Office of the Historian

37. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, February 26, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Afghanistan

REFERENCE

  • Your memorandum of February 21, 1979, same subject (attached)2

The state of our knowledge of Afghanistan and of Afghan groups abroad opposed to the present regime is so fragmentary that it is impossible to develop “a coherent and systematic plan.” Remedying this deficiency must be the first step. Beyond this, we need a more coherent framework within which to plan. Covert action only makes sense within the framework of a broader set of policy goals toward which covert action contributes. I am not sure we have these in respect to Afghanistan. Do we simply want to harass the present regime and prevent its consolidation? Do we want to replace it with something else? What? What kind of resources in what amounts are we willing to commit to supporting a regime more to our liking? Dissidents with whom we would have to work to do anything about Afghanistan will want to know this. So will the Pakistanis or anybody else we might want to work through. (TS)

Recent statements of the President and the Vice President leave me with the impression that they are unwilling to support serious intervention in Afghanistan or any similar situation.3 CIA’s capacity [Page 104] to plan and implement covert action in a challenging environment such as Afghanistan, where U.S. influence is widely perceived as declining, is extremely limited. In the face of declared lack of desire for such action from highest authority, one cannot expect more than a half-hearted planning effort from CIA. This is unlikely to result in plans in which one can have much confidence. CIA’s recent covert action effort in Iran was totally illusory. (TS)

CIA/DDO’s NESA Division Chief, Alan Wolfe [less than 1 line not declassified] recently visited the area and assessed the situation firsthand. His conclusions are going to be reflected in the paper CIA is preparing for consideration at the SCC meeting scheduled for this coming Friday, 2 March 1979.4 I recommend that we ask Stan Turner to bring Wolfe along for this phase of the discussion so that you can get the direct benefit of his knowledge and thinking. (S)5

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 3, Chron File: 2/79. Top Secret. Sent for action.↩
  2. Not attached. The memorandum from Brzezinski to Henze stated: “Please outline for me a coherent and systematic plan for Afghanistan. Should we help any insurgents? What would be required? With whom would we have to work? How likely are the Pakistanis to be effectively helpful? What will be the chances of success, and how would success be defined?” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978)↩
  3. An apparent reference to Carter’s public reaction to the death of Dubs. The President, who attended a ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base, February 18, marking the arrival of Dubs’s remains to the United States, characterized Dubs’s killing as “senseless terrorism.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 295–296) A news report of the ceremony noted that Carter “stopped short of repeating criticism of the Soviet Union by name for its role in advising Afghan forces to storm the kidnappers’ stronghold.” (John MacLean, “With ‘Sadness, Outrage,’ Carter Eulogizes Dubs,” Chicago Tribune, February 19, 1979, p. 2) On February 20, Carter gave a speech on foreign affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology upon receiving an honorary degree. Prefacing his condemnation of Dubs’s killing, Carter made an apparent reference to Vietnam: “The United States cannot control events within other nations. A few years ago, we tried this and failed.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, p. 301) No statements by Mondale were found.↩
  4. For the CIA paper, see Document 38. No record of an SCC meeting on March 2 was found, although there was an SCC meeting that covered Afghanistan on March 6, which was possibly a reschedule of a meeting originally planned for March 2. See footnote 5, Document 38.↩
  5. Brzezinski did not indicate his approval or disapproval on the memorandum.↩