Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 6, 1978, 0435Z

9599. Subject: Afghan-Soviet Relations on the Eve of Taraki’s Trip to Moscow.

1. Summary: Noor Mohammad Taraki, Afghanistan’s President and Prime Minister, departed Kabul on December 4 to visit the Soviet Union. In many ways it is fitting that Taraki’s first trip outside Afghanistan since the April 27 revolution should be to Moscow. The pro-Soviet views of the Afghan leadership have become increasingly apparent recently, a development which may stem from deep ideological convictions, as well as this regime’s genuine and increasing need for Soviet support in several fields. Aside from the symbolic and public relations aspects of the trip—which are significant in their own right, the Afghan delegation will probably raise a number of issues, which, if Moscow is reasonably forthcoming, could solidify the already close bilateral relationship, especially the link between the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The capstone of the visit could be the signing of a new bilateral treaty—a step which would, from the DRA’s vantage point, represent a complete break with past Afghan regimes and would codify the two countries’ special relationship.² We have no firm evidence, however, that this subject has been under active consideration by either party. The Afghans are also expected to ask the USSR for food and increased economic assistance. We anticipate that Moscow will not want their guests to go away empty-handed, and that the visit will, therefore, produce some concrete results which would help to identify the future direction of this rapidly developing relationship. End of summary.

2. Departure of the Afghan party: Taraki was accompanied by the following Cabinet officers (names are in the order listed in the official media): Hafizullah Amin, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister; Dr. Shah Wali, Minister of Public Health and Acting Minister of Planning; Dr. Saleh Mohammad Ziri, Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform; Professor Mahmud Sooma, Minister of Higher Education; Mohammad Mansoor Hashimi, Minister of Water and Power; Eng. Mohammad Ismail Danesh, Minister of Mines and Industries; and Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi, Minister of Communications. With the exception of the last three men, all members of the travelling party are members of the PDPA Politburo. The “pecking order” of the top officials bidding farewell to the Taraki party was: Dastagir Panjshiri, Minister of Public Works; Abdul Karim Misaq, Minister of Finance; Major Mohammad Awlam Watanjar, Minister of Interior; Abdul Hakem Sharaie Jauzjani, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General; Mohammad Hassen Bareq-Shafiee, Minister of Culture and Information; Abdul Qudus Ghorbandi, Minister of Commerce; and Dr. Abdul Rashid Jalili, Minister of Education. Panjshiri and Misaq are known members of the Politburo. When the Ambassador asked one protocol official who has been left in charge, the reply was “Watanjar.” The Chief of Protocol later told the Ambassador that the Revolutionary Council was in charge of Afghanistan collectively—and that any urgent important problems would be forwarded to Moscow for decisions. (We find this version more credible; Watanjar appears to lack sufficient presence or intelligence for the “charge” role.) In trying to set up top-level appointments for visiting USAID official Wheeler, the Embassy’s protocol officer has been told that the Afghan party will return to Kabul on December 7.

3. The Afghan view of the Soviet connection: The pro-Moscow mind set of Taraki and his closest advisors, particularly his two principal lieutenants, Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin and Acting Planning Minister Dr. Shah Wali, has been well documented since the April 27 revolution, both through domestic pronouncements and by high-level speeches before international fora. In the initial post-revolutionary period, however, the leadership generally tried to camouflage its pro-Soviet views with explanations that the USSR and Afghanistan have had good and friendly relations for decades, and that the new regime in Kabul was merely carrying on in the same tradition. The Khalqi leaders publicly denied that their PDPA was “Communist,” “Socialist,” or “Marxist-Leninist,” although they admitted its Marxist-Leninist character in private fora.

4. In recent weeks, however, a deeper pro-Soviet attitude has emerged from the PDPA closet; the Afghan leadership has made no effort to disguise its belief that Kabul’s relationship with Moscow is of overriding importance, not only in the foreign policy field, but also probably domestically as well. Amin’s November 7 speech, which portrayed Afghanistan’s Saur revolution of April 27 as an historical extension of the “great October revolution” (Kabul 9145) was typical of the obsequious degree to which Taraki and his colleagues are willing to reveal their political convictions.³ In this connection, Taraki himself took the unprecedented and well-publicized step of attending (with virtually the entire Afghan Cabinet) the November 7 Soviet National Day reception, a far cry from the regime’s standard practice of sending one minister to the similar celebrations of other countries. Most recently, Taraki, in his lengthy speech to the plenum of the Party’s Central Committee echoed the Soviet line of international issues, ranging from the inevitable victory of socialism over imperialism to support for Vietnam in its struggle against intrigue by its neighbors.⁴ The presence of the Afghan Minister for Higher Education in the Taraki party might indicate a desire to involve the Soviets more intensively in the tertiary education field to ensure ideological purity and harmony in a critical area which has heretofore been an arena for extensive American participation and influence.

5. Reasons for the DRA’s pro-Soviet attitudes: The primary well from which the strong leftist views of this regime’s leaders spring is their long-held beliefs in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and a probably more recently acquired conviction that the world correlation of forces and events is evolving in such a way that the ultimate victory of Marxism-Leninism cannot be denied. Although the Afghan leadership’s grasp of many of the arcane principles of this doctrine has come under polite fire by a number of visiting Third World officials (e.g., Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee), in our assessment Taraki and his colleagues are sincere in their devotion to this ideology and in their belief that Marxism-Leninism contains the ultimate answers on how to modernize Afghanistan’s feudal society. They also display full trust and confidence in the Soviet Union as their sole support and defense at this vulnerable stage of consolidation. There is no indication that they see any unacceptable risks to their independence in this relationship. Indeed, an ideologue like Amin would probably describe Outer Mongolia as an “independent” state. The Khalqi perception of Afghan independence is different from the classical stance taken by other Afghans.

6. Afghan security needs: Simultaneously, there is a practical side to Taraki’s and Amin’s view of politics, and this element of the equation may account, to a greater extent, for the recent pro-Soviet developments noted above, and may also determine the primary significance of Taraki’s trip to Moscow. Although the accession of a leftist regime in Kabul has undoubtedly served a number of important Soviet foreign policy and ideological interests, one could make a strong argument that, at this stage of the game at least, the Afghan leadership needs the Soviets more than the latter needs Kabul’s possible contributions. The security of the Taraki regime has not yet been fully established, despite the Afghan leader’s confident remarks in his November 27 address to his party colleagues. Active opposition, especially in the eastern tribal areas, appears to be inadequate to overcome the military force and ruthless determination of the Khalqi regime. Nevertheless, it refuses to go away or be stamped out. Rightly or wrongly, it is widely perceived here that Moscow has undertaken a bottom-line commitment (some believe to the extent that it would provide para-military forces if necessary) to the survival of a leftist regime in Kabul, a perception that probably serves to intimidate somewhat any potential domestic opporition—or any Pakistani inclination to contribute to this subversion. Thus, in the crucial security field the possibility that the Taraki regime might at some point be able to exercise the “Soviet option” is from Kabul’s point of view an indispensable factor in Kabul’s bilateral relationship with Moscow—and, for that matter, with Islamabad, as well.

7. Regional politics: On the broader foreign policy front, Moscow’s presence in the wings is probably a comforting one for the DRA leadership, especially as it formulates its policies toward Pakistan and Iran. There is a trade-off here, however, as the Afghans conceivably could find themselves not completely free agents should Moscow, for its own purposes, decide to exercise a restraining hand over possible irredentist Afghan tendencies vis-à-vis the Pushtun and Baluch regions of Pakistan, or any Afghan inclination to reheat the Helmand waters dispute with Iran. Nevertheless, the Afghans could well use a commitment from Moscow that the USSR would extricate Afghan chestnuts in the event Taraki might overplay his hand and provoke a strong Pakistani reaction of some sort. Many observers here believe that such a commitment has already been given, even if only tacitly. From the Soviet viewpoint, the Afghan potential for making trouble for Iran and Pakistan in Baluchistan remains an important card in Moscow’s hand. Moscow might, therefore, consider some statement of support for Afghan concern for its “Pushtun and Baluch brethren.”

8. Economic needs: Also of immediate concern to the Afghan leadership is the extent to which Moscow would be willing to underwrite Afghanistan’s economic development should Kabul’s stand on international issues and its approach to bilateral programs provoke a reduction of Western or Arab-Iranian assistance. The presence of several “economic” ministers in the Taraki party signals a long Afghan shopping list. Although no non-Communist country has as yet significantly cut its operations here, radical or rigid Afghan policies could create a situation in which Moscow and its Socialist colleagues would be the only donor countries willing to invest economic resources in Afghanistan, a possibility which could well have provoked the Afghan leadership’s recent pro-Soviet displays. A Soviet diplomat in Kabul recently told an Indian diplomat that the Socialist Bloc is prepared and able to shoulder the entire development burden in Afghanistan should the West elect to quit the field (Kabul 8970).⁵ Taraki’s delegation might also ask the Soviets to support Afghanistan’s food needs during the current testing period when oppositionists are successfully withholding key commodities, such as flour, from the market. Although Moscow may be unwilling to satisfy each Afghan request to the letter, Taraki and his colleagues will probably not come away empty-handed. It is possible that the Soviets might utilize this occasion to announce another large credit for Afghan development. We presume that the Soviets are fully cognizant of the crucial supporting role they play here, and that they will want to reassure, to an extent consistent with their own assessment of the relationship, the Afghan leadership that Taraki and his colleagues can count on Moscow’s backing on several fronts.

9. Increased Afghan-Soviet ties: The Afghans will also possibly seek the establishment of some sort of “official” tie between the CPSU and Kabul’s ruling PDPA. Taraki strongly alluded to this possible development in his November 27 speech to the PDPA Central Committee plenum when he said that during the Soviet [visit] the Afghans would “study and take decisions on the relations between the parties of the two countries” (septel).⁶ Taraki will also probably seek some sort of Soviet public endorsement of the DRA’s policies to date, undoubtedly including some nice words regarding the Afghan leadership’s performance. General Soviet expressions of support for the regime’s domestic policies and reform measures are probably the minimum the Afghans expect to emerge from the trip.

10. The potentially critical Soviet role in guaranteeing this regime’s security will unquestionably be high on the agenda of these talks, but we anticipate that the substance of these discussions will be closely held and that the issue may not arise in public statements or reports. Both parties may be content with the current magnitude of Soviet presence in Afghanistan (best estimates are that approximately 600 Soviet military advisors are serving here, while about 2,000 Soviet civilians are employed throughout the government’s bureaucracy), and that further augmentations are unnecessary to deal with the present level of Afghan needs.

11. Finally, the visit conceivably could produce a new bilateral treaty of some sort to replace the current 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression which was most recently extended for ten years at the time of Nikolai Podgorny’s visit here in December of 1975.⁷ Although both sides, especially the Soviets, could probably live with the legal status quo governing their relationship, the Khalqis may raise the subject because, in their minds, the 1931 treaty could represent a “relic” of the past, it does not commit Moscow to protect Afghanistan’s security in the event of aggression by some “foreign power,” and a new accord would constitute a dramatic symbol of the “new relationship” which the Afghan leadership is so eager to flaunt. The timing of this visit may find the Soviets in a treaty-signing mood, although for a number of reasons (e.g., reluctance to endorse too fully this particular leadership, concern about alarming unduly the other countries of South Asia—especially India, and a general hesitance to modify legal relationships unnecessarily) the issue, if in fact it is raised by the Afghans, may be quickly squelched.

12. Conclusions: Taraki’s first visit abroad as the leader of a revolutionary Afghan regime could produce results which would have far-reaching impact on this government’s ultimate survival and ability to deliver on many of its reforms and promises. The trip undoubtedly will be utilized to symbolize the new “special relationship” between the two countries, a relationship which has already gone well beyond the close ties developed under previous Afghan regimes. How far the Soviet leadership will go in meeting the genuine needs of Taraki and his colleagues remains to be seen, but we anticipate that Moscow will probably choose to err on the generous side, since this regime, and the type of revolution it represents, serves a number of Moscow’s ideological and security interests.

Dubs

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780502–0817. Confidential. This telegram repeated, for the Department’s information, the telegram of the same number sent December 5 to Moscow, and for information to Ankara, Islamabad, London, New Delhi, Peking, Tehran, and CINCPAC for POLAD. A copy of this telegram was also found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (1978).
2. The Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty, signed by Brezhnev and Taraki in Moscow, December 5, was reported in telegram 30123 from Moscow, December 7. The Embassy noted that the treaty covered “cooperation in the military, political, economic, scientific, and cultural fields” and committed both countries to “open-ended” consultations on security issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780504–0924) A Voice of America report, December 7, quoted Brezhnev’s speech at a Kremlin dinner for Taraki on the significance of the treaty: “The traditional good relations between our two countries have assumed, I would say, a qualitatively new character.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–47, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978)
3. In telegram 9145 from Kabul, November 15, the Embassy characterized the speech as “obsequious and effusive.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780471–0343)
4. In telegram 9531 from Kabul, December 3, the Embassy reported on Taraki’s November 27 speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780499–1007)
5. Telegram 8970 from Kabul is dated November 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780461–0225)
6. The Embassy commented futher on the November 27 speech in telegram 9616 from Kabul, December 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780504–0134)
7. In telegram 18473 from Moscow, December 29, 1975, the Embassy reported on Podgorny’s December 9–10 trip to Afghanistan, the main purpose of which was to renew the 1931 agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750449–0163)