344. Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are a title page and a cover page.]
Sino-Soviet Relations and the Impact of the Invasion of Afghanistan ([classification marking not declassified])
Overview
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US response to it produced a sharp reaction in China that led Beijing to squelch domestic debate over foreign policy, reduce its meager relations with Moscow, and expand contacts with Washington. ([classification marking not declassified])
China’s decision in January 1980 to suspend the resumption of political negotiations with the USSR originally slated for this spring ended the latest phase in bilateral relations that began after China’s denunciation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty in April 1979. During that period, political fluidity in China and heightened tensions resulting from China’s invasion of Vietnam created a situation in which dissonant voices called for a lessening of China’s hostility toward the USSR and an increase in bilateral economic exchanges. ([classification marking not declassified])
Proponents of a less hostile policy toward Moscow may have included centrist leaders in the Chinese Politburo. Their influence was strengthened by a temporary alliance with party leftists during the spring of 1979, when Deng Xiaoping and his allies were beset with political problems. ([classification marking not declassified])
In subsequent months, Deng gradually isolated his leftist opponents, and they were finally removed from the Politburo at the party’s Fifth Plenum last February. Although the centrists remain powerful figures on the Politburo’s Standing Committee, the growth of Deng’s influence has reduced their ability to redirect policy. The trend has been toward a strengthening of Deng’s grip on domestic affairs, languishing relations with the USSR, and improved ties with the United States. ([classification marking not declassified])
[Page 902]Deng has been less successful in devising an ideological framework within which to revise policies to suit his pragmatic approach while still proclaiming ideological opposition to the Soviet Union. This has forced Beijing to impose heavyhanded measures to ensure conformity on discussion of the Soviet brand of socialism. Nonetheless, allegorical articles debating foreign policy have continued to appear in China’s media, and some middle level officials are known to be in favor of new approaches to China’s Soviet policy. ([classification marking not declassified])
Beijing is sensitive to foreign awareness of the internal Chinese debate over policy toward the USSR and the United States. Deng seems to fear that the appearance of less than unanimous support for China’s foreign policy will undercut the willingness of the United States, Japan, and the West to cooperate with Beijing. This sensitivity has led to a succession of extraordinary efforts in the past year to demonstrate that China will not deal with the Soviets in ways that Moscow might use to portray a lessening of Sino-Soviet hostility. ([classification marking not declassified])
US actions are central to the Chinese foreign policy equation. Deng, having closely identified himself with the US connection over the past several years, has had to demonstrate to skeptics at home that the benefits of the deepening US-Chinese relationship outweigh the costs of continuing hostility toward the USSR. He also has appeared anxious to prove the value of the US connection at times when Washington seemed to be improving relations with the USSR or when Taiwan-related issues have emerged—developments that strengthen critics of Deng’s foreign policy. Some Chinese, moreover, may calculate that Washington’s concern about possible improvements in Sino-Soviet relations can be manipulated to induce the United States to provide China with technology, equipment, and political support to forestall a Chinese move toward accommodation with the Soviets. ([classification marking not declassified])
Sino-Soviet relations since Afghanistan have worsened despite Soviet efforts to portray progress. Beijing remains eager to rally opposition to Soviet “hegemonism,” to explore sales of US civilian and military technology, and to portray the Chinese leadership as unified as it goes through the transition from older to younger leaders. ([classification marking not declassified])
Nonetheless, Beijing has maintained minimal, correct diplomatic dealings with Moscow, and has reserved the option to reopen political negotiations. The chances that Beijing would exercise that option would increase from the current low if political turmoil arises in China as it did in April 1979, or if Deng has to placate elements in the Chinese leadership who are skeptical of the US relationship. Circumstances that [Page 903] might put pressure on Deng to make such a move could include a return to detente politics in the West or a developing trend toward “official” ties between Washington and Taipei. ([classification marking not declassified])
[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 82T00150R: Production Case Files, Box 3, Sino-Soviet Relations and the Impact of the Invasion of Afghanistan. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A statement on the cover page reads: “This paper was prepared by [less than 1 line not declassified] Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Offices of Economic Research and Strategic Research and reviewed by the National Intelligence Officers for East Asia and the USSR-Eastern Europe.”↩