Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, October 24, 1978, 0145Z

5272. For Assistant Secretary Vaky only from Bowdler. Subj: Nicaragua Mediation No. 57: Pressure Points to Use with Somoza. Ref: Managua 5251.²

1. Our success in persuading Somoza to leave will depend on two factors which should be mutually reinforcing:

—The degree to which the FAO–PLN talks serve to soften up the elements which prop up the regime, especially the PLN and the GN.

—The amount of pressure we can bring to bear internally and internationally at the time when Somoza receives our message that he should leave.

2. Essential to the effectiveness of both factors is the reasonableness of the FAO proposal and their flexibility in accepting enough of the PLN counter proposals, particularly with regard to dignified departure, appropriate assurances on Somoza assets, viable constitutional transition, amnesty and other reassuring measures for the PLN and GN. This will serve to undermine Somoza’s basis of support and to posit a strong platform for international reaction.

3. The immediate actions which can be concentrated around the time our message is conveyed to Somoza are:

A. Induce the “oficialista” conservatives to walk off their jobs in the congress and elsewhere in GON, and to issue a public statement that they will absent themselves until Somoza steps down.

B. Announce immediate departure of Milgp personnel and their families with word filtered to key NG officers that they will return when Somoza departs.

C. Persuade the Presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to send private personal messages to Somoza asking him to step down as a contribution to the peace and tranquility of the Isthmus. (Obiols thinks it is possible to get them to do this.)

D. Encourage the convening of the MFM to consider the Nicaraguan situation in the light of the IAHRC report and his refusal to step down. (We do not know whether the report will be ready in time.)

E. Get a suitable Latin American country to make a statement at the IMF on the status of the CFF, calling for its postponement until Somoza resigns.

F. Get one or more bankers to make a statement that further loans cannot be extended to Nicaragua until Somoza steps down.

G. Turn down Nicaragua’s request for an increase in beef “voluntary restraint” level until Somoza steps down. (GON has just written Embassy asking for a fourteen percent increase.)³

H. Stimulate U.S. longshoreman’s union to announce boycott on handling all Nicaraguan goods moving to and from U.S. ports until Somoza steps down.

I. Persuade Israel to suspend military sales to Nicaragua and engineer a public statement to this effect. (This step will be effective, inasmuch as Israel has replaced U.S. as primary arms supplier, and not only Guardia but whole country knows Israeli ships have brought, and may soon again bring, military hardware to the Guardia.)

J. Send prestigious and respected friend of Somoza’s, from Congress and/or from the U.S. military, to counsel Somoza to resign for his own and his family’s safety and welfare, and for the good of his country.

K. Issue a White House statement to effect that Somoza’s continuance in office is not viewed favorably by USG, and that we believe he should step down to make possible an enduring, peaceful and democratic political settlement in this country.

4. Meanwhile we should continue in effect several things we are doing now:

—Stop all deliveries of MAP and FMS items;

—Hold up new IMETP training commitments, and also U.S. service academy nominations;

—Extend the freeze on all significant USAID disbursements and other visible actions; and

—Keep the lid on any new bilateral or IFI commitments for Nicaragua as long as Somoza is around.

5. More drastic measures which might be considered in event the foregoing do not suffice are:

—Recall Ambassador Solaun; our military attache; some of our State, AID and USICA American civilian employees until Somoza steps down.

B. Encourage other governments to withdraw their Ambassadors until Somoza leaves office.

C. Announce plans to evacuate American personnel and dependents on grounds that their security cannot be guaranteed by Somoza’s regime.

D. Cut out Nicaragua’s existing beef “voluntary restraint” level (one technique would be to find Somoza’s meat packing plant does not meet U.S. sanitary requirements, and thus cut off sales from this one plant.) Look for ways to cut out or at least reduce other U.S. imports from Nicaragua.

E. Cut all remaining official economic ties (new OPIC coverage, Exim activity, USAID pipeline and all other USAID programs).

F. Encourage U.S. private banks, and to extent feasible IFI’s, to harden loan conditions, “call” loans, etc.

G. Consider freezing assets in U.S. of Somoza, his family and Somoza enterprises. (Lanica aircraft could be seized for debts, possibly, or be held as litigation proceeds.)

H. We might be able to stimulate a series of resignations from the GON, and thereby develop a “sinking ship” mindset among GON officials.

Solaun

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2497. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. Christopher wrote “D” on another copy of the telegram. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 21, Human Rights—Nicaragua V)
2. Telegram 5251 from Managua, October 23, Bowdler discussed the Negotiating Group’s plans to continue discussions with the FAO and attempt to convince the PLN to name negotiators. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2494)
3. Not found.