13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala, the Embassy in the United Kingdom, and the Consulate in Belize City1
243504. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Molina.
1. The Secretary, Mr. Habib and Amb Todman met with Foreign Minister Molina, Amb. Asensio Wunderlich and Amb Herrera on Oct 6 to hear Molina’s report on his talk with Foreign Secretary Owen.
2. Molina said he was not very happy with his talk; the British had gone back on what they said in London. Owen had told him the two sides were far apart and Britain reserved the right to grant Belize independence at any moment. Molina said this was very disturbing and he had transmitted it to Laugerud who was also disturbed. Owen had said he couldn’t promise that Premier Price would relinquish an inch; Molina commented if that is the British position he did not see how they could negotiate. Owen was interested in a saleable agreement, so was Guatemala. Owen mentioned the Moho-Aguacate line plus the 2 cays, but could not promise Belize would accept it. Belize would have a 3-mile territorial sea which Molina thought satisfactory. Owen had said the Monkey River was not negotiable and added the UK was negotiating only because of the wishes of the U.S. Molina explained that he asked about the territory between the Monkey and Moho. In London a development project and later consultations of the population had been suggested, but it seemed the Foreign Office officials’ opinions were not necessarily those of Owen.
3. The Secretary said we have concluded the British can go no farther than the Moho, Aguacate plus the two cays and they would be willing to use their best efforts to persuade Belize to go along. We have heard from a number of Caribbean and Latin countries; there is a great deal of support for Belize. Molina mentioned statements of Cuba and Barbados supporting Belize and the Secretary noted that of Jamaica also.
4. Molina said they had been optimistic after the London talks and discussion of the possibility of a joint economic program which perhaps would be saleable in Guatemala, but the Moho line was not very saleable. He asked if it might be possible to have later consultations on the territory between the Monkey and Moho. The Secretary saw no [Page 41] possibility and Mr. Habib said even the Moho and Aguacate would be difficult—they may have missed the boat. It is possible the Belizeans would be very difficult. Molina mentioned the possibility of hostilities.
5. Amb Todman noted the Commonwealth were all supporting Belize and were concerned that colonial borders be respected. There were complaints the U.S. was pro-Guatemala and supported an arrangement between Guatemala and the UK against the wishes of Belize. In addition, there is growing support for Belize outside Latin America. Some are thinking of calling on the UN to help guarantee Belize’s borders. Molina agreed that some would try a UN resolution, but that would not solve the problem. The UN would not maintain a peace-keeping force in Belize forever; there was the danger of hostilities.
6. If there is a territorial settlement that Britain can sell, the Secretary urged Guatemala to consider it very seriously. Molina said he would take the information back to Laugerrud who would be disappointed, but Molina would inform him that they may have missed the boat. The President did not think the Moho line was saleable before but Molina would explain the situation. The Secretary noted the situation was getting more difficult; support for the Belizean position was more widespread.
7. Molina asked if the U.S. could do anything, perhaps through mediation. The Secretary and Habib said the British and Guatemalans would first have to reach a solution; then a mediator could be used to “save face” by presenting the same solution. Molina repeated that the situation was disturbing.
8. The Secretary told Molina that once Guatemala reaches a decision and a territorial settlement, we and the British would help try to get it through. Molina was concerned about the reaction of Guatemala, there was a critical period in July and another could occur. He said he would go to Laugerud for a decision and let us know.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770369–0917. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Pfeifle; cleared in ARA/CEN, S/S, and P; approved by Todman. Telegram sent unchanged to USUN on October 23 with the same telegram number. (Ibid.) No other memorandum of conversation was found.↩