339. Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (Hummel) to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Coon)1
[message number not declassified]. For CIA and State NEA–Coon From Amb Hummel. Subject: Ambassador’s Conversation With PRC and Egyptian Ambs Re Arms for Mujahideen.
When I saw Egyptian Amb Scharaff Dec 10 for a return courtesy call, I raised subject of foreign inputs to Afghan Mujahideen, asking what he knew of the matter. First elliptically, and then more directly, he acknowledged that he knew of Egypt’s own assistance and also something of USG and Saudi activities. He did not talk about the content or magnitude of the inputs.
He said that in his Mission only he and his MilAtt (whom Scharaff personally chose, the MilAtt having been a lieutenant under Scharaff in the army) knew of the inputs. The MilAtt deals directly with Gen Akhtar on these matters. Scharaff had a favorable impression of Gen Akhtar. I said on my side only a very few of my officers knew of the program not including my military attachés. I said that the Egyptian DCM (Scharaff said this officer was also one of his own choosing “because personal loyalty is very important”) had been discussing with foreign diplomats the subject of arms to Mujahideen. I said I proposed that in our Embassy only the Amb and I should have such discussions. Scharaff agreed, and indicated he would pass the word for those not witting on his staff (he said that “some of them may have a general idea”) not to ask questions or discuss the subject. Comment: My purpose in raising the subject was to make Scharaff aware that his DCM has been making statements about arms input and probing for information).
He asked how the U.S. Embassy deals with this subject with the Pakistanis. I said I have an “Intelligence Liaison Officer” (whom I did not name) who deals only with Gen Akhtar.
We both agreed that the MFA should not be involved in this subject. I told him that I had had clear instructions from Pres Zia not to discuss it with the MFA.
[Page 895]Scharaff said he hoped soon to have an intelligence officer assigned to his staff, and that after that officer arrived he hoped he and my officer could be in touch. I was noncommittal.
In a separate private conversation with PRC Amb Xu Yi-xin I tried to probe him on PRC inputs to the Mujahideen. Xu acknowledged that the PRC would like to see more support given to the freedom fighters, but asserted that PRC support goes to the Pak Govt “in general”, and none was specifically earmarked for the Mujahideen.2 The unspoken implication was that the GOP makes its own decisions as to what arms of PRC origin go to Afghans. (Comment: This does not square with other reports that some AK–47s from the PRC are earmarked for Mujahideen).
- Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Liaison Files, TIN 980643000012, Box 6, Afghanistan 1980. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
- [text and 1 line not declassified] “The PRC routinely provides machine guns, small arms, hand grenades and ammunition to the Afghan rebels. Shipments are by ship into Pakistan ports and by air. In some instances shipments have been by Pakistani C–130 aircraft flown direct from China to airfields near the Afghan border. He stated that no shoulder-fired SAMs had been provided because China had none. He stated that in his opinion, SA–7s had been provided by Egypt. Source claimed not to know the dates of the shipments but described them as routine and continuing. He claimed that PRC aid to Afghan rebels has the full but unannounced support of the Government of Pakistan.” (Telegram 27726 from Cairo, December 16; Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, PRC Support for Insurgents)↩