Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

84. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

[cable number not declassified]

Washington, December 13, 1979

COUNTRY

• Afghanistan/USSR

SUBJECT

• Appraisal of Situation in Afghanistan (12 December 1979)

SOURCE

• This is a field appraisal. It presents the views of this Agency’s senior officer on the scene. It is an interpretation based on previously reported information. Prepared primarily for internal Agency use, it is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to others in their own assessment of the situation.

1. We believe the current buildup of Soviet forces reflects a continuing deterioration in the situation for the Afghan military and Government. The Afghan military has suffered a series of reverses in the last several weeks. Additionally, the government’s successful October offensive in Paktia has largely now been negated by recent events there. Badakhshan is in a precarious position. The situation elsewhere between Kabul and the northeast border is deteriorating. The rebels are again active in Paktia and Qandahar areas. Nightly, both Herat and Qandahar cities are the scenes of rebel activity and assassinations and the fighting is creeping closer to Kabul. Additionally, the DRA is no longer able to meet its manpower requirements and continues to experience desertions from its forces. We would assume that, given the above, there is a note of desperation at the People’s House and a general fear among the Khalqis and their Soviet supporters that the DRA military position could quickly crumble, leaving Kabul exposed to a successful insurgent attack and/or a general breakdown in the law-and-order situation.

2. Another possibility and only partially connected to the above is that the Soviets are getting ready to remove Amin.

3. It seems evident that the Soviets are committed to supporting the revolution here. Our sources tell us that they will forward whatever supplies are needed to do this. Increasingly, we are receiving rumors that the Soviets are directly engaged in combat operations. On 11 December, a third-country diplomat told us that he has a senior Khalqi source who says that Soviet combat troops are involved in combat operations. Previous reporting from Paktia Province during the October offensive supports the premise that Soviet troops were involved.

4. It is clear that the Soviets are actively, aggressively engaged in suppressing the insurgency; that they will take whatever steps are necessary to do this. While we do not know whether they will be successful, we do know that the insurgents, in the past, have been unable to exploit favorable opportunities their successes have presented to them.

5. We believe the Soviets have undertaken the resupply of Afghan troops by air because they perceive that they are in an emergency situation.² The road connecting the Soviet port of Termez to Kabul, while occasionally interdicted, is open. The road system from the Soviet border to Herat is open. Therefore, if there were no emergency, the Soviets could augment and resupply forces here by road. We believe the Soviet decision to send troops in by air and to resupply Afghan forces by air is a reflection of their evaluation that the situation is deteriorating. The number of resupply flights to Kabul and Bagram between 29 November and 4 December was 17, of which 13 were AN–22 flights and 4 were AN–12 flights. (An AN–22 carries 176,000 pounds of cargo or about 400 men when modified and an AN–12 carries 44,000 pounds of cargo.) Subsequent to this, additional AN–22 and AN–12 flights have arrived in Afghanistan. The exact number is unknown at this time. Also, there has been an increase in the TU–154 flights into Kabul. We are witnessing a major Soviet military/civilian airlift into and out of Afghanistan.

6. Chargé’s comment:³ Given the importance of the comments made in this appraisal, I have asked the Defense Attaché, and A/DCM, and POL/ECON section officer Taylor to add their own views to the above report. My own comments follow theirs.

A. DATT [less than 1 line not declassified] comment: I share the view that the present insurgency situation in-country gives grounds for Soviet alarm. The Afghan Army has been unable to successfully achieve its objectives in its recent large counterinsurgency operations, and it now appears to be struggling to maintain the status quo. Were DRA forces to experience a significant setback, such as the fall of Feyzabad (capital of Badakhshan Province), this could well trigger large-scale desertions and unit defections, not only in the north, but elsewhere. The Soviets are most certainly aware of the poor state and low morale of Afghan troops. Actual troop strength in many units appears to be below that of three months ago. Thus, I believe the recent action to augment the airlift of cargo and personnel to Afghanistan is a reflection of their concern about this worsened situation.

B. A/DCM and POL/ECON section chief (Freres) comment: I agree that the Soviets are probably worried about the Amin regime’s ability to cope with the insurgency, notwithstanding all of the Soviet logistic and advisory support given heretofore. I do not believe, though, that the buildup of Soviet forces in Afghanistan reflects a Soviet estimate that the Amin regime is about to fall, nor do any of those commenting here believe that the regime’s collapse is imminent. Rather, in my view, the Soviets’ objective is primarily to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan by enabling themselves to intervene promptly and physically with troops should they perceive that this is required. Secondarily, the Soviets may be looking beyond Afghan borders for targets of opportunity, such as in Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan. If so, it would seem prudent for them to strengthen their position in Afghanistan now.

C. POL/ECON section (Taylor) comment: In the short run, the recent upsurge of direct Soviet involvement could be designed to insure the survival of the regime in Kabul and other key areas until the arrival of winter. Cold weather and heavy snows will presumably dampen military activities in general, and could provide a respite for the regime to prepare for next spring’s campaign. A crucial unknown factor, however, will be the magnitude of Soviet “emergency support” necessary to buy the DRA some breathing space.

D. Chargé’s comment: I don’t fully share the Agency senior officer’s and DATT’s conclusion that the current buildup of Soviet forces reflects a recent deterioration in the position of the DRA military and Government. I appreciate, however, that this is the most plausible reason for the buildup. I also appreciate that there has recently been some evacuation of Soviet dependents from Kabul, and that Soviet UN personnel have evinced nervousness about their dependents. On the other hand, the insurgents have in recent weeks not scored any dramatic success in the field except in the sense that they have held DRA forces at bay in several areas, turned back DRA forces near Bamian and relieving columns approaching Feyzabad (Badakhshan) and Taqab (Parwan), and reestablished their previous countryside dominance in Paktia. But the overall situation does not seem much different from that of three months ago except in DRA Army unit strengths. Furthermore, there has been no real military threat posed yet to Kabul, the political heart of the country. My own surmise about the Soviet buildup is that it was decided upon a month or so ago as a precautionary contingency measure to bolster the regime and protect Soviet personnel in Kabul should there be a major DRA military force collapse in the field.

I don’t share the Agency senior officer’s surmise that the buildup is related to possible Soviet plans to remove Hafizullah Amin. The Soviets must appreciate that there is no Afghan Communist waiting in the wings who seemingly can match Amin’s abilities, and that Amin ostensibly fully supports the Soviets special position in Afghanistan and Soviet foreign policy.

As to the A/DCM’s surmise that the Soviet troop buildup in country may be related to events in Iran, Baluchistan, etc., I am not sure. I believe it is solely related to events in Afghanistan itself.

Whatever the case, we are in the midst of an interesting and potentially critical stage of the insurgency. Were the insurgents to bring about the surrender of a provincial capital or major town, this would be a major psychological blow to the DRA. This bears on what could well be the Achilles Heel of the DRA: lack of military manpower. Most DRA units are already far understrength. Since 85 percent of the country’s population is rural, were the regime to lose control of almost all of that countryside (which is now mostly the case), they will be hard-pressed to overcome the insurgency. End Chargé’s comment.

7. ACQ: [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

8. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 91, Afghanistan: 5/78–12/79. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. The Soviet airlift was first reported in [text not declassified] December 7. The report surmised that the airlift “may have been prompted by a major rebel offensive in the valley north of Kabul,” and would “probably be viewed by many as an intervention” and “provide a focus for religious outrage over a perceived Soviet move against brother Muslims, perhaps led by Iran,” or even the Afghan military. The airlift constituted a “serious escalation” in Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and it demonstrated that the situation was more dire than current intelligence reporting suggested. “Most importantly,” the report concluded, the airlift “demonstrates Moscow’s resolve in pursuing its interests in Afghanistan despite the obvious pitfalls and at a time when the Kremlin might consider the U.S. preoccupied with events in Tehran.” (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, Afghan Situation Folder, Start 14 Sep)
3. The Chargé was Amstutz.