86. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs (Shulman) to Secretary of State Vance1
SUBJECT
- Possible Conclusions of a Soviet Policy Review
Assuming that the primary purpose of Dobrynin’s return to Moscow is to participate in a high level review covering foreign policy, defense and economic planning with emphasis on US-Soviet relations, I want to give you some thoughts on how such a review may come out.2 Our conclusion is that Dobrynin will return prepared for a further limited deterioration in US-Soviet relations.
What follows is our best effort to delineate the picture from Moscow’s standpoint.
General Outlook
The “holding pattern” Moscow had expected to follow Vienna pending SALT ratification has been eroded by a series of bilateral controversies for which the Soviet leadership does not consider itself primarily responsible. The sheer number of these controversies has [Page 241] had a multiplier effect, each magnifying the significance of the other, and causing both sides to react with greater stridency and rigidity than might otherwise be the case. Heightened tension has affected each side’s media treatment of the other. The Soviets probably see themselves as victims of officially-inspired US press accusations—just as we see ourselves as the injured party in an escalating public dialogue.
Faced with these trends, the Soviets are concerned that US-Soviet relations are moving inexorably toward a continuing downslide, in which the whole range of our cooperative activities, including arms control, would come into question. We believe the Soviets would see such a development as contrary to their interests, and that they would hope to avoid it. Developments since Vienna have given them cause to doubt this will be possible, however, and there is a good chance that the review now under way is designed to develop concrete policy options for dealing with a bilateral relationship they may conclude will continue to deteriorate. This would be reflected in their approach to the following specific issues.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, CV Meeting 12/15/79 (MDS re U.S.-Sov rel.). Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Drafted by Parris and cleared by Barry.↩
- Dobrynin informed Vance during a meeting, December 5, that he would depart for Moscow later that day and expected to return to Washington 10 days later. (Telegram 313797 to Moscow, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1897) In his memoirs, Dobrynin refers briefly to his trip to Moscow for high-level consultations that, according to his account, were dominated by concerns over the deployment of Pershing II missiles by NATO and SS–20 missiles by the Soviet Union. (Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 432–433)↩