Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, January 10, 1981, 1329Z

321. Subject: Afghanistan: Soviets Appear To Renege on Their “Initiative.” Ref: State 5253.²

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: In carrying out instructions today on Soviet initiative on Afghanistan, I was informed by President Zia and Acting Foreign Minister Shahnawaz that Soviet Ambassador has suddenly pulled the rug out from under them by informing GOP that regional conference on Afghanistan would not be possible if linked to UN General Assembly resolution, that participation of Iran was not acceptable, and that UN SYG’s Special Representative could participate only as an observer.³ Soviets attributed these sudden changes to Babrak Karmal. Shahnawaz has already told Soviet Ambassador that GOP is ‘deeply disappointed’ and he will shortly deliver formal reply from President Zia. Zia and Shahnawaz said that initiative had been stopped dead in its tracks. Zia said that Pakistan will continue its firm opposition to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in absence of some acceptable proposal for compromise.⁴ He hoped Pakistan’s friends would be prepared to back it up in these circumstances. End summary.

3. I called on President Zia at noon today, accompanied by DCM, to carry out instructions contained in reftel. Zia, who leaves for Gulf and Turkey early tomorrow morning, had Acting Foreign Minister Shahnawaz and Americas Director Rana present.

4. I went through talking points contained in reftel word for word with President Zia, emphasizing certain points and adding thought that softening of Islamic Conference resolution would be premature. I expanded on talking point regarding Jan 7 Radio Moscow commentary and left FBIS transcript of commentary with Zia. I also left text of Department Press Spokesman’s Jan 7 briefing dealing with Afghanistan initiative, and in this connection I made point that we were taking positive position in public while expressing our concerns over this initiative to GOP in private.

5. Zia responded by briefly rehearsing how GOP had arrived at present position. Islamic Conference Standing Committee, expanded to include Guinea and Tunisia, had led to nowhere and Pakistan had quite deliberately moved situation towards UN General Assembly vote that had resulted in overwhelming call for Soviet withdrawal. Recent initiative entirely that of Soviet Union and he could see three possible motives for new Soviet initiative:

—A. Buying time. Soviet initiative—“if indeed it is an initiative”—might be nothing more than a “short-sighted” maneuver to get them past the Islamic Summit and NAM gathering.⁵ Similar tactics were employed by Soviets before two Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Conferences.

—B. Beset with difficulties in Kampuchea, Poland and Afghanistan, Soviets decided it was to their advantage to show signs of flexibility in at least one of these places.

—C. Other explanation was the Mujahidin resistance was becoming so costly that Soviets had decided that it was to their advantage to try and reach an understanding with Pakistan, the only country in a position to inhibit activities of freedom fighters.

6. Now, however, said Zia, there had been a new development of which he had not himself yet been fully briefed, and he would let Acting Foreign Minister Shahnawaz explain what had happened. Shahnawaz prefaced his remarks by saying that new Soviet Ambassador Smirnov and aide who accompanied him both spoke excellent English and there could be no question of misunderstanding, as had occasionally happened with previous Soviet Ambassador. Original approach to Shahnawaz had led to meeting at which Soviet Ambassador made his pitch to Zia, Shahi and Shahnawaz. In course of outlining his proposal for a regional conference Ambassador Smirnov had at least three times made following statements in reply to questions put to him by Pak side.

—A. Soviet-Afghan side would be prepared to open dialogue under auspices of UN Special Representative.

—B. Participation in talks by Kabul regime as party and not government was acceptable.

—C. Discussions would not imply recognition of Babrak Karmal government.

—D. Soviet and Afghan Ambassadors at UN would be instructed to follow agreed line.

7. Shahnawaz went on to say that they had told Smirnov that they would inform Waldheim of proposal and advise him that he could check directly with Moscow if he wished. Smirnov had inquired about what reaction there would be from Iran, and Zia had said that was one question Pakistan could not answer. Zia then put question to Smirnov on whether Soviet Union prepared to withdraw its forces. Smirnov replied that Soviets would do so as soon as outside interference stopped. Paks then challenged this view of situation, but finally agreed that there was basis for proceeding with initiative. Soviets requested no publicity, but Paks insisted that some public statement would be required. Shahi’s carefully worded public remarks constituted that statement.

8. Then, said Shahnawaz, on January 9 Soviet Ambassador called seeking urgent meeting with Zia. Shahnawaz replied that Zia was out of town but if it was a matter of real urgency he could call at Shahnawaz’s residence. Message that Smirnov brought was that President Zia and his government had given an interpretation to Pak-Soviet understanding which was “not quite correct.” Therefore Moscow had not sent instructions to delegations in New York. In addition Babrak Karmal regime had informed Soviets it would not accept any initiative that came under UN resolution. Finally Pakistan had introduced Iran into equation. Babrak Karmal had reacted to this by saying that only bilateral talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan were acceptable and that UN Special Representative could only participate in these discussions as an observer, not as a participant.

9. Shahnawaz said he had told Smirnov that he was “deeply disappointed” by what he had heard. There had been a clear understanding that Iran and the SYG’s Special Representative would be participants. He would have to consult his President. Shahnawaz said that he was quite taken aback to hear Smirnov at this late date say that he did not see how it would be possible to have a conference under UN auspices in view of General Assembly resolution “hostile to USSR and Afghan Government.”

10. Zia took over at this point to say that as a result of these developments GOP position was firmer than ever that any initiative must be under General Assembly resolution or “at least under auspices of Secretary General whose authority in this matter derives from that resolution.” Obviously any conference must include Iran. Zia’s conclusion: “The Soviets have got cold feet.” I asked Zia for a few clarifications. Had Smirnov blamed all of this sudden shift on the Afghans? Yes. Including unwillingness to include Iran in discussions? Yes. In fact, said Zia, Babrak Karmal was directly quoted as saying, “Relations between Iran and Afghanistan are none of Pakistan’s business.” Would the Kabul regime accept participation as a party and not as a government? Yes. In fact, that was one thing Smirnov said Afghans were satisfied with.

11. Shahnawaz added that GOP still felt it had made a wise move. If initiative had moved in the right direction everybody would have benefitted. If it didn’t, as it now appeared would be the case, the onus would be on Soviets. I replied that in view of what I had just been told it seemed that many of our concerns were quite justified. Shahnawaz and Zia concurred. Shahnawaz said that obviously next move was up to Soviets, after he formally conveyed President Zia’s negative reaction to Ambassador Smirnov. I said that there was still one point of difference between us which I thought was important: While GOP would be prepared to see some kind of discussion take place simply under auspices of SYG Special Representative we felt that link to General Assembly resolution must be quite explicit. Neither Zia nor Shahnawaz reacted positively to this thought. As to what happens next, Zia said I could be assured I would be kept fully informed on each development and that the details of what had taken place between Shahnawaz and Smirnov he and I had heard together for the first time. As to the future we were in complete agreement that the Islamic Summit must not in any way dilute the Islamic world’s stand on Afghanistan. He was totally committed to this position until there was some sign that the Soviets were genuinely ready to compromise.

12. I observed that it seemed to me the Soviets had for their own reasons used the reported objections by the puppet Babrak govt as the excuse for completely revising the position they had first taken. This sort of Sov behavior lay at the base of the strong concerns the USG has had about how the Sovs might twist future scenario of any talks as they unfolded. Zia and Shahnawaz wryly agreed, and said it would not be the first time in their experiences with the USSR that the Sovs blandly reneged on their commitments.

13. At this point I tried to close the conversation; but Shahnawaz, as he often does, wanted to remind me of the collusion that GOP sees between the Soviets and India. He cited a recent book in which several GOI officials are quoted as acknowledging that Amin had suggested that India should move toward the dismemberment of Pakistan on more than one occasion. I said I was not surprised that Sovs and Afghans wanted to enlist India in pressures on Pakistan, but by Shahnawaz’ own account India had rejected these suggestions, so I could not see any new significance in terms of Indian intentions.

14. Zia closed the conversation by saying that in reporting this conversation he hoped I would make sure that Washington understands that despite the fact that the Soviets appeared to be backing out of what they proposed, Pakistani public reaction had been very positive on hearing there might be a chance for a political compromise. He had received hundreds of letters in the last few days expressing relief that a solution was in sight. The fear of Soviet or Soviet-Indian aggression is very strong. If the confrontation is now to continue Pakistan must have assurances that its security will be strengthened. The nation badly needs some boost for its morale from its friends, he emphasized.

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810014–0355. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Peshawar, The Hague, New Delhi, Beijing, Kabul, Jidda, Moscow, London, USUN, Paris, USNATO, and Bonn.
2. Telegram 5253 was not found. In early January, with Soviet support, Pakistan and Afghanistan had tentatively agreed to begin talks. (Michael T. Kaufman, “Afghanistan and Pakistan Report Progress Toward Beginning Talks,” New York Times, January 7, 1981, p. A4) On January 7, it was reported that the Soviet Union no longer insisted that Pakistan recognize the Karmal government as a condition for the talks. (“Dispute on Afghanistan,” Washington Post, January 7, 1981, p. A20)
3. See footnote 4, Document 337. An item in the President’s Daily Brief, January 14, noted that Pakistan informed the Soviets that these preconditions for the talks were unacceptable. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1981, PDBs)
4. In telegram 363 from Moscow, January 10, the Embassy reported that officials in Pakistan’s Embassy in the Soviet Union privately considered the Soviet move as evidence that its pressure on Pakistan had “borne fruit.” Additionally, the telegram noted “intense pressure” placed upon Pakistan by the Soviet Union to enter into talks with the DRA on the latter’s terms; if Pakistan did not, the Soviets “hinted” of “possible Soviet action ahead,” presumably a veiled threat of a military attack. According to a Pakistani Embassy official, Zia took this threat seriously in light of what he considered insufficient support either from Western Europe or the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810014–0358)
5. Reference is to the upcoming Islamic Summit in Saudi Arabia January 25–28 and the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi February 9–12.