Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, October 20, 1978, 1615Z

5211. For Under Secretary Newsom and Assistant Secretary Vaky only from Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 50: FAO Meeting with Negotiating Group.

1. We suffered a temporary setback in the talks yesterday as the FAO indulged in an ill-considered play which annoyed the NG. At the conclusion of the meeting last Tuesday,² after we had reviewed the document they presented and they had promised to study our questions and give us a revised paper, I had raised the issue of how they proposed to reach the provisional government stage from the present situation. At yesterday’s meeting they came prepared to discuss the constitutional procedure along the lines of Managua 5187³ but before doing so they decided to throw down the challenge that until the NG got Somoza out of the country it would not be possible to start talks with the Liberal Party. This challenge, which had been unanimously approved by the FAO, was cast in the form of the terse note contained in Managua 5210.⁴

2. This is how the brief session unfolded:

A) Robelo of FAO opened meeting by reading brief document which he stressed FAO had unanimously approved in their plenum. He then proceeded to give copies of document to NG. He stressed, as did Cordoba Rivas, first point of document to effect NG should take upon itself the responsibility for ousting Somoza and his family from the GON and GN without delay, and meanwhile no bilateral or multilateral aid should be furnished the Somoza regime or its PLN successor. He said that a new transitional government would be formed, implicitly through the constitutional route. Cordoba Rivas expanded on this point to say that since NG had asked how the transition would be carried out, then FAO answer is that they would work with PLN members in the Congress to implement constitutional succession upon Somoza’s putative departure. Cordoba Rivas said the only other alternative would be “another 9th of September”, i.e., a resumption of armed civil strife. He concluded rather abruptly that Somoza’s departure is “your problem”.

B) FonMin Jimenez then told FAO he believed they had interpreted the NG request incorrectly. What the NG had asked for is a more detailed plan of the steps immediately to be taken assuming Somoza were to depart. NG was inquiring, for example, whether a de facto regime or a constitutional regime would be the route recommended by the FAO. Jimenez emphasized that NG wants to explore and find a solution to this problem in collaboration with the FAO, but that the response contained in the FAO doucment did not do so; instead it constituted “un salto atras” (a step back). I concurred in Jimenez’ presentation as did Obiols.

C) Robelo then asserted that the FAO position was logical and followed on the NG request for information on how the FAO would carry out the initial steps assuming Somoza departs. Ramirez said that the FAO was trying to accommodate what it considered to be the NG request for more information as to how the FAO would deal with the PLN and the Guardia Nacional. He asserted that the PLN could only become involved in negotiations after Somoza leaves and at that stage the FAO would deal with the liberals on transition arrangements. He asserted that FAO proposal is really a step forward, which would demonstrate that the negotiations were genuine. But in his presentation he also let slip a concept he may have not intended to make. He said that in the post Somoza period he thought the NG’s role would be “protocolary”.

D) At Jimenez’ request the meeting was recessed briefly so NG could consult on its response. In this discussion it became clear that the Latin machismo of my colleagues had been aroused. They were not about to be treated in this cavalier manner. To make the point we agreed to discontinue the session without engaging the FAO in further debate and let our annoyance percolate. Jimenez then informed the resumed meeting that the NG had decided to study the FAO document further, but commented that NG was frankly “decepcionado” (disappointed) with the FAO presentation. The meeting was then adjourned to FAO’s perplexity.

3. NG decided to go straight from this meeting to call on Archbishop to register its concern. Jimenez told him what had transpired and emphasized our disappointment. He added that he and Obiols will now have to return to their capitals to receive further instructions before proceeding with discussions. Archbishop expressed deep regret that this had happened. He said he will take sounding with the opposition tomorrow but did not commit himself to any specific action.

4. The NG went from the Archbishop’s to the house of prominent lawyer for dinner. Present were Adolfo Robelo and Adolfo Calero of the FAO as well as Foreign Minister Julio Quintana and head of the Banco de America Ernesto Fernandez Holman. The chemistry of this social event was fascinating. Robelo and Calero were in a state of shock over the NG’s reaction to the FAO ploy. Robelo sought out Obiols to make explanation. Calero took me on. We both used the opportunity to stress the seriousness of our purpose and the need to enter into discussions with the liberal party right away. Calero urged that the NG contact the FAO today to resume discussions. They would be waiting for our call. The other significant aspect of the venting is that around the dinner table we had, in effect, the first FAO–PLN dialogue with NG involvement. The exchanges between Quintana and Robelo-Calero were sharp but respectful. These touched mainly on the representativeness of the FAO, the Marxist influence in the FAO and the problem of Somoza’s continued presence in the country. Only debating points were scored but the exchange was useful.

5. After dinner I had a few minutes with Quintana alone. I broached the issue of the PLN selecting three representatives to dialogue with the FAO. He said he had been thinking along parallel lines but asked that we take no initiative with Somoza until he gets back from the new Pope’s coronation. He said that would be next Thursday, October 26. This is a regrettable delay but it spans the period when my two colleagues plan to be away (septel).⁵

6. Comment: The position that FAO has taken reflects their grave doubt that in the final analysis Somoza can be removed by peaceful means. To satisfy this doubt they have come up with this tactical ploy intended to force the NG to put Somoza’s actual departure up from now. This obviously won’t wash for the three governments and the FAO has to be brought to understand this.

7. Our initial response was designed to signal to the FAO to stop playing games with us. While this sinks in we will continue our other contacts (today we meet with INDE and private sector, three labor confederations and wealthy businessman Alfredo Pellas and will have dinner at Xavier Chamorro’s, presumably with some FAO members present). In our discussions we will take the following line:

—Our immediate objective is to bring the FAO and carefully chosen PLN representatives together for discussions which NG would sponsor and attend.

—We cannot accept creating a vacuum, which we believe would result from this latest FAO proposal.

8. The FAO commitment to follow the constitutional procedure in installing the provisional government, which Robelo communicated to me last Wednesday, was notably omitted from its document, although the commitment was implicit in Robelo’s comments. We understand, however, that the FAO plenary prior to yesterday’s session with us formally approved taking the constitutional route by a vote of 12 for 3 against (G–12, PSN and PCN-Aguero). It is significant that the G–12 and Maoist-Marxist PSN should have cast a negative vote on this basic question. We presume Aguero’s vote reflects his long-standing feud with those conservative party leaders who, by going the constitutional route, will be able to keep their members in the officialista posts in the Congress and other branches of GON.

9. Please pass to Deputy Secretary Christopher and Bill Luers.

Solaun

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2499. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. See Document 117.
3. In telegram 5187 from Managua, October 19, Bowdler reported to Newsom and Vaky that he had met with Alfonso Robelo on October 18 and learned that the FAO would approve a new proposal, which represented an “about face.” The new proposal stipulated that “as soon as Somoza and his family depart, constitutional procedures would be followed in the establishment of the successor government with the election of a new President from among the ranks of the PLN in the Congress.” Next, the “FAO would immediately enter negotiation with this successor government on partial amendment of the Constitution to pave the way” for a provisional government that would be shaped by further negotiation between the “FAO and the successor government.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
4. In telegram 5210 from Managua, October 20, the Embassy transmitted the Spanish-language text of the document the FAO gave to the Negotiating Group at the October 19 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780430–0649)
5. In telegram 5188 from Managua, October 19, Bowdler reported to Vaky that Obiols and Jimenez were planning trips to their respective nations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780428–0998)