Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, November 11, 1978, 0015Z

5775. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky Only From Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 121: Conversation With Somoza. Ref: Managua 5770.²

1. I met with Somoza in “his bunker” for an hour and 45 minutes. The conversation was candid yet friendly throughout. There was no bitterness nor recrimination. He did not raise subject of President Carter’s statement at yesterday’s press conference³ nor the NG demarche on Tuesday.⁴ Somoza gave me the impression of a man still struggling with the decision of whether or not he should stay on.

2. I opened the conversation by expressing appreciation for the opportunity to have a private chat. I then proceeded to make the points contained in State 283900⁵ Somoza heard me out without interruption. At the end of the presentation he said that he found little difference from the message which Ambassador Solaun had given him following the death of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. I noted that a great deal had occured since that tragedy to demonstrate that Nicaragua is on a downhill slope to greater violence which unless reversed is going to produce untold bloodshed, grief and instability which could usher in a Sandinista victory. The danger is acute and prompt decisions on basic change are necessary.

3. Somoza came back with arguments that:

—He is providing constitutional government and making every effort to bring peace and prosperity to his country,

—The Liberal Party is clearly the majority party, as repeatedly made clear in internationally supervised elections, and there is no reason why they should surrender power to disparate elements which have little political strength.

—The violence is largely the work of conservative party elements representing special interests, who, frustrated in their electoral ambitions, have now turned to violence by joining forces with the Communist-led Sandinistas.

—The Sandinistas are able to carry out operations in Nicaragua because of the moral encouragement provided by the current human rights policy of the Carter administration and the financial and material support coming from Venezuela, Panama and Costa Rica.

—The FAO represents very little in comparison with the Liberal Party but if they want to test their strength via a plebescite he would be only too happy to comply. He did not press the plebescite proposal.

4. At this point I told Somoza that I wanted to be respectful but also very candid. I told him that the basic problem facing his country was his continued presence in power as he himself had recognized in his first meeting with the Negotiating Group. This fact antecedes any charge of foreign influence. I pointed out that there is no confidence in the efficacy of the democratic process as long as he and his party are in control of the government structure. Violence is growing in the country because of the frustration of people over the lack of honesty in government and their inability to affect the political process in any meaningful way. The polarization and radicalization of the population, especially the youth, posed a security problem far greater than he might imagine because of the potential it offered to the Sandinistas. The September fighting had clearly demonstrated that. I emphasized that fear stalks the country and not only among those opposed to his government. I told him that his close followers were perhaps too loyal to tell him the truth, but after the assassination of Senator Granera Padilla⁶ they also are increasingly fearful for their lives and the safety of their families. All of this frustration, enmity and fear centered on him. The only way that I could see to break out of this impasse was for him to take the tough decision to step down. Somoza took his medicine without disputing me.

6. Somoza referred to the inadequacies of the FAO plan. This afforded the opportunity to go through its essential elements to explain that it offered a viable framework for negotiations. I told him that liberal charges that it was unconstitutional and called for the dismemberment of the Liberal Party and the National Guard were simply not so. The FAO plan is a negotiating document. During these negotiations I would assume that he and his negotiators would bargain for an appropriate role for the Liberal Party in the transitional government, the careful selection of the men who would occupy key posts in that government, and the maintenance of the National Guard as an institution. In this he could count on the support of the Negotiating Group. If he wished to make changes in the proposed mechanics for the transition period, there would be the opportunity to do that. I informed him that we had only yesterday received a proposal from an outstanding group of professional Nicaraguans deeply concerned over the future of their country. This document⁷ which also calls on him to step down, had many useful concepts that might be considered at the appropriate time.

7. I told Somoza it would be a tragedy if the present opportunity to reach agreement on a peaceful solution to the crisis is lost. I indicated that he stood at an historic crossroads. He could choose the path of defiance which would lead the country into further violence and counter-violence which would bring untold suffering and isolation for Nicaragua and threaten the peace and stability of the whole isthmus. He could choose the path of high statesmanship, admittedly at a personal sacrifice, in which he could personally negotiate the government that was to succeed him. He could do this without humiliation or loss of dignity by capitalizing on the manifestations of support which I understood he had been receiving during the last few days. This support afforded a basis for him to go before the country to say that despite this backing he had decided to step down for the greater interests of Nicaragua. This courageous act might not win him affection, but he would earn gratitude and respect at home and abroad.

8. Thoughout my presentation, Somoza stopped me on three occasions to say that I was presenting convincing arguments for him to go. These were punctuated by long pauses during which he obviously was struggling with a decision. One of the occasions was when I referred to the genuine fear of his followers despite their pledges of loyalty. He admitted that this was the case. A second opportunity came when I referred to the great longing of vast numbers of people for an end to the killing and suffering which they attribute to him. The third occasion was after I had described the role that he would play in negotiating a strong transitional government and in so doing cloak his departure with prestige and dignity. He appeared on these occasions to be on the verge of saying that he would go but each time he hung back and ended up seeking refuge in the need to finish his constitutional mandate. I came away with the feeling that he is not irrevocably determined to stay on. He came closest to saying this when he indicated that the question of his resignation was a matter which in effect came up every day depending on his health and other possible factors. He warned me not to read too much into that statement but this was clearly not the expression of a man who had made up his mind to fight to the bitter end.

9. As I left, I expressed regret that he had not seen his way clear to step down. He thanked me for my not pulling any punches. I asked him to think over what I had said and refrain from taking any extreme position in his press conference. He made no commitment.

10. The meeting with the Negotiating Group at 11:00 am was an anti-climax. He informed us that he had searched his conscience on the question we had asked and reached the conclusion that he should carry out his constitutional mandate until 1981. I asked him to give us time to deliver the PLN proposals to the FAO before holding his press conference and making the document public. He agreed to hold off until 5:00 pm. During this short session he made two caustic references to President Carter’s press conference statement.

11. I believe Somoza may be wavering. However, he is not yet sufficiently convinced of (a) the seriousness of USG intent and its determination to take measures on behalf of a peaceful solution and (b) the seriousness of the crisis situation facing the country. Our immediate objective should therefore be to do all that we can to convince him on both counts. I recommend that we proceed with the second stage demarche and back up measures to include:

—Announce AID suspension

—Withraw MilGrp

—Get Israelis to terminate their military supply relationship

—Recall Ambassador Solaun for consultations

Publication of the IAHRC report on November 18 will fall into this pattern of pressures (State 285352).⁸ I believe these measures, taken within the next 7–10 days, will remove any doubts which Somoza may have concerning our intentions and our determination to act decisively. Some of these measures, particularly aid suspension, may also serve to worsen the crisis situation and hopefully will heighten Somoza’s appreciation of it. The aspect of the crisis which will have greatest impact on his willingness to leave will be the military/security situation. We, of course, cannot act in this area, although withdrawal of MilGrp and termination of the Israeli connection will have an indirect impact. However, I believe we can expect the FSLN to at least escalate the level of violence, if it does not launch an offensive ([less than 1 line not declassified] some FSLN activity may be imminent.)

12. The above measures will not only undermine Somoza’s confidence but will also have a favorable impact on the FAO. If we are seen to be acting forcefully, it will reinforce our appeal to them to stay with the mediation and facilitate their convincing their constituents to do likewise. We made an appeal to the FAO–PC this afternoon, asking them to take several days to carefully study the PLN response before reacting. We told them that some of us will be returning to our capitals for consultations with our respective governments on next steps. We will return next Tuesday⁹ to meet again with them.

13. As part of this scenario, I had thought of returning to Washington tomorrow. (My two colleagues have already made arrangements to leave and be back on Tuesday.) However, our meeting this afternoon with the FAO convinced me that one of us should stay behind to be available for handholding. Robelo specifically asked for this and I said I would stay unless the Department instructed me otherwise. Jim Cheek will be able to assist in drafting talking points for a second demarche to Somoza, as well as help prepare a strategy of specific measures which will reinforce the message to Somoza and at the same time serve to convince the opposition to keep the door to negotiations open. Jim will carry my views on the plebescite idea which I think Somoza will use as the front piece of his effort to demonstrate reasonableness.

Solaun

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 35, Nicaragua, 10/78–12/78. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 5770 from Managua, November 10, the Embassy transmitted Bowdler’s condensed version of his meeting with Somoza. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua VII)
3. During a November 9 news conference in Kansas City, Missouri, Carter noted the Negotiating Group and U.S. efforts to negotiate “actively now to reach an agreement in Nicaragua to control bloodshed, to minimize disputes, and to set up a government there that will have the full support of the Nicaraguan people.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, p. 1993)
4. See Document 134.
5. See Document 134.
6. In telegram 5722 from Managua, November 8, the Embassy reported Liberal Party Senator and First Secretary of the Senate Ramiro Granera Padilla had been assassinated by unknown assailants. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780465–1207)
7. Not found.
8. Telegram 285352 to Managua, November 9, noted the impending release of the IAHRC report on Nicaragua. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780463–0996) The IAHRC issued its report on Nicaragua on November 17. Pastor summarized its findings in a November 27 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron: “The report finds that the government of President Anastasio Somoza systematically committed atrocities against its citizens. Citing instances which have occurred during recent years only, the IAHRC report refers to three general periods: (1) the capture, disappearance, and confiscation of lands of 338 campesinos (small farmers) from 1975–1977 at the hands of the National Guard; (2) the general strike and unrest following the assassination of Dr. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a prominent political figure and journalist, in Managua January 10, 1978; (3) the September 1978 ‛mop-up’ exercise conducted by the National Guard following the August 22 seizure of the National Palace by the FSLN and the insurrection that followed.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 11/23–30/78)
9. November 14.