to the Chairman

  • White House

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron

  • NSC

    • Robert Pastor, Note Taker

  • CIA

    • Robert Bowie, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
    • [name not declassified] Office of Regional and Political Analysis Analyst

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Purpose of Meeting. To review the state of the mediation effort in Nicaragua and the political situation and to decide on the next steps which the USG should take in order to move the process closer to a peaceful, enduring, and democratic solution in Nicaragua.

2. Bowdler’s Report. Ambassador Bill Bowdler reported on the state of the mediation effort. Somoza has made a counter-proposal to the Broad Opposition Fronts (FAO) Plan. He has suggested a plebiscite [Page 372] which will, in effect, be a registration of voters with a view of determining the relative strength of political parties. Then, on a basis proportional to their electoral strength, representatives of these parties will be considered for incorporation into General Somoza’s government. The opposition has rejected the plan.

3. A Plebiscite. The discussion focused on whether the U.S. should work with the FAO to shape a plebiscite which will give the Nicaraguan people an opportunity to determine whether Somoza should step down. There were two views on that subject, and it was agreed that a decision memo should be sent to the President which spelled them out.2

One view is that Somoza’s plebiscite proposal is intended as a delaying tactic to discredit the mediation effort, to discourage and fragment the moderate opposition, and to polarize the political situation so that he can remain in power. According to this view, we should continue on the same track we have been following before the plebiscite. Bowdler should tell Somoza that we reject his proposal, and that Somoza should accept the main elements of the FAO plan, which includes his departure. If Somoza rejects that, we will have to withdraw our support from him and distance ourselves from his government.

A second view is that Bowdler should seek agreement within the Negotiating Group (NG) on the necessity of dealing with the concept of a plebiscite plan. Then the NG would try to persuade the FAO of the importance of a plebiscite which would be free and fair and under legitimate international supervision. The final plebiscite proposal would have to be agreeable to the FAO. Bowdler would inform the FAO that if they agreed to a plebiscite, the U.S. would place its full weight behind it when presenting it to Somoza.

4. Consultations. If the President chooses to follow the plebiscite track, Congressional consultations need not be as intensive or as extensive as if he chooses the other option. Consultations with leaders of regional governments should occur regardless of which option is chosen, but these consultations will have to be more extensive if the plebiscite option is chosen.

5. Down the Road. When we place the weight of the U.S. behind an approach with which Somoza disagrees, we should be prepared to take firm steps—like withdrawing our AID missions and our Milgroup and considering the withdrawal of our Ambassador—in order to distance ourselves from the Somoza government.

[Page 373]

6. With the National Guard. It was agreed that it is important to begin contacting people, like General Julio Gutierrez, Nicaragua’s current Ambassador to Japan, who could play important roles in a future government.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 11/1–22/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.↩
  2. See Document 140.↩