Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

337. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, December 8, 1980, 2303Z

325039. Subject: Letter From President Carter to Waldheim on Afghanistan Resolution.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. President Carter has written a letter dated December 8 to Secretary General Waldheim containing U.S. views on implementation of the November 20 UNGA resolution on Afghanistan.³ Ambassador McHenry is requested to deliver to Waldheim the following text of this letter, which we have received from White House.

3. Begin text.

Dear Kurt:

I know from our previous talks that you join with me in welcoming the action by the General Assembly in adopting by an overwhelming majority a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. This strong expression of support for international law and the United Nations Charter by the General Assembly has made a very favorable impact on the American people and has reinforced their faith in the moral authority of the United Nations.

In the resolution, as you know, the Assembly expressed its hope that you would appoint a special representative to seek a political solution on the basis of the resolution and in accordance with its call for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Ambassador McHenry has already expressed our strong views to you in this regard, but I want you to know that this is a matter of personal concern to me.

In light of the Soviet attitude I recognize that it will not be easy to move rapidly toward a political solution based on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. But I trust you will agree that the appointment of your special representative should be expedited because of the overwhelming vote by the international community. The 111 member states who supported the resolution were well aware of the Soviet Union’s negative attitude. Nevertheless, we expressed support for your appointment of a special representative to promote a solution based on the principles of the Charter which the Soviet Union has so flagrantly violated in Afghanistan.

I have asked Ambassador McHenry to deliver this letter urgently to you as a private expression of my views.⁴

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

End text.

Muskie

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800585–1110. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad, Moscow, and London. Drafted by Pope (IO/UNP); cleared in IO, IO/UNP, S/S, and in substance in NEA/PAB; and approved by Christopher.
2. UN General Assembly Resolution 35/37, adopted on November 20 by a vote of 111 to 22 with 12 abstentions, called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, supported the right of the Afghan people to choose their own form of government, urged all parties to reach a political settlement, and asked the Secretary General to appoint a special representative to assist in finding a solution. For the UNGA consideration of the resolution and its text, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, pp. 304–309. An intelligence report produced in the Central Intelligence Agency, October 29, noted that the draft resolution, introduced by Pakistan, was similar to the “strong position” previously adopted by the Islamic Conference with regard to Afghanistan. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1980, NIDs)
3. Christopher sent Carter a draft of the letter on December 5, on which Carter handwrote corrections and noted: “OK as amended. J.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989 (Not for the System, Evening Reading, Personnel Sensitive), Lot 92D630, Box 6, Evening Reading: December 1980) In a memorandum to Carter, December 10, Christopher reported the letter was delivered to Waldheim and that the U.S. Mission to the UN would consult with allies “on how best to maintain the pressure on Waldheim concerning this matter.” In the left margin of Christopher’s memorandum, Carter wrote: “Continue to push.” (Ibid.)
4. In a memorandum to Carter, December 18, Muskie reported he “had an unexpectedly comprehensive discussion” with Waldheim regarding Afghanistan and the appointment of a special representative. Muskie noted that Waldheim was “receptive.” (Ibid) An article in the National Intelligence Daily, January 8, reported that [text not declassified] the DRA was willing to meet with Pakistan and a UN Special Representative despite Pakistan’s ongoing refusal to recognize the Afghan Government. The report further noted that the Pakistanis “view the UN talks in the past as a means of reducing Soviet pressure temporarily.” Even so, the report concluded, such talks would give the DRA “a lift.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—December 1980, NIDs)