On the other hand, if the decision is made simply to publicize the Soviet
role in Afghanistan through our international network of media assets,
agents of influence and liaison contacts, the General Finding authorizing us
to “expose and counter Soviet interference in other countries’ affairs”
already provides us with policy sufficiency.
The options presented vary in degree of risk and cost, but are not mutually
exclusive. For example, a program of support to an insurgency would also
include some or all of the less risky options, such as a worldwide
propaganda campaign on both Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the abuses
of the Taraki regime.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency2
COVERT ACTION OPTIONS AGAINST
AFGHANISTAN
INTRODUCTION:
The communist regime of Nur Mohammad
Taraki and Hafizullah
Amin appears to have established itself in effective
control in Kabul.3 It possesses the essential mechanisms of
central government and, if left to its own devices, should eventually be
able to lay to rest the tribal insurrections it continues to face,
principally in the eastern border area of Nuristan. No central Afghan
government has ever been in total, absolute control of all parts of the
country, and the center traditionally faces periodic tests of its
authority from parochial interests in the more remote provincial areas.
In this respect the Nuristan insurrection follows a familiar pattern,
but it is taking place on an order of magnitude considerably in excess
of what recent Afghan regimes have faced, and with a professed
ideological content not usual to such events.
The Afghan army, its leadership already debilitated by arrests and
purges, is disadvantaged in Nuristan by terrain which singularly favors
guerrilla activity. The admittedly limited intelligence available on the
insurrection suggests that regular forces have not fared well and that
word-of-mouth awareness of Nuristani success may be stimulating
recalcitrant tribal elements in other areas to assume equally
belligerent postures towards Kabul’s control. The latter point is
largely speculative however; little reliable intelligence now exists. To
the extent that current army leadership is embarrassed by its
performance in this matter, turning on the political leadership which
ordered the confrontation, is one possible course open to it. While
tribal insurrection cannot directly bring down the central government,
its continued success could spur politically uncommitted army officers
to such an effort. The insurrectionists are poorly armed and lack money,
medical facilities and ammunition; nor do they now appear to be
receiving more than token assistance from external sources. Left to its
own devices, the insurrection
[Page 107]
will probably peter out. Actively stimulated, it conceivably could spark
the reaction suggested above. Unilateral and bilateral mechanisms appear
to exist to provide this support; each has singular advantages or
disadvantages attached.
PURPOSE:
Covert Action (CA) could be undertaken
against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with objectives ranging from harassment to the actual
overthrow of the present communist government. The principal purpose
would be to demonstrate to the Soviets and the Third World that the
U.S. is not willing quietly to
acquiesce in the absorption of another country into the Soviet orbit.
The main risk in undertaking such a CA
program would come from the Soviet Union. In the event of a lightning,
and successful, coup d’etat in Kabul, it is unlikely that the Soviets
would intervene militarily. A gradually intensified insurgency could
lead to escalating Soviet military countermeasures. While the Soviets
would be unlikely to introduce line troops into Afghanistan, they could
easily provide virtually limitless supplies of military equipment,
military “advisors,” pilots, etc.
UNILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL CA:
Limited CA activities can be undertaken
unilaterally. For example, we can intensify our propaganda campaign and
supply funds to insurgent groups without collaborating with other
countries. Unilateral CA has security
advantages, but would be far less effective than programs undertaken
jointly. Because of geographical considerations, the cooperation—or at
least tacit endorsement—of the Government of Pakistan (GOP) would be almost mandatory if we were
to provide significant material support to the insurgents. Such
cooperation is by no means assured; the GOP would be likely to demand a high price in return for
its cooperation—viz. greatly increased military and economic assistance.
This would involve us in supporting the political status quo in
Pakistan. The GOP would run the risk of
its actions boomeranging, leading to serious instability in Pakistan.
The Afghans have the capability of stirring up Pakistan
tribals—particularly in Baluchistan. Some insurgent leaders have good
connections with Saudi Arabia, and there have been reports that aid from
that country already has been sent to exile leaders in the Peshawar
area. In view of the influence that Saudi Arabia has had on Pakistan,
the Saudis could usefully front for us with the GOP and serve as a conduit for aid to the insurgents,
probably via exile elements. Other countries might play lesser roles.
[less than 1 line not declassified] are
willing to cooperate in an anti-DRA
propaganda
[Page 108]
campaign, and [less than 1 line not declassified] are willing to
provide some intelligence. The head of [1 line not
declassified] said his organization would be willing to provide
training for the dissidents, although it is doubtful he was speaking for
[less than 1 line not declassified]
Government when he made this comment.
CA OPTIONS—PRO’S
AND CON’S:
1. Propaganda—Outside Afghanistan. We could
generate a worldwide media campaign publicizing the DRA’s problems, exposing Taraki and his colleagues as pawns of
the Soviet Union. We could condemn Taraki for attempting to force an atheistic philosophy
on the religious population and for violating civil rights. Such a
campaign could be conducted unilaterally or with the cooperation of
friendly governments such as [less than 1 line not
declassified]. It would be virtually risk free, but probably
would have little impact within Afghanistan itself. It would, however,
establish the groundwork for additional CA activities, including influencing Saudi Arabian and
other prospective donors of aid to the rebel cause.
2. Propaganda—Inside Afghanistan. Propaganda
material could be distributed inside Afghanistan. Afghans have a
tradition of employing “night letters”—clandestinely produced
leaflets—to register protest. CIA could
produce such material for non-attributable distribution in Kabul and
elsewhere in Afghanistan, but this obviously would entail considerable
risk for those involved. We cannot predict in advance the success of an
internal propaganda campaign or the overall effect it would have on the
regime. It probably would have the greatest impact if it were undertaken
in conjunction with a broader program of support for the insurgents.
3. Propaganda—Radio. Radio broadcasts in Dari and
Pushtu in the standard broadcast band beamed into Afghanistan from
neighboring countries would require the cooperation of the Governments
of Pakistan and/or Iran.4 In the past the GOP
has transmitted propaganda into Afghanistan from a radio station in
Quetta. If relations between the two countries deteriorate, the GOP might resume such broadcasts. Some
existing shortwave broadcasts, [less than 1 line not
declassified], also reach Afghanistan, and we could explore the
possibility of putting our message on this medium. Again, cooperation of
a third country would be essential. An airborne radio station also is
possible, but this too would have to be supported from a nearby country.
Satellite broadcasts theoretically could be arranged, but only at great
expense
[Page 109]
and not in the near
term. If the radio propaganda option is being seriously considered, a
technical study would be required to determine the best way to reach the
Afghan radio audience. Assuming the broadcasts are fairly widely heard,
they could have a significant impact. If the broadcasts originated from
a neighboring country such as Pakistan, this would be considered a
serious hostile act and the DRA could
be expected to take countermeasures.
4. Insurgency Support—Non-Lethal. The easiest way
to support the insurgents is to furnish them with money on a unilateral
basis. We have identified a number of Afghan exile leaders through whom
such funds could be channelled, although our ability to monitor how the
money actually is spent would be limited. A possibility also exists to
establish direct contact in Pakistan with Nuristan leaders, via
discreet, unilateral Pakistani intermediaries. If we wanted to remove
ourselves a step from such transactions, we might be able to get Saudi
Arabia to front for us, but this would further reduce the element of
control. Small amounts of non-lethal material such as medical supplies,
rations and low-grade communications equipment, might be furnished
unilaterally through Pakistan territory, although obviously this could
be done more easily with GOP
cooperation, or possibly by having the Saudis broker the deal with the
GOP. U.S. assistance to the insurgents, whether in the form of
money or non-lethal supplies or both, could be expected to encourage the
anti-regime movement, but its ultimate effect would be difficult to
predict. If significant quantities of aid were involved, this could not
be kept secret. The USG probably would
be accused of supporting the rebels by the Soviets and the Afghan press,
whether or not concrete proof was available. Nevertheless, plausible
denial could be maintained, or the USG
might even admit to supplying “humanitarian aid” to the exiles.
Pakistan’s attitude would be critical. The GOP could be seriously embarrassed if it developed that an
increasingly creditable insurgency movement was operating from its
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and
might take steps to restrict activities of the insurgents.
5. Insurgency Support—Lethal. Funds could be
provided to the insurgents to purchase lethal military equipment, as in
the non-lethal insurgency support option outlined above. Likewise, the
Saudis could be asked to front for us on this. Small amounts of lethal
equipment probably could be introduced clandestinely, but GOP cooperation would be required if
significant amounts were involved. Equipment which could upgrade the
insurgents’ combat capabilities might include small arms, sniper
equipment, light to medium crew-served weapons, unconventional
demolitions, and anti-aircraft weapons such as the Soviet SA–7 missiles. Training also would be
required, and with full GOP
[Page 110]
cooperation, a small CIA team could handle this in NWFP. Alternatively, Afghan rebel cadres
could be brought out of the area and trained in a third country such as
Saudi Arabia. From the standpoint of efficiency, the closer the training
team can operate to the scene of action, the better. Efficiency would be
lowered, but security enhanced, if American staff did not operate in
Pakistan. The results of modest but across-the-board support for the
insurgents would be hard to estimate. It could greatly improve the
insurgents’ military capability, sap the managerial resources of the
thinly staffed DRA leadership, and
eventually lead to a revolt in the Army which would overthrow the
Taraki regime. It also could
lead to increased Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, as we believe they
will take strong measures to ensure that the communist regime is not
displaced. A long drawn-out insurgency would result in great suffering
for the people involved, with no guarantee that a satisfactory outcome
would be achieved.
6. Coup d’etat. It is possible that the Taraki regime could be brought down
the same way it came to power—in a lightning coup d’etat. This would
have to be carefully planned and organized, and executed with precision.
As in the April 1978 coup, the aim would be to obtain support of key
military units and then move quickly to eliminate the DRA leadership. If successful, such a coup
would cause minimal bloodshed, and would be over before the Soviets had
time to react. A number of Afghans already have been arrested by the
regime on charges of coup plotting. At this point we do not know whether
there are viable anti-regime groups attempting to organize a coup such
as described, and it could well be that there are none. The DRA has not flinched from employing
draconian means to maintain internal security; regime leaders are well
protected by heavily armed guards and the political loyalty of key
military commanders has been carefully investigated. While dissidents
both inside and outside of Afghanistan may be discussing the theoretical
possibility of mounting a coup, little or no spadework may have been
done to prepare for this. Anti-regime exiles seem to have only
rudimentary contact with guerrillas operating in the border areas, and
presumably even poorer communications with potential dissident activists
in the capital. Nevertheless it is possible that a creditable
anti-regime underground could develop, and CIA could make contact with it, probably via selected
anti-regime exiles. In theory we could then provide specialized support
including training, advice, non-attributable sniper rifles, explosives,
anti-tank weapons, communications equipment, etc. This material then
would have to be smuggled into Kabul—again implying the existence of a
well organized underground. The political risks to the U.S. would be great, but probably
[Page 111]
not much greater than if we
decided to provide quantities of lethal equipment and training for the
insurgency as described above.5
