Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, February 14, 1979, 1440Z

1098. Subj: Death of Ambassador Dubs.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Here follows our account of the kidnapping and death of Ambassador Dubs. This should be read in conjunction with the sitreps.²

3. At approximately 0845, February 14, the Embassy was informed by the Ambassador’s chauffeur, Gul Mohammad, that the Ambassador had been kidnapped by armed persons, one of whom was wearing a uniform. When the Ambassador’s car had approached the traffic intersection near USICA, a man who appeared to be a uniformed traffic policeman halted the car. He pointed a pistol at the driver and ordered him to open the car’s electric door locks. Four armed men then entered the Ambassador’s vehicle and ordered the driver to drive to the Kabul Hotel. They entered the hotel with the Ambassador as a prisoner after ordering the driver to return to the Embassy and inform the Embassy about what had happened.

4. The DCM immediately phoned Foreign Ministry Chief of Protocol and the RSO telephoned police commandant Sayed Daoud Taroon for information and assistance. Both Mandozai and Taroon appeared surprised, and this appeared to be the first word they had received of the incident. Taroon insisted that the Ambassador’s driver repeat the story to him over the telephone. (At this time, it was not yet clear to the Embassy whether the Ambassador had been taken by Afghan officials or someone else.) Mandozai called back almost immediately and informed DCM that he had informed Foreign Minister Amin, that this was not the work of the government, and that they were in touch with the police.

5. Events at the hotel: Some EmbOffs immediately went to the Kabul Hotel, arriving at approximately 0900. At the same time, the first police arrived, pushing through the people in the lobby toward a small room off the hotel desk. The EmbOffs heard loud scuffling and angry noises in the room.

6. At about 0915 Political Counselor Flatin established contact with a plainclothes police officer, who appeared to be in charge of the operation. He was a former Air Force officer known by Americans to be one of Taroon’s closest aides. We do not know his name.

7. At about 0920, the first Soviet police advisor, a tall, balding man, with a black overcoat, arrived on the scene and immediately went into consultations with the Afghan officials.

8. At about 0930, at the request of the American side at the hotel, there was a small conference among the Americans, the Afghan police, and the Soviet advisor. All then available information about the incident was exchanged at that time. We were told that the kidnappers had refused to answer the room telephone and were refusing to respond to any attempts to communicate with them. The American officers stressed their concern for the safety of the Ambassador, and were assured by the Afghan and Soviet participants that they shared this concern. Following this meeting the American officers began to find it more difficult to deal directly with the Soviet advisors and therefore began to negotiate directly with the senior Afghan police officials at the scene.

9. At 0950, under the instructions of DCM Amstutz, Political Counselor Flatin repeated the strong concern of the USG for the safety of Ambassador Dubs to both the Afghan police and Soviet advisors (at this time another two Soviet plainclothesmen had arrived on the scene, carrying with them several green canvas bags) and requested that no precipitous action be launched. They were told that in the American view this would greatly endanger the Ambassador. The Americans requested that the Afghans wait for the advice which the Embassy had already requested from Washington. The Afghans and Soviets clearly acknowledged and understood this U.S. request and indicated that they agreed with the wisdom of following a patient course of action, but they declined to make any commitments. About this time, the Embassy’s ambulance and medical staff arrived at the hotel and were permitted to position themselves in the lobby.

10. At about 1015 Sergei Bakhturin, the Soviet Embassy security officer, arrived on the scene. He assured the Americans of a strong Soviet interest in the Ambassador’s safety.³ At the same time, Taroon’s aide also assured us that all possible precautions were being taken to prevent any harm from coming to the Ambassador, and he promised that he would personally defend the Ambassador with his own life. It was at this time that we gained additional details about the entry into the hotel. The Afghan police said that the kidnappers had moved Ambassador Dubs through a crowded lobby and up the stairs to the second floor (second top) to room 117. One of the three kidnappers had returned to the lobby to ask the desk for the key to the room. Not recognizing him as a hotel guest, the hotel people were suspicious and sent a hotel employee up to the room with him. At the door to the room, he ordered the employee at gunpoint to unlock the door. The other kidnappers entered the room with the Ambassador and the third returned downstairs with the employee and at gunpoint ordered the hotel desk personnel not to allow anyone to go upstairs or to enter the hotel. It is not clear to us how he subsequently was overcome. From the nature of the 0900 police rush on the office near the desk where the terrorist presumably was, it is possible that he was disarmed and subdued at that time.

11. At 1115 a Ministry of Interior official asked RSO Boles if we had a security plan for this type of situation. Boles replied that to this point we had left the situation in charge of the Afghan police and the Soviet advisors, but that we felt that taking precipitous action would greatly endanger the Ambassador’s life. Boles then outlined the American strategy of waiting in such cases. Boles then told the police that we had our medical staff ready for all emergencies and were prepared to move the Ambassador to the dispensary, if necessary. Boles was then assured that the police would provide an escort.

12. At about 1115 a.m. Mr. James E. Taylor, Political Officer, and Embassy employee, Jalal Talibee, arrived at the Ministry of Interior. They asked to see police commandant Sayed Daoud Taroon and were asked to wait in Taroon’s outer office by his secretary, for a few minutes. Earlier in the morning, Taroon has met Admin Officer Bernie Woertz and a local and had said that an American officer was welcome to sit in Taroon’s office and act as a contact point for the USG. What Woertz and his local picked up by way of info was transmitted by sitrep no. 5.

13. At 1120, Afghan police were observed moving ladders against the outside of the hotel in such a way that the kidnappers could see the action. Troops with what appeared to be commando badges also arrived at that time. By this time, the entire hotel and neighboring streets and buildings were filled with police and other security forces. At 1125, RSO Boles notified the Embassy that it appeared that a police action against room 117 may be pending immediately. At the Embassy’s request, American officers at the hotel once again asked the Afghan police for patience, advising that time is usually on the side of the authorities. The Americans then saw several commandos enter the hotel lobby, cock their weapons, and rush upstairs.

14. At 1128, the Embassy told American officers at the hotel that DCM Amstutz was trying to get in touch with police commandant Taroon. This information was passed to the Afghan police at the hotel and they were asked not to do anything drastic until these negotiations took place.

15. At 1130 Bakhturin told American officers that the men in the room demanded the return of the man whom the police had caught in the lobby. He said that this request had been conveyed to Hafizullah Amin. The terrorists said that after their comrade had been returned to them, they would be willing to talk further with the police. An Afghan police official told us that security forces had talked to Ambassador Dubs, but did not know what his condition was. He reportedly confirmed in English that he was all right. They also reported that a policeman across the street had viewed him through a window and he appeared to be all right. Bakhturin indicated that he thought it would be at least an hour before anything could be done.

16. Also around 1130, Bakhturin asked Flatin what languages the Ambassador knew besides English. He was told the Ambassador’s best foreign language was Russian. Bakhturin did not appear satisfied with this, and asked what other languages he knew. When told German, Bakhturin asked if Flatin knew German, and was told yes.

17. At 1140, a police security officer asked Flatin to accompany him upstairs. On the second floor, Flatin met Azizi, a plainclothes police official that he had by chance once met in Badghis Province in 1977. (This police official, who speaks perfect English, had at that time told Flatin that he served one and a half years as a special police bodyguard for Ambassador Newmann when he was under a PLO terrorist threat in Kabul in the 1960s. He gave the impression of being a secret police official at that time.) Azizi, who also spoke apparently perfect Russian with the Soviet advisors, asked Flatin if he could do a favor for the police. He asked whether he would mind talking to the Ambassador in German so that the kidnappers would not understand. The police seemed to think that the kidnappers knew English.) Flatin asked whether this would endanger the Ambassador in any way, and was assured that the police had already made arrangements with the terrorists. (They were talking with the terrorist named “Najib” through the keyhole.)

18. The police asked Flatin to ask the Ambassador what type of weapons the terrorists had. Speaking through the door, Flatin identified himself in German and asked the Ambassador how he was. The Ambassador replied that he was all right. His voice sounded strained, but strong. Flatin, upon the repeated requests of the police, then asked the Ambassador what types of weapons his kidnappers had. The Ambassador began to reply, but after saying the word “revolvers”, he was silenced by the people in the room, who by that time were probably aware that a language other than one they understood was being used. The police requested the captors to permit the conversation to continue, explaining that the Ambassador should be permitted to speak to his own Embassy officials. The kidnappers retort was, “We are in charge here and it isn’t necessary.”

19. Flatin was then asked to tell the Ambassador that ten minutes from that moment he was to try to go to the bathroom or drop to the floor. Flatin requested an immediate conference elsewhere with the police. Flatin commented that such an instruction to the Ambassador obviously meant that the police were poised to strike, and, as the police already knew, the Americans had officially requested a delay. Flatin explained that DCM Amstutz was trying to discuss the situation at the very moment with police commandant Taroon, and requested that nothing be done until the American Embassy had had a chance to discuss onward tactics further with the police. Meanwhile, Amstutz talked again twice with Deputy Foreign Minister Dost, and attempted desperately to reach Foreign Minister Amin by phone (and dispatched Woertz to try to enter Palace.)

20. The Afghan police officer, who at this stage had apparently taken over charge of the operation, a youthful and tough-looking plain-clothes man, became very upset over this request for a delay, and insisted that he was under orders to strike immediately. Flatin then talked with Bakhturin who had in the meantime come upstairs, and stressed our strong American interest in the delay. Bakhturin said that he agreed time was also a good idea. He then talked with the senior Soviet police advisor. The situation then became temporarily calm on the second floor. It was at this point that Bakhturin revealed that the Afghan police were working under time deadlines which had been imposed by the kidnappers. The original noontime deadline had already passed, and the police now thought they had an extension until 1300.

21. About this time, firemen with picks and axes arrived on the scene and joined the police. Then at this time, a photograph of the Ambassador was displayed to all members of the security strike forces. One of the commandos then asked, “Is that the terrorist?” He was told that it was the Ambassador whom he was to avoid shooting.

22. Events at the Interior Ministry: At 1145, at the Interior Ministry, Mr. Taylor again asked the secretary to remind commandant Taroon that he was waiting to see him. Mr. Taylor told the secretary, a police captain, that it was important that the U.S. Embassy representative see Taroon in order to know what the Afghan Government was intending to do. The secretary came from Taroon’s office and Mr. Taylor was told to continue waiting.

23. For some reason the strike plans were apparently again relaxed and the American officers were able to again consult the Embassy. At an earlier stage in the morning’s operation the Americans had recommended that the police bring the third terrorist, as demanded, to his colleagues in order to elicit further demands from them. The police decided to bring the third man up to the room but this gesture was not sufficient; the terrorists wanted the return of his weapon too.

24. At 1207 the Afghan police requested that the American medical personnel and stretcher be brought upstairs and placed in readiness near the corridor of room 117.

25. Immediately thereafter the third terrorist was brought up the stairs hooded. It was clear to EmbOffs that a strike was being prepared. The Embassy was informed and again DCM urgently requested that EmbOffs seek further delays. The EmbOffs repeated their earlier advice to the Embassy that nothing could evidently be done with the police officials at the scene, as they were repeatedly arguing that they were already under orders from high officials elsewhere. At one time the Americans were told they were under orders of the “Prime Minister” himself. This was in response to the Embassy officer’s statement that Mr. Amstutz was still trying to reach Mr. Taroon.

26. At this stage, the Soviet Embassy security officer and three Soviet police advisors were all present, but hanging back, trying to look only like “advisors”, and allowing the Afghan police to be in charge. Flatin talked to the man who appeared to be a senior Soviet advisor and asked whether he spoke English. He did not, but he did speak a little German. Flatin tried to secure his understanding of the urgent need for a delay. He replied this was an Afghan police matter.

27. At about 1215 p.m. Mr. Taylor called the Embassy to inform that he still had not been allowed to see Taroon despite several reminders to Taroon that he was waiting and that it was extremely important to the USG to know what the Afghan Government was intending to do.

28. Back at the hotel: At 1217 additional security forces rushed upstairs and took ready positions near room 117.

29. At approximately 1230 a military officer in the lobby who seemed to be in charge of the operation gave instructions to Taroon’s assistant who returned upstairs. At 1235 Taroon’s aide came downstairs again and went into the room with the officer-in-charge who seemed to be talking on the radio.

30. At 1230 p.m. still not having been allowed to see Taroon, Mr. Taylor again called the DCM to ask if he should remain in Taroon’s waiting room. The DCM advised Mr. Taylor to wait at the Ministry for 30 more minutes but that Mr. Taylor was to insist that the following message be passed to Taroon: “Above all else, the USG did not want any action taken by the Afghan Government which would endanger the welfare of Ambassador Dubs.” That message was given to Taroon’s secretary, who claimed that he had passed it to Taroon.

31. Events again at the hotel: At the hotel, at 1237, Taroon’s aide went outside the hotel but returned one minute later. The officer-in-charge returned to the side room where there was a radio, after which two plainclothes gunmen went upstairs.

32. At about 1245 p.m. Mr. Taylor called the Embassy from the Interior Ministry, again saying that, in spite of repeated requests, he had still not been allowed to see Taroon, and was advised by the DCM that the foregoing message should be stressed again and that the Embassy had information that the Afghan authorities were contemplating action within the next two minutes. Mr. Taylor reiterated the U.S. position to Taroon’s secretary and stressed that that policy had been specifically by Secretary Vance. Mr. Taylor also emphasized that information available to the Embassy indicated that some kind of forceful action was imminent and that absolutely nothing should be done that would endanger the welfare of the Ambassador. The secretary entered Taroon’s office and upon emerging at 1250 said the message had been given to the police commandant. The secretary added that “not all information should be made available, everything is under control, and Taroon is busy with the operation at the hotel.” He claimed that “all is designed” to “secure the life of the Ambassador and the terrorists.”

33. At about 1245 it was clear to EmbOffs in the corridor outside room 117 that the police had received their orders. Top police officials and other armed men joined the crowd outside the room. One specially armed and armored policeman lay prone on the floor before the door, pointing his weapon at the door, while others stood behind him and to his side also pointing their weapons at the door. The Soviet advisors then stepped forward into operation roles. One Soviet advisor helped to arm an Afghan policeman with what appeared to be special weaponry. Two other Soviet police advisors and Bakhturin went out to the balcony. The tall, senior Soviet advisor then made hand signals from the balcony, presumably positioning the snipers across the street.

34. Before 1250, the police had all non-participants take positions of safety. At exactly 1250 very heavy gunfire broke out in the corridor, in the room, and from across the street. Both single-shot and automatic weapons were heard (several American officers were nearby). The main bursts of firing continued for approximately 40 seconds. The police snipers across the street continued to fire until two Soviet advisors gave hand signals to cut it off. Following that, there were at least three more bursts from inside the room, and then silence.

35. The police then asked the Americans to come immediately with the stretcher. The entryway into the hotel room was a seven foot long hall whose air was filled with dense cordite smoke. When the American party entered the room, they found the Ambassador seated to the right side of the entryway next to a wardrobe. His head was slumped to the right side and he had sustained several bullet wounds, one of which appeared to be a single small calibre shot above the right eye. A heavy calibre round had struck him in the heart area. A third round had hit him in the left wrist. The American party placed the Ambassador on the stretcher. The Embassy doctor’s initial diagnosis in the room was that the Ambassador was dead.

36. At 1253 the party rushed the Ambassador down to a waiting American ambulance which took the Ambassador’s body to the American dispensary. Mr. Flatin remained behind as the two terrorists were removed. The first terrorist was dragged out into the hallway through cascades of water (the radiator pipes in the room had been shot out). The police slapped his head around with a gun butt, but he appeared as probably dead. The second man was still, and possibly dead. The third terrorist, who had been held back in the immediate area of shooting was then badly roughed up by the police. A hood was put back on his head and he was dragged down to the lobby. By about 1258 all three terrorists had been removed from the hotel. The one who had been first captured was definitely alive at that time and on his feet. A second terrorist was taken from the hotel either unconscious or dead. The third terrorist was on a stretcher very bloody and apparently dead.

37. Police officers then came out of the room with the Ambassador’s sports coat and tie. Flatin asked for possession. The nearest police official was prepared to permit this but the tall Soviet police advisor came up and convinced him to rescind his permission, explaining the items were necessary for police examination. (The Ambassador’s possessions were later returned to the Embassy.)

38. Events back at the Interior Ministry: At about 1255, Mr. Taylor phoned the Embassy to report that the Afghan police were obviously on the verge of some overt action. Mr. Taylor talked to Mr. Turco who said that whatever the DRA was planning had just happened. At that point, while Mr. Taylor was on the phone with Mr. Turco a Russian civilian emerged from Taroon’s office and left the waiting room. This man had not entered through the waiting room while Taylor was there so he must have been with Taroon during the entire period Taylor was at the Ministry. About three minutes later, another official entered the waiting room and said to the secretary that he had heard shooting and the secretary informed all of the police stations to search their areas for the source of the shooting.

39. At about 1305 hours Taroon and his bodyguard came out of the commandant’s office and Taroon said that it was all over “and that the Ambassador was injured and in the hospital.” Taroon quickly left the room and went down to the main exit of the building. Mr. Taylor rushed after him down the step and asked for five seconds of his time to explain what Mr. Taylor thought of Taroon’s behavior and his handling of the whole affair. Taroon replied he was “too busy” and didn’t have time to talk with Mr. Taylor.

40. Taroon with his machine gun drove off in his Mercedes. It was obvious that Taroon refused to have any American representative aware of what the Afghan police were preparing to do. He also deliberately disregarded the American position for delay which was repeatedly made known to him a number of times, and disregarded his telephone promise to the DCM not to take action without consulting us, and that after the incident he did not want to hear any questions or statements from the American representative. It was equally clear that a civilian Soviet advisor was intimately involved with the Afghan police preparations in Taroon’s office.

41. Back at the hotel, Flatin subsequently discussed the incident with the police plainclothesman in charge of the operation, and asked why the action had been launched so precipitously. The police official said he was under higher orders and claimed that the Afghan police did not start the shooting. He explained that the terrorists had told the police that the ultimatum time had elapsed and that they did not want to wait any further. The police then pleaded for a further delay, but upon hearing a shot within the room, opened fire and rushed the room in an attempt to save the Ambassador. When told that the American Ambassador was dead the police officer expressed his sympathy.

42. Some American officers then went back to room 117. They looked for signs of shooting in the room. No bullet holes were observed in the corridor door to the room, which looked as though it had been struck near its lock by a heavy object. The glass door at the end of the hallway leading directly into the room was shattered. The wall against which the Ambassador’s body was found had at least five bullet holes at an elevation of approximately five feet higher and on the wall opposite the window were a number of bullet holes above the door frame, presumably from the snipers across the street. No bullet holes were observed in that part of the wall immediately behind the Ambassador’s body’s location or in the wardrobe cabinet next to this spot. The police then asked Embassy officers to leave before they could finish their inspection of the room.

43. According to Dr. Rotz, our RMO, Ambassador Dubs officially died at 1305 hours. Our report on this follows septel.⁴

Amstutz

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Communications with Soviet Union Re: Death of Dubs. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad.
2. Only situation report number 1, prepared in the Operations Center of the Department of State, February 14, was found. (Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Box 42, Foreign Countries—Afghanistan, 1979) A full report, entitled “The Kidnapping and Death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs, February 14, 1979, Kabul, Afghanistan,” prepared by the Special Assignments Staff, Office of Security, Department of State, was found in the Department of State, M/CT—Office for Combatting Terrorism, Country and Functional Files, 1980–1982, and Terrorist Incident Files, 1973–1976, 1976, 1980–1981, Lot 83D135, Box 12, Dubs, Adolph Amb—Afgh, Kidnapping Death—Feb 14, 1979–1980. The 17-page report includes: a summary; background on the security situation facing Dubs prior to his death; accounting for the actions taken by the United States during the standoff with the terrorists; actions of Soviet officials in Afghanistan before and during the standoff; demands made by terrorists and their possible identity; and requests made by the Embassy to the Afghan Government in the wake of Dubs’s death. Key conclusions of the report include: the Department of State had no prior indication of any threat facing Dubs; the DRA excluded U.S. officials from all decisionmaking during the standoff; the Soviet Union denied any role in assisting the Afghan officials during the standoff; both the terrorists’ demands and identity were not fully known at the time of writing; and that the DRA had been wholly uncooperative with U.S. authorities’ attempts to gain a fuller picture of the events surrounding Dubs’s death.
3. In telegram 3716 from Moscow, February 14, the Embassy reported a conversation between Toon and Gromyko regarding Dubs’s death. Gromyko expressed his regret, pledged Soviet cooperation, and identified the perpetrators as agents of a “right extremist reactionary provocative group.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Communications with Soviet Union Re: Death of Dubs) A memorandum from Bowdler to Christopher, February 14, relayed INR’s conclusion that “the Soviets share responsibility with the Afghans in precipitating the assault on the kidnappers which produced the death of Ambassador Dubs.” INR based its conclusion on two analyses of Soviet behavior during the incident: 1) “failure to adequately inform official Americans on the scene of the terrorist terms (conditions and deadline) and about the Afghan plans to assault the room where Dubs was being held;” and 2) “disregard of repeated U.S. pleas for patience and restraint.” (Ibid.) In telegram 38921 to Kabul, February 15, the Department stated that Vance called Dobrynin to inform him that “highly reliable” eyewitness reports indicated “Soviet advisers were intimately involved in carrying out the ill-advised assault which resulted in Ambassador Dubs’s death,” and that “this incident may well cause serious damage to our relations.” (Ibid.; printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 171) Telegram 3933 from Moscow, February 16, relayed Gromyko’s categorical refusal to accept blame for Dubs’s death. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1026) In a condolence message from Taraki to Carter, transmitted in telegram 39443/Tosec 10033, February 15, Taraki emphasized that “every effort” was made by Afghan security authorities to save Dubs’s life. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790073–0061)
4. A likely reference to telegram 1605 from Kabul, March 1, which transmitted the autopsy report on Dubs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])