87. Editorial Note
By mid-December 1979, U.S. intelligence reporting indicated that the military buildup on the Soviet-Afghan border and in Afghanistan was quickly intensifying. This prompted Secretary of State Vance to order both Marshall Shulman, his Adviser on Soviet Affairs, and the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., to seek an explanation from Soviet diplomats regarding the ultimate Soviet objectives in Afghanistan.
Analysis [text not declassified] detailed the military buildup in several reports and memoranda. The Strategic Warning Staff of the CIA issued memorandum [text not declassified] December 14, which reported on military activity involving air transport, ground forces, [text not declassified] which [text not declassified] indicated “Soviet intent to deploy additional combat forces to Afghanistan.” [text not declassified] these developments included an increase in the number of aircraft and airfields involved in airlift operations to Afghanistan; significant movement of heavy ground equipment, including convoys of cargo trucks, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, howitzers, and tanks: [text not declassified]. The report concluded by noting that a recent TASS commentary marking the anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of [Page 242] Friendship and Cooperation referred to the military aspect of the treaty, which called for “conducting joint measures to insure the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries.” (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 94T00046R, Box 2, SWS Products on Afghanistan)
[text not declassified] reported on developments over the past 24 hours, which “suggest that the USSR is rapidly expanding the size of its military force in Afghanistan,” including the operational deployment of the [text not declassified] to the Soviet-Afghan border at Termez; movement of approximately 45 aircraft to Afghanistan or the Afghan border; and the arrival of 34 armored vehicles, 47 helicopters, and “a large number of personnel and tents” at an airfield north of Termez. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/14–22/79)
This information was brought to Brzezinski’s attention by NSC Staff member Stephen Larrabee on December 15. Referring to the comments made by the Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul, quoted in Document 84, Larrabee disagreed that the escalating Soviet presence in Afghanistan was “a direct response to targets of opportunity the Soviets see elsewhere, i.e., Iran, Baluchistan, etc., but rather is related primarily to the situation in Afghanistan itself.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 8–12/79)
That same day, [text not declassified] issued an intelligence cable that noted many of the military movements described above and reported that imagery analysis “provides the first indication that the Soviets are setting up a communications network in that country.” The cable concluded that “establishment of a Soviet communications network in Afghanistan would facilitate combined Soviet-Afghan operations if they should become necessary.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 12/14–22/79)
In telegram 323556 to Moscow, December 15, Vance directed Watson to “seek an urgent appointment with Gromyko or highest available MFA official and ask for an explanation of the significant continuing deployment of Soviet military units outside the borders of the USSR into Afghanistan which has come to our attention.” Vance further directed that this request, which would also be presented to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, should be made “in the context of the 1972 Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations and commitment therein to consult so that conflict situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, untitled folder; printed in Foreign Relations, [Page 243] 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 239) The “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” was signed May 29, 1972, in Moscow by President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev. The second article of the agreement states: “The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations” and “both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.” The full text of the agreement is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1972, pages 633–635.
Watson responded in telegram 27491 from Moscow, December 15, that the request for an “urgent appointment” with Gromyko or one of his deputies had been made. (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Watson-Mal’tsev Meeting in Moscow on Afghanistan, Dec. 17, 1979) Following Vance’s directive, Shulman met with Vladillen Vasev, Chargé of the Soviet Embassy, December 15. Vasev agreed to request further instructions from Moscow, but stated that his personal opinion was that the Soviet leadership would be “disturbed” by the request because they might interpret it as a ploy to divert Soviet attention from “planned U.S. action against Iran.” Telegram 323581 to Moscow, December 15, reported on the meeting and is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol VI, Soviet Union, Document 240.
The Embassy reported in telegram 27530 from Moscow, December 17, that the Soviets had not responded to Vance’s request; moreover, their response to the request “was essentially a rebuff.” Watson summarized his conversation with First Deputy Foreign Minister Mal’tsev, during which Mal’tsev reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was “puzzled” by Vance’s request; that Soviet-Afghan relations were “not subject to interference from third states; and that the Basic Principles agreement of 1972 “had no relationship to this situation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Watson-Mal’tsev Meeting in Moscow on Afghanistan, Dec. 17, 1979)
[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]