120. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
CUBAN SUPPORT TO THE FSLN
Introduction
Castro’s enmity toward the Somoza regime is deep-rooted, and there is no government in Latin America, with the possible exception of that of Pinochet in Chile, that Havana would rather see toppled. Havana is well aware, however, that dramatic Cuban support to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)—such as providing “volunteers” or guerrilla advisers—could prove counterproductive to the Sandinista cause. Given the recent fluid situation in Nicaragua and the Castro regime’s stake in maintaining its revolutionary credentials, the Cuban response to the FSLN’s appeals for aid have been relatively restrained. Working largely through leftist groups in third countries as well as providing on-island training, Havana’s efforts seem to be limited to building up the FSLN’s logistic and support capabilities for a long-term struggle.
[Page 319]The Cuban Role: Background
Since the FSLN was formed in the early 1960s, the Sandinistas have looked to Cuba for ideological inspiration, strategic guidance, tactical training, material support, and sanctuary.
Some aspects of Cuba’s support role are well documented. Throughout the FSLN’s existence, Cuba has been a training site; two years ago 60 Sandinistas were there in various stages of training. Cuba is also both a safehaven and propaganda base; one of the guerrillas flown to Cuba after the December 1974 operation remained in Havana until earlier this year to act as FSLN liaison with the Cuban Government, to direct Sandinista propaganda over Radio Havana, and to keep in touch with representatives of other radical organizations. Sandinistas in Cuba may also be in contact with support groups in the United States and other third countries.
In the last few years, however, Cuba apparently declined repeated Sandinista appeals for money, arms, and increased training outside Cuba, limiting its support to training in Cuba and to related expenses, including transportation and documentation. Havana became cautious in its dealings with the FSLN because it was:
—skeptical about the group’s capabilities, particularly given the strength and efficiency of the National Guard
—concerned not to damage its improved reputation among some Latin America governments for eschewing armed insurgency
—aware of Moscow’s desire for caution
—desirous of avoiding US counter reaction.
The Cubans insisted that before they were prepared to make a major commitment, the FSLN purge itself of factionalism, establish a unified leadership base, and prove itself under fire.
Until the Sandinista surge of recent months, insurgent unification movements within the Central American countries were primarily generated internally. Earlier this year, however, Cuba stepped up its efforts to encourage unification of Central American guerrilla groups. Cuban officials tried several times to set up meetings in Costa Rica and Panama to help the Sandinistas’ Terciario (T), Popular Prolonged War (GPP), and Proletarian Tendency (TP) factions iron out their differences. During the World Youth Festival in Havana (28 July–5 August), the Cubans announced that the unification of the three factions had been achieved—an obviously premature and overly optimistic assessment.
More recently, new differences seem to have strained the union. These reflect the divergent tactical approaches taken by each of the factions when they entered the union. Given the level of domestic and foreign support for the FSLN military campaign, as well as basic agreement on the ultimate objective of ousting Somoza, the factions [Page 320] will probably draw together if any of them succeeds in promoting another major offensive.
Current Cuban Role in Central America
To some extent, the increased cooperation among Central American guerrilla organizations seems to be a result of Cuban efforts. Cuban officials pushed the idea of cooperative Central American insurgency and support for the FSLN at the World Youth Festival in Havana. They also sponsored a meeting of representatives from 15 Latin American insurgent organizations and urged them to stage dramatic operations in their respective countries to demonstrate their solidarity with the Sandinistas and to “distract” the US.
Guatemala’s Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and El Salvador’s Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) have already undertaken the kinds of actions recommended by Cuba and are planning more. Ecuador’s Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSRE) has reportedly planned an attack on the Nicaraguan Embassy in Quito, to be carried out with support from the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The MIR also reportedly has a support apparatus in Costa Rica that helps train Nicaraguan guerrillas. Radical groups in Peru and Colombia are reportedly considering sending volunteers to Nicaragua to fight with the FSLN guerrillas. All the Central American guerrilla groups probably provide the Sandinistas with safesites, documents, and assistance in travel and border crossing.
During the World Youth Festival Cuba not only lobbied in the Latin American insurgent groups, but also in Latin American Communist Party representations. [1 line not declassified] the Cubans said they were convinced the Sandinistas had the necessary ideological commitment and popular support to take on the Somoza government. Cuba asked the visiting party delegates to give “financial, propaganda, and perhaps physical support” to the FSLN.
The Cubans reportedly promoted the consultative working conference of the Communist parties of Central America and Mexico and other leftist and anti-Somoza groups that met in Panama City from 29 September to 1 October. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Nicaraguan situation, and Havana very likely continued urging active support for the Sandinista guerrillas.
Cuba has been trying publicly to play down its involvement with the FSLN. On 6 September, for example, Fidel Castro said that the Sandinistas know how to obtain arms and money and do not need Cuba’s help. But Cuba’s strong propaganda support for the Sandinistas demonstrates its interest in the possibility of a revolutionary renaissance in Central America. A solidarity rally was held in Havana in September, and a recent feature article in Granma states that Central [Page 321] America now has all the conditions for a true revolutionary situation. The US Interests Section in Havana has commented that while Cuba makes abundantly clear its hope for a Sandinista success, it apparently wishes to keep its assistance hidden in order to discourage antiguerrilla intervention.
Recent events indicate that the Cubans—while more active—continue to proceed cautiously and to work through third parties where possible. While encouraging the Sandinistas to get as much as they can out of the negotiations approach, the Cubans believe that the FSLN is likely to take power only following a long armed struggle. To prepare the Sandinistas for protracted conflict, Cuba has been active in recent weeks in helping to build up FSLN logistics and support capabilities in countries neighboring Nicaragua.
Panama seems to be the headquarters for Cuba’s liaison with the FSLN and with most other Central American guerrilla groups.
—The Castro regime recently assigned Julian Lopez Diaz, a ranking Cuban Communist Party intelligence official whose experience in subversion in Latin America dates to the mid-1960s, to the Cuban embassy in Panama to oversee Cuba’s contacts with all Central American insurgent groups.
—A senior security specialist from Cuba’s Ministry of Interior, known as “Justo,” has been assigned to the Cuban embassy to provide guidance to the FSLN in “special operations.”
—[less than 1 line not declassified], most of Cuba’s financial assistance to the FSLN is disbursed by the Cuban embassy in Panama.
As a direct result of Cuban encouragement, contacts between the Honduran Communist Party (PCH) and the FSLN has grown since mid-1978.
—During September alone, the Cubans “ordered” the PCH to provide the FSLN with [number not declassified] blank Honduran passports; whatever arms, radios, and recorders could be collected; assistance in border crossings; and six safesites for [less than 1 line not declassified] Sandinistas who would be arriving in Honduras, presumably from Cuba.
—More recently the Cubans have instructed the PCH to find sites in Honduras where training can be conducted for [number not declassified] members of the FSLN/GPP faction.
—Later this year the Cubans plan to begin training some [number not declassified] Hondurans in Cuba in intelligence and security matters as well as in guerrilla warfare. The purpose of the guerrilla training is to create a contingency force that can be used in Honduras or, if need be, in Nicaragua.
In El Salvador the generally softline Communist Party (PCES)—with Cuban encouragement—has reportedly initiated efforts to provide [Page 322] money, food, clothing, equipment, and arms to the FSLN. Committees of Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People—generally FSLN front groups—are collecting funds and propagandizing for the Sandinistas in Mexico, Venezuela, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, and other Latin American countries.
[1 line not declassified] an experienced and presumably high-ranking Cuban military or intelligence officer is in Costa Rica, involved in some way with the Nicaraguan guerrillas. [2 lines not declassified]
The Cubans have also used the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left’s support apparatus in Costa Rica to provide the FSLN with materials such as disguises and false documentation.
Reports of a Cuban presence in Nicaragua itself are highly suspect. For example, [2 lines not declassified] Cuban advisers were training Sandinistas in underground sites in a town 50 kilometers from Managua. [2 lines not declassified] the FSLN in Nicaragua, [3 lines not declassified] reported to [location not declassified] the rumor that [number not declassified] Cubans were directing FSLN operations.
There is good evidence that Havana has recently also provided some direct support to the FSLN. The leader of the recent Sandinista assault on the National Palace in Managua appears to be one of some four dozen FSLN members who were supplied with Cuban passports in alias by the Cuban Embassy in Panama. And last year a Cuban Prensa Latina offical in Venezuela was reportedly trying to help collect money for the FSLN.
Outlook
Various FSLN emissaries have traveled to Cuba in recent weeks to request that Cuba increase its direct support by providing arms, money, and—in one case—even military intervention. Havana doubtless believes that the prospects for the armed struggle are improving not only in Nicaragua but elsewhere in Central America as well. Consequently, Cuba may well intensify its efforts to strengthen the fighting capabilities of local insurgent groups by training programs in Cuba, while urging them to do the necessary grass roots political organization work to build a mass base of support. The Cubans are likely to continue to channel their logistics assistance primarily through third parties, however, and to avoid undertakings that might provoke a strong US counter-response. If, however, it appeared that the FSLN might suddenly be on the verge of a military victory, Havana’s hitherto relatively discreet role would probably become more activist and more overt—particularly if Panama and Venezuela were to agree to participate with Cuba in joint operations.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 38, Nicaragua Cables: 10/14–22/78. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. This memorandum was requested by Pastor and prepared in the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.↩