1. Forwarded herewith (Tab A) is a first cut of a covert action options paper
on Afghanistan, which outlines alternative programs of varying costs and
risks.
2. The Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, who has been advised of the
National Security Council’s interest in Afghanistan, is
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currently in the field, conferring with
concerned station chiefs regarding their capabilities to implement the
programs described in the attachment. We intend to draft a formal proposal
for submission to the Special Coordination Committee when he returns on 12
February. On the other hand, if a paper is desired more urgently, we can
solicit his views by cable and submit our proposal within the next few
days.2
3. You may have already noted State 014844 (Tab B), which reports a request
by the Afghan National Liberation Front for U.S. support of its activities against the Afghan regime:3 and Kabul 0528 (Tab C), which
warns that overt contact with Afghan dissidents would be harmful and
recommends that CIA therefore handle such
relationships. We are working with State on this.4
All portions of this document are SECRET.
Tab A
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency6
SUBJECT
- Some Covert Action Options in Afghanistan
Background:
On 27 April 1978 leftist military forces staged a successful coup in
Afghanistan, replacing the government of President Daoud with a Soviet-oriented
“Democratic Republic”. Prime Minister Taraki and other government leaders all are members of
the “People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan”, which is Soviet-style
communist party in a Stalinist mode. The new regime has placed a high
priority on consolidating its control of government organizations and
the armed forces, and has had considerable success in this. It has been
greatly aided by an influx of Soviet advisors who have been placed in
almost all departments of the government and throughout the armed
forces. The situation in the countryside is different. Afghan
governments traditionally have had little control in the rural, tribal
areas; this government is no exception. Its problems stem particularly
from its pro-Soviet, communist orientation, which offends many deeply
religious, conservative Afghans. Afghans tend to be nationalistic, and
many are conscious of, and resent, the growing dominance of the USSR in their affairs.
A tribal rebellion has been underway for several months in Afghanistan’s
eastern provinces, and the government is finding it increasingly
difficult to maintain public order in other outlying areas of the
country. Outside Afghanistan, emigre dissidents claim to have several
thousand trained fighters, including a few hundred former military
officers, in and around Peshawar and the Pakistan frontier. The
principal Afghan rebel group in this area is the Afghan National
Liberation Front (ANLF), although
there also are other significant groups which rival the ANLF. Thus far the Government of Pakistan
(GOP) has turned a blind eye to
this Afghan dissident activity. The rebels are reported to be receiving
support from individual Afghans living abroad, and also from Saudi
Arabian sources (The latter is not confirmed nor whether the alleged
support comes from private or official sources.).
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Assumption:
Afghanistan’s importance lies in the destabilizing effect its communist
government could have on the region—particularly on Pakistan. Further
afield, the Afghan situation is having an adverse psychological impact
on many Third World countries. It tends to bolster the thesis that the
Soviet way is the wave of the future, and that the U.S. will make no effort to stem Soviet
encroachments in the Middle East. Therefore, it is in the U.S. interest to have the Taraki Government fall and be replaced
by a non-communist regime. Currently the USG is seeking to influence Afghan policies by conventional
diplomatic means, including the continuation of AID programs. Our
ability to exercise economic and political leverage is limited, and
efforts to date have been largely successful. Conversely, given its
geographic proximity, existing close economic and military
relationships, and common political philosophy, the USSR has been able to move quickly to
consolidate and strengthen its already considerable influence.7 Nevertheless, an anti-communist coup d’etat
is still possible, and the Soviets would probably feel obliged to accept
such an event without resorting to military intervention, assuming it
was carried out quickly and decisively. On the other hand, a gradually
accelerated insurgency would carry a greater risk of countermeasures,
both overt and covert.
Our intelligence indicates the insurgency is going to continue, no matter
what position the U.S. adopts in respect
to it. We cannot at this time predict how it will develop, nor whether
it will succeed. But we do see it hurting the Taraki Government and, in particular,
having a divisive impact on the armed forces. The soldiers, mainly rural
draftees, are being required to use their weapons against their fellows
from the countryside. The officer corps, although purged of suspected
anti-Taraki elements, could
well become increasingly embarrassed and angry at being obliged to
impose an unpopular regime on their own people. A possible scenario: the
continuing insurgency would lead eventually to the active disaffection
of a sufficient number of officers into blaming the country’s problems
on Taraki, who would forcefully
overthrow his regime. Finally, there is the fatigue factor. The
Taraki Government is
narrowly based and thinly staffed. A sustained insurgency would
undoubtedly drain scarce managerial and leadership resources the
government can ill afford. While it is possible that the government will
fall very quickly (viz, in a lightning coup), it seems more likely that
Taraki will be overthrown as
a result of his continuing inability to deal with the insurgency. We
also believe that the Afghan
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rebels will need some outside assistance if they are to sustain the
insurgency at its present level. The USG could increase the prospects of the Taraki regime being overthrown through
a variety of covert action techniques, ranging from propaganda support
to clandestine arms supply. The risks to the U.S. would be largely dependent upon the type of techniques
adopted.
Covert Action Options:
(1) Generate a worldwide media campaign publicizing the regime’s
problems, exposing Taraki and
his colleagues as pawns of the Soviet Union. Condemn Taraki for attempting to force an
atheistic philosophy on a sincerely religious population, and for
violating their basic human rights. Such a campaign would be virtually
risk free, but probably would have little impact within Afghanistan
itself. It would, however, establish the groundwork for additional
CA proposals, including influencing
Saudi Arabian and other prospective donors of aid to the rebel
cause.
(2) Expand the above program to include radio broadcasts in Dari beamed
into Afghanistan from neighboring countries. This would almost certainly
require the cooperation of the Governments of Pakistan and/or Iran,
either of which might be difficult to secure. In the past the GOP has beamed propaganda into Afghanistan
from a radio station in Quetta. If relations between the two countries
deteriorate, the GOP might resume such
broadcasts. [less than 1 line not declassified]
shortwave broadcasts also reach Afghanistan, and we could explore the
possibility of putting our message on this medium.
(3) Encourage and assist Afghan rebel groups with representation outside
of Afghanistan to oppose the regime. CIA officers currently are in contact with a small number
of Afghan exiles who at this time are being exploited only for
intelligence collection purposes. Other potential exile leaders have
been identified and could be approached in due course. One of these is
an Afghan, long resident in the U.S.,
who already is believed by emigre leaders to have some form of secret
U.S. support. Some of these
individuals could be used as conduits of funds and material support to
rebel groups operating from the Peshawar area. We also might establish
connections with a member of the ruling family of Chitral, the Pakistan
princely state which lies just across the border from Nuristan where
most of the guerrilla activity is taking place. This could give us the
possibility of utilizing the natural smuggling routes through Chitral to
support the rebels directly, thus bypassing the emigres. Saudi Arabians,
who may have some connections with the dissidents, might be asked to
front for us in supporting the insurgency. Any proposed material
assistance to dissidents would have to be carefully weighed from the
policy standpoint. Aside from
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spending funds for intelligence collection, and supplying material aid
on humanitarian grounds (viz, medical supplies), selection of this
covert action option would indicate a clear-cut U.S. Government decision to attempt to overturn the current
Afghan Government.
Risk vs. Gain:
An intensified propaganda program against the Afghan regime, particularly
one which involved radio broadcasting, would come to Afghan and Soviet
attention. It might be blamed on the USG, or CIA in particular,
although it would technically remain nonattributable. However, in view
of the current volume of Soviet propaganda against the U.S., particularly with regard to
neighboring Iran, we doubt that Soviet reaction to such a program would
adversely affect U.S. interests in the
area. It would increase the hostility of the government towards
Americans in Afghanistan, but this is not a vital consideration. A
successful propaganda program would make the world more aware of the
nature of the Afghan regime, but it probably would do little to weaken
it. On the contrary, it might induce the government to tighten its grip
and become even more dependent upon the Soviets. Propaganda of the type
envisioned could provide marginal encouragement to the insurgents, but
overall would have little effect on them.
Although thus far we have refrained from doing so, we have the capability
to explore with Afghan exiles the possibility of joint action against
the regime. If, however, there is no intention to follow through, it
would be inadvisable to embark on such a course of action. Raising the
expectation of these exiles and then refraining from taking any action,
would do more harm than good.
GOP support, or at least quiet
acquiescence, would be almost essential for the success of any program
designed to assist the Peshawar-based rebels. Although we could smuggle
small quantities of material to them unilaterally, tacit GOP agreement would be required if larger
quantities are involved. We have one unconfirmed report that Saudi
sources are sending equipment to the rebels via Karachi, and that the
GOP has turned a blind eye to this.
If true, this suggests that should we become involved in a supply
program, we might consider working with the Saudis in view of the
influence they can bring to bear on the GOP.
There are several competing factions among the rebels. Some are royalist,
some are Islamic fundamentalist and some are both. If we elect to
support the dissidence, considerable care will be needed to ensure that
our aid gets to the proper place; that it is not squandered on political
infighting. We believe this is a manageable problem, because we should
be able to keep fairly close track of activity in the dissident movement
through a number of separate, compartmented sources.
