Office of the Historian

126. Memorandum for the Record1

NFAC–4995–78
Washington, October 31, 1978

SUBJECT

  • PRC Meeting on Nicaragua, 31 October 1978

PARTICIPANTS

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski; David Aaron; Robert Pastor, NSC; Warren Christopher; Viron Vaky; Brandon Grove, State Department; Robert Bowie; [name not declassified] CIA; William Smith, JCS; two others unknown to me

1. Christopher explained that the mediation efforts in Nicaragua had done well in getting the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) to produce a responsible plan for transition from the Somoza regime to a successor government. Events were proceeding well, but several factors jeopardized the mediation and required that the US now weigh in heavily to persuade Somoza that his early retirement (before 1979) from power is essential. These factors included FAO fragility, impending FSLN guerrilla attacks, and Somoza’s intention of publicly rejecting the plan on 3 November.

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2. State recommended that the approach to Somoza be made immediately and in two stages: (1) Somoza would be told on 1 November that the IMF would be delaying its expected decision on $20 million in compensatory drawing for at least two weeks, the US would publicly announce that it was holding up all bilateral assistance and AID disbursements, and Somoza would be nudged to accept the FAO plan. (2) If, as expected, Somoza rejects the FAO plan, he would be told that the US favors his early resignation and would begin to take steps to withdraw support (US milgroup, AID mission, embassy personnel) and weigh in with Somoza’s sources of arms (Israel, Guatemala, etc.) and finances.

3. Following some discussion, Brzezinski argued that the decision to take these latter steps should be made only by the PRC principals and, in any event, could be delayed for a couple of weeks. He wanted other Latin American governments involved. He was concerned that the National Guard might disintegrate when Somoza left and that the FAO would be too weak to rule.

4. Vaky discussed the problems inherent in delay, but the bulk of opinion supported Brzezinski. There was then general agreement to implement step one immediately and save step two for awhile, perhaps until it could be considered by a meeting of the PRC principals.

5. Aaron suggested that the US ought to be sounding out the National Guard now in order to assure that it would adjust to Somoza’s departure in an orderly manner.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 36: (SCC) Nicaragua. Secret. Drafted by Bowie on November 8.↩