338. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
12795. Subject: Afghanistan and Pakistan/U.S. Relations.
1. (S) Entire text.
2. Summary: The end of 1980 and the current transition period leads us to take another look at some fundamental issues which are key to U.S./Pakistan relations during the coming years. For simplicity of presentation we have divided these concerns into (A) Afghanistan-related issues, (B) U.S./Pakistan bilateral issues and expectations, and (C) South and Southwest Asia security concerns. This telegram, addressing the Afghanistan question, is the first of three which we are submitting and which are intended to stimulate a dialogue with Washington and other concerned posts aimed at a more precise definition of options available to us. The Afghanistan situation remains central to our relationship with Islamabad and to Islamabad’s relationship with many of the nations of Southwest, if not South, Asia. Pakistan’s firm stance on Afghanistan continues to be fundamental to our own policy. We think it behooves us to take a look ahead—possibly at some unthinkables—so that our policies will at least attempt to influence the course of events rather than the other way around. End summary.
3. In the midst of a major transition between administrations and as we near the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we think it opportune to suggest that the Department and other members of the foreign affairs community in Washington take a look at the Afghan situation and the policy options it presents us. Some of those options bear directly on the future of our relationship with Pakistan and other countries in this region, and we would like to offer a few thoughts from this vantage point.
4. We start with a few basic assumptions derived from our reading of the current situation in Afghanistan and the likely course of events over the next year; these we regard as “givens”:
—(A) Soviet troops will remain in Afghanistan as long as Moscow deems it necessary to secure a sympathetic regime in Kabul and to remold Afghan institutions along Communist lines;
—(B) Soviet pressures, including cross-border attacks on Pakistan, will continue and probably escalate as Moscow seeks to intimidate [Page 891] the GOP to drop its opposition to Soviet policy and to accept the “irreversibility” of events in Afghanistan;
—(C) Large numbers of Afghan refugees (which could approach two million) will remain in Pakistan for the foreseeable future becoming an increasingly serious domestic political issue in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier particularly, and
—(D) The Afghan resistance will continue to obstruct Soviet efforts to pacify the Afghan countryside, but at present levels of outside support it may begin to lose effectiveness as the war of attrition drags on in Afghanistan.
5. There may be some debate among Americans about the validity or force of these assumptions, but there is substantial evidence that they form the current mind-set of most key Pakistanis who will be responsible for influencing Pakistan’s own policy toward Afghanistan. For the Pakistanis, therefore, these are very real factors which we must take into account in determining our own approach to the issues involved, including the nature of our bilateral relationship with Islamabad.
6. We would hope that someone in transition Washington is looking down the road six months or a year trying to ascertain where would we prefer to be then.
—Are we prepared, for example, to simply let the situation drift, somehow hoping that the resistance will remain strong and that Pakistan will maintain a firm stance against the Soviets?
—Or are we prepared to take some positive initiatives either to help defuse the tensions boiling in the area or to bolster Pakistani resolve in standing up in the face of intense pressures?
These are difficult questions to which we do not have the answers. We suggest only that someone should be giving them serious thought.
7. If we assume that the Soviets will negotiate over Afghanistan only on their own terms (essentially the May 14 proposals), we do not see much likelihood of a solution which would meet our stated requirements including complete Soviet troop withdrawal, restoration of Afghanistan’s nonaligned and independent status, self-determination for the Afghan people, and guarantees of keeping up our own firm opposition to the invasion and recognition of the Karmal regime. On the other hand, we ourselves may have extended an aspect of formal recognition to Karmal by granting an A–1 visa to one of his diplomats.2 Is it not at least conceivable that Pakistan could find a way [Page 892] of talking to Babrak while obscuring the fact of recognition. If this were to reduce tensions in the region, would we see such a development as in our interest or not?
8. If we think it very important to avoid such a development, then we should be taking concrete steps to bolster Pakistan in ways which the Pakistanis consider meaningful. With the exception of debt relief, we have so far been unable to deliver on our rhetoric of support for Pakistan. We have in fact cheered on from a comfortable distance while the Pakistanis themselves bear the real costs of standing up to the Soviets. True, we have provided generous humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees but that is not likely to count for very much among Pakistani decision-makers who may believe they are faced with their country’s very survival.
9. We realize that any discussion of support for Pakistan on a scale which would produce measurable results here automatically raises the prospect of strong Indian reactions. But we must question how much good will we have won in India by our recent policies of providing almost nothing (in relative terms) to Pakistan. We suggest there is a middle ground between minimal support and maximal support for Pakistan which would solidify our position and strengthen Pakistan. Naturally, whatever we do will have an impact on relations with New Delhi, but thirty years of threading policy course among the irrelevant (to us) enmities of the region should long ago have accustomed us to the fact that we cannot satisfy ourselves and everyone else in South Asia at the same time.
10. Another set of issues revolves around the question of military assistance to the Afghan resistance groups. The problems in providing such aid, including the multitude of competing groups and the desirability of maintaining a diplomatic mission in Kabul, have been discussed before in other forums. We would submit, however, that we cannot realistically expect the Mujahideen to go on fighting the Russians forever without increased support and we should be thinking how we would adjust our policy to deal with such a development.3 Or we should take another hard look at what we can do to sustain and promote the resistance cause.
11. Finally, we need to do some serious long-range planning on our role in providing relief to growing numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Not only should we be taking steps to ensure adequate funds are available for a generous contribution of our own over the [Page 893] next several years, but we should carefully consider supporting recent GOP interest in an international pledging conference. Such a conference could serve two of our stated objectives, namely to stimulate other potential donors to take on a greater share of the relief burden as well as to focus additional international attention on the Afghan situation. Strong and prompt support for this GOP suggestion would be well-received in Islamabad.
12. We need to look as well at our own immigration policy regarding the flood of Afghans with whom our consular officers are currently besieged, with a view toward making additional numbers available for Afghan applicants—perhaps by designating them a separate refugee category—and expediting application procedures to the extent possible. We have already suggested, for example, that a voluntary agency rep be assigned to concerned posts to help with processing (Islamabad 12007 and 12444).4
13. In sum, we should look ahead to the likely ramifications of possible Afghan developments which we would view as adverse to our regional interests, i.e., Soviet consolidation of its position in Afghanistan, collapse of the Afghan resistance, Pakistani acceptance of a fait accompli across the Durand Line, and possible Pakistani accommodation to broader Soviet aims in the region. If we conclude that we can live in such a new environment, then certain policy options offer themselves as preferable. If otherwise, then other steps would seem called for.
14. We hope the Department agrees that such a look ahead would be both timely and useful. We would be happy to contribute to the discussion in any way deemed desirable.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800590–0379. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. Sent for information to Karachi, Beijing, Moscow, New Delhi, London, Kabul, and Jidda. Pouched for information to Peshawar and Lahore.↩
- Telegram 285609 to Kabul and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 25, authorized the Embassy to issue A–1 visas to two Afghan diplomats. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800511–0150) The A–1 is a diplomatic visa issued to foreign government officials traveling to the United States to conduct official business on behalf of their government.↩
- It is not clear if Hummel was aware of the recently authorized increase in expenditures to support the Afghan insurgency; or if he was, whether he viewed such incremental steps as sufficient.↩
- Telegram 12007 from Islamabad is dated November 11; telegram 12444 from Islamabad is dated December 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800560–0017 and D800574–0981, respectively)↩