32. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are a title page, cover page, map, and list entitled “The Afghan Cabinet Announced on 1 May 1978.”]
The Afghan Revolution After Six Months ([classification marking not declassified])
Key Judgments
President Taraki has consolidated his position in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and in the government. Foreign Minister Amin has emerged as the second most important person in the country.
Working through Amin, Taraki is attempting to control the military through the small minority of completely loyal officers. They may be in a position to keep him better informed than any of his predecessors about coup plotting.
Control of the military remains the key to Taraki’s survival. His government, like its predecessors, is weak, and his sudden overthrow by a small group of military officers cannot be completely discounted.
There is nothing to indicate that distrust of his government on religious grounds has abated. Tribal rebellions are spreading, and should antigovernment activity increase significantly, the willingness of the military to carry out the government’s orders could be seriously affected.
In foreign policy and their public statements the Afghan leaders have moved closer to the Moscow line. They have, however, done little to implement domestic programs that could be labeled Communist, presumably to avoid risking adverse popular reaction but also in part because they lack the resources to do so.
The degree, if any, to which Taraki is independent of the USSR has not so far been tested by significant differences between Moscow and Kabul. Taraki may believe he needs Soviet backing to survive and the Soviet role in Afghanistan continues to increase.
[Page 79]Taraki has not been able to allay Iran’s and Pakistan’s deep suspicions of his and Moscow’s intentions, and poor relations with both are likely to continue.2[classification marking not declassified]
[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 11, The Afghan Revolution After Six Months (An Intelligence Assessment). Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. According to a typed statement on the cover page, “the author of this paper is [name not declassified] South Asia Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis.”↩
- Highlights of the remainder of the report include CIA’s assessment that Taraki’s major achievement since taking power “may have been to survive;” that “there is no good evidence of a rift” between Amin and Taraki; “the degree to which Taraki has maintained his independence from Moscow is unclear, perhaps even to Taraki and the Soviets;” and “religious and tribal groups in Pakistan are aiding Afghan rebels, and Afghan dissidents are allowed to operate fairly openly in Pakistan, but at this time the Pakistani Government does not appear to be encouraging this activity.”↩